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POLICE DISCRETION AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN
PUBLIC PLACES: COURTS, COMMUNITIES, AND THE
NEW POLICING
DebraLivingston*
The advent of community and problem-oriented policing-the socalled "quality-of-life" policing philosophies-raisescomplex questions
concerningpolice discretion in addressingminor street misconduct and
judicial response to that discretion. In this Article, Debra Livingston
addresses these questions by reassessing the ways in which courts have
employed the facial vagueness doctrine to limit police discretion in the
performance of "ordermaintenance"tasks. Livingston contends that aggressive employment of the facial vagueness doctrine is an inadequate
mechanismfor limiting police discretionand at the same time could impairpositive change in the direction of community andproblem-oriented
policing. As an alternativeto the facial invalidation of reasonably specific public orderlaws, Livingston proposespoliticaland administrative
measures to managepolice discretion in the community policing era.
Livingston begins by examining the emergence of the new, more preventive policingwith itsfocus on amelioratingproblems of neighborhood
disorder. In communities that may elect to address quality-oflife concerns, she argues that police will sometimes need new legal authoritythus raisingthe question whether police can be granted the authority to
address minor street misconduct within current constitutional constraints. Livingston argues that some courts have extended the vagueness prohibition beyond its stated concern with indefinite laws that encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement to deal with the
broader issue of police discretion in order maintenance. She contends
that the invalidation of public order laws can never be an adequate
solution to the problem ofpolice discretionand that communities should
not be prevented from employing an amalgam of civil, criminal, and
administrative law to authorize police to perform order maintenance
tasks. Mhen these new public order laws are not facially aimed at rendering some people outsiders to the community, but are instead directed
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appreciate the many helpful comments that I received from participants in the Legal
Studies Workshop at the University of Virginia School of Law. Finally, I thank William
Savitt, Paul Rosenthal, Noah Levine, and especially Meredith Johnson for outstanding
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at setting behavioralstandardsin the interest of making a community's
public life possible, courts should not invalidate them.
As an alternative to courts' intervention, Livingston argues that
politicaland administrativemechanisms should be employed to manage
police discretion in the community policing era. The author argues, in
particular,for enhancing community-police reciprocity as a means of
helping to ensure that police discretion is exercisedfor the benefit of the
community. She arguesfor renewed attention to politicalcontrols on the
police andfor more neighborhoodinvolvement in the nomination ofpolicing problems. She suggests that police departmentsformulate guidelines to inform the exercise of police discretion. Finally, she argues that
internaland external monitoring mechanisms be used to obtain information from the community about the policingservices being provided and
the satisfaction of local residents with these services.
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INTRODUCTION

The tiny neighborhood around Orange Street in Norwalk,
California, lies only one mile south of Norwalk's City Hall and in the
heart of Los Angeles County. In the early 1990s, this modest community
of bungalow-style homes and aging apartment buildings was terrorized by
members of a local gang-the Orange Street Locos.' The City of
Norwalk charged in 1994 court papers that gang members-some residents of the neighborhood, some not-loitered there during all hours,
marking the neighborhood with graffiti, trespassing on private property,
urinating "wherever and whenever" they chose, and using drugs and alcohol in public places. 2 Gang members allegedly participated in four fire
bombings of neighborhood residences and frequently discharged weapons in the community. Property owners saw the value of their property
decline and were forced to incur expenses to repeatedly paint over gang
graffiti and repair other damage caused by vandalism. The City alleged
that residents had lost control of their homes and their neighborhood to
gang members who threatened retaliation against anyone perceived to be
cooperating with the police. Many residents, the City said, stayed inside
whenever possible, ceding public streets and common areas to gang
members and retreating to small homes and apartments where iron bars
3
covered many windows. Some residents simply moved away.
By the end of 1994, newspapers were reporting that most residents of
the twenty-square-block area around Orange Street felt that the situation
had greatly improved.4 Earlier that same year, the City of Norwalk filed a
lawsuit charging that the Orange Street Locos constituted a public nuisance. The City obtained a preliminary injunction restraining twenty-two
named gang members from engaging in a variety of legal and illegal behavior while in the neighborhood. They were enjoined from carrying
baseball bats, glass bottles, crow bars, and other potential weapons in
public, or remaining in the presence of anyone possessing a dangerous
1. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, City of
Norwalk v. Orange Street Locos, No. VC016746 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.July 21, 1994).
2. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order; Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary
Injunction at 2-5, Orange Street Locos (No. VC016746).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Duke Helfand, A Legal Turf Battle, LA. Times, Oct. 13, 1994, at B1.

554

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:551

weapon; from trespassing on private property or loitering on the premises of an unoccupied or abandoned building within the affected area;
from being present on the roof of any building-where gang members
allegedly acted as lookouts to avoid apprehension by police-or climbing
over any fence, in the absence of an emergency; and from blocking public thoroughfares. 5 The injunction imposed a 10:00 P.M.-to-sunrse curfew
on gang members younger than 18 and a midnight-to-sunrise curfew on
adult members-forbidding the named individuals from being in a public place within the twenty-square-block area during these hours, unless
an exception to the curfew applied. The injunction further forbade damaging or vandalizing the property of others, littering, urinating in public,6
or possessing any graffiti tool in a public place within the neighborhood.
Violations of the injunction, which is still in place, carry penalties of up to
six months in jail and a $1000 fine. 7 Few have actually been prosecuted
for violating the injunction, s but the number of calls made to police by
residents of the neighborhood dropped dramatically soon after the injunction was served.9
The use of civil injunctions to abate gang activity as a public nuisance
is a new policing and prosecutorial technique that has been employed
principally in California and that has received the recent endorsement of
the California Supreme Court.' 0 California municipalities, however, are
by no means the only jurisdictions that have recently experimented with
5. See City of Norwalk v. Orange Street Locos, No. VC016746 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction).
6. See id. at 3.
7. See Cal. Penal Code § 166(a) (4) (West 1988) (providing that wilful disobedience
of court order is misdemeanor); id. § 19 (providing punishment for misdemeanor); Maura
Dolan & Alan Abrahamson, State High Court Allows Injunctions to Restrict Gangs, L.
Times,Jan. 31, 1997, at Al (noting that Norwalk injunction has been in effect since 1994).
8. Five members of the Orange Street Locos were cited for violating the injunction
during its first 10 months of operation. See Bill Kisliuk, A Bike Ride That Ended at the
Police Station, RecorderJuly 11, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
9. See id; Seth Mydans, New Anti-Gang Weapon Bars Everyday Conduct, N.Y. Times,
June 11, 1995, at Al.
10. In People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), the Supreme Court of
California determined that California public nuisance law affords California courts the
authority to enjoin gang-related conduct when a gang's activities in a particular
neighborhood constitute a public nuisance. Under California law, a public nuisance must
affect an entire community, neighborhood, or a considerable number of persons. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 3480 (West 1970). A nuisance must be both a substantial and unreasonable
interference with collective social interests, but can constitute anything that is,
injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property, or unlawfully obstruct[ ] the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of... any public park, square, street, or highway.
Acuna, 929 P.2d at 604 (citing California law). The California Supreme Court rejected
various constitutional challenges to provisions of a preliminary injunction entered against
named members of a gang that had claimed a four-square-block neighborhood in SanJose
as its turf, noting that the State had not only the authority to assist communities in the
maintenance of livable social environments, "but an obligation to do so." Id. at 603.
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often hotly debated policing strategies aimed loosely at addressing concerns about the quality of life in public spaces. Mayor Marion Barry cited
the need to overcome a "culture of fear and violence" in July 1995 when
he signed into law a juvenile curfew in Washington, D.C., thus briefly
adding Washington, in the period prior to that law's subsequent invalidadon, to the list of approximately 150 major American cities that have
adopted juvenile curfews of one sort or another.'" In 1992, the Chicago
City Council enacted a gang loitering ordinance that was used to make
over 40,000 arrests and to disperse some 40,000 others before it was
struck down by an appellate court in December 1995; the ordinance and
police regulations guiding its enforcement authorized police to order any
group of two or more people tarrying in designated public places to move
along on pain of arrest, so long as at least one of the group was reasonably believed to be a member of a criminal street gang.' 2 Many other
jurisdictions have recently enacted ordinances prohibiting loitering for
particular purposes, such as drug dealing or prostitution.' 3 Still others11. See MichaelJanofsky, Teen-Agers in Washington Face New Curfew, N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1995, atA16; Toni Locy, D.C. Curfew Overturned in Federal Court, Wash. Post, Oct.
30, 1996, at Al. A recent study concluded that "use of curfews as a means to control
delinquency and reduce juvenile victimization is the norm in major American cities."
William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynolds, Curfews and Delinquency in Major American
Cities, 41 Crime & Delinq. 347, 353 (1995). Curfew ordinances exist in 77% of American
cities with 1992 populations of 200,000 or more, and half of all such cities either enacted
new curfews or revised existing curfews between the years 1990 and 1994. See id; see also
Lawrence W. Sherman, The Police, in Crime 327, 342-43 (James Q. Wilson & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1995) (noting that curfews have become widespread in the 1990s, with 100
New Jersey communities adopting them in 1993 alone).
12. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (1995), reh'g granted, 664 N.E.2d
639 (1996) (citing provisions of ordinance and invalidating it as violative of, inter alia, the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Michael Gillis & Fran Spielman,
City's Loitering Law Ruled Unconstitutional, Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 19, 1995, at 3
(noting that Chicago ordinance, approved by the City Council in 1992, was used to arrest
41,740 people and to disperse 43,457 before its invalidation in 1995).
13. See, e.g., Anna Cearley, After 4Years of Loiter Ban, City Says Drug Crime is Down,
San Diego Union-Tribune, Jan. 22, 1994, at B8 (authorities report decline in street-comer
drug sales in Monrovia, California since adoption of anti-drug loitering ordinance in
1990);John Gallant, City Council Oks Drug Loitering Law, Las Vegas Review-Journal, May
19, 1994, at 1B (noting passage by Las Vegas City Council of drug loitering law); Kimberly
Garcia, Ordinance Aims to End Drug Deals, Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 28, 1994, at 1A,
available in 1994 WL 8289040 (noting 1994 passage of drug loitering statute in
Milwaukee); Philip J. aVelle, San Diego Enacts Two Anti-Crime Ordinances, San Diego
Union-Tribune, Nov. 9, 1993, at B1 (citing 1993 passage of anti-drug loitering statute in
San Diego); John P. Lines, Anti-Drug Loitering Law Backed, Intelligencer J. (Lancaster,
Pa.), Nov. 1, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 7078386 (drug loitering ordinance enacted
in 1993 praised during public review before Lancaster City Council 18 months later);John
Rivera, Loitering Bill with $1,000 Fine Targets Brooklyn Park Prostitution, Baltimore Sun,
Jan. 4, 1994, at 3B, available in 1994 WL 6940296 (reporting 1994 enactment of antiloitering bill to discourage prostitution in Baltimore's Brooklyn Park); Renate Robey,
Aurora Council Passes Anti-Drug Loitering Law, Denver Post, May 19, 1993, at 1B (1993
passage of drug loitering law in Aurora, Colorado); Pierre Thomas, Alexandria AntiLoitering Ordinance Takes Another Test Flight, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1991, at C12 (noting
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hailing "quality of life enforcement" as an essential part of both crime
control and fear reduction in American communities-have either
passed or started enforcing ordinances prohibiting things like aggressive
panhandling, unlicensed street vending, graffiti scrawling, public drinking and urinating, and loitering in the vicinity of automated teller
4
machines.1
Some of these new laws and enforcement measures have attracted
attention from legal commentators. The widespread revival of juvenile
curfews, for instance, has prompted reexamination of the legal standards
governing judicial review of curfews and reassessment of the practical efficacy of curfews in reducing juvenile violence and protecting young
people from crime on the streets. 15 Police enforcement of laws restrict1991 enactment of drug loitering ordinance by Alexandria, Virginia City Council); Mike
Todd, Council Passes New Law Against Loitering, Austin American-Statesman, Feb. 4,
1994, at B3, available in 1994 WL 3945343 (reporting 1994 passage of anti-drug and antiprostitution loitering ordinances in Austin, Texas).
14. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Efforts on Quality of Life in Village a Success, the Police
Say, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1994, at BI (noting increased summonses in Greenwich Village
for minor offenses like graffiti vandalism and unlicensed vending); Steve Miletich,
Sidewalk Law is Posted, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 19, 1994, at Al (discussing
enforcement of Seattle anti-camping and public urination ordinances); Michael Ybarra,
Don't Ask, Don't Beg, Don't Sit, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1996, § 4, at 5 (noting that cities
"from Alexandria, Va. and Akron, Ohio to Berkeley, Calif. have put limits on where and
how people are allowed to beg"). See generally City of New York Police Dep't, Police
Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York (1994) (outlining New York City
Police Department strategy for ameliorating disorderly conditions); National Law Ctr. on
Homelessness and Poverty, No Homeless People Allowed (1994) (discussing antipanhandling and related measures in cities across country) [hereinafter No Homeless
People Allowed]; Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 Yale LJ. 1165, 1168, 1217-19
(1996) (describing "unprecedented level of legislative and judicial attention" to issues of
public order in 1990s and predicting that cities will continue to adopt ordinances
"authoriz[ing] their police forces to curb street misconduct") (quoted material at 1165,
1168).
15. See, e.g., Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial
Review ofJuvenile Curfew Ordinances, 24 Colum.J.L. & Soc. Probs. 381 (1991); Craig M.
Johnson, Comment, It's Ten O'Clock: Do You Know Where Your Children Are? Qutb v.
Strauss and the Constitutionality of juvenile Curfews, 69 St. John's L. Rev. 327 (1995);
Note, Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1693
(1994); Kevin C. Siebert, Note, Nocturnal juvenile Curfew Ordinances: The Fifth Circuit
"Narrowly Tailors" a Dallas Ordinance, but Will Similar Ordinances Encounter the Same
Interpretation?, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1711 (1995). Though President Clinton recently
endorsed the use ofjuvenile curfews, now in effect in nearly three-quarters of the nation's
largest cities, see Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Backs Plan to Deter Youthful Violence, N.Y.
Times, May 31, 1996, at A20,police managers warn that youth curfews are often a "quickfix" solution to concerns about community violence because police departments are rarely
afforded additional resources to enforce them. See Robert Hanley, Authorities Turn to
Curfews to Clear the Streets of Teen-Agers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1993, at B1; accord,
Sherman, supra note 11, at 342-43. There is little empirical research on the costs and
benefits of such ordinances. See Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 361. But see U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, Curfew- An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency and Victimization?, Juvenile
Justice Bulletin, Apr. 1996, at 3-9 (assessing curfew programs in seven communities and
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ing or prohibiting activities like panhandling, sleeping in streets and
parks, and even public urination has likewise been the subject of critical
scrutiny, at least to the extent that such enforcement seems aimed at banishing homeless populations, rather than at assisting neighborhoods in
16
maintaining a sometimes tenuous sense of public order.

On the whole, however, legal scholars have paid inadequate atten-

tion to the reermergence of statutes, ordinances, and law enforcement
measures aimed at public conduct and, more broadly, the quality of life
in public spaces. 17 Moreover, they have virtually ignored the implications

of this new focus on quality-of-life concerns for a subject that it profoundly affects-namely, the scope of police discretion in street en-

counters. This inattention is surprising. After all, the aspiration to constrain police discretion on the street was in large part what prompted

legal scholars over thirty years ago to mount a constitutional attack on the
vagueness that characterized broadly-worded vagrancy, loitering, breach

of peace, and disorderly conduct statutes and ordinances. This scholarly
attack helped prompt the judicial invalidation of many such laws and left

police departments with considerably less authority to intervene in streetorder problems than citizens often assumed to be the case.18 In addition,
concluding preliminarily that "comprehensive, community-based juvenile curfew
programs," especially when they provide assistance to youth and families with underlying
problems, can help to reduce delinquency and juvenile victimization).
16. See, e.g., No Homeless People Allowed, supra note 14, at 2; Christine L. Bella &
David L. Lopez, Quality of Life-At What Price?: Constitutional Challenges to Laws
Adversely Impacting the Homeless, 10 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 89 (1994); Harry
Simon, Towns Without Pity A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to
Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (1992);Juliette Smith,
Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson
Doctrine, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 293 (1996). For a thoughtful discussion of how
liberal principles can translate into a very concrete concern about the enforcement of
general statutes and ordinances against the homeless, see Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights
309-38 (1993).
17. For one notable exception, see Ellickson, supra note 14. For articles addressed at
specific aspects of public order, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the
Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1993); Robert Teir, Maintaining
Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54
La. L. Rev. 285 (1993). Though legal scholars generally have paid little recent attention to
the problem of public order and its policing, First Amendment commentators have
produced an extensive literature on freedom of speech in public spaces, most recently
assessing ordinances passed in the 1990s that regulate panhandling. See, e.g., Helen
Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ- The First Amendment and the Right to
Beg, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 896 (1991); Fay Leoussis, The New Constitutional Right to Beg-Is
Begging Really Protected Speech?, 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 529 (1995); Cynthia R.
Mabry, Brother Can You Spare Some Change?-And Your Privacy Too?: Avoiding a Fatal
Collision Between Public Interests and Beggars' First Amendment Rights, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev.
309 (1994); Jonathan Mallamud, Begging and the First Amendment, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 215
(1995); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the
Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 255 (1994).
18. See Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing 134 (1990) (noting that
authority of police to deal with public order problems is less clear than citizens often
assume).
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courts have reached conflicting results in several recent cases assessing
facial vagueness challenges to the efforts of legislatures and city councils
to fashion new forms of police authority to deal with neighborhood
problems-from the drug dealers who loiter on neighborhood comers to
the noisemakers who disrupt the quiet of residential streets. 19 These conflicting results should be of interest to legal scholars because they suggest
confusion about the role of facial invalidation in constraining the potential for arbitrary police enforcement.
Legal scholars' relative inattention to police activities directed at promoting the "quality of life" in public spaces stands in stark contrast to the
significant attention recently paid this subject by criminologists and police scholars. The ongoing transformation in the philosophy of American
policing, from professional policing to community and problem-oriented
policing, will likely continue to fuel interest, among these scholars, in the
"order maintenance" activities of police.20 Such activities are aimed at
preserving what might be termed the "neighborhood commons": both
tangible community resources like parks, streets, playgrounds, parking
lots, and libraries, and the associated intangible interactions among
people, both organized and spontaneous, that take place around these
resources. 2 1 Proponents of these new policing strategies have increasingly asserted, as did Jane Jacobs over thirty years ago, that preservation
of the neighborhood commons is essential to the vitality and well-being of
American cities. 22 Jacobs contended that in vibrant neighborhoods, the
peace and safety of public spaces are kept not primarily by the police, but
19. See, e.g., E.L. v. State, 619 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 1993) (invalidating for vagueness
and overbreadth an ordinance making it a crime "to loiter in or near any thoroughfare,
place open to the public, or near any public or private place in a manner and under
circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in drug-related activities"); City of
Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (sustaining constitutionality of
similar ordinance).

20. James Q. Wilson has provided the classic definitions of "order maintenance" and

"peacekeeping," which need not be distinguished from each other for the purposes of this

Article. Both consist of police efforts directed at securing the "absence of disorder' in
public places. "Disorder" refers to the persistence of conditions or behavior that either
"disturbs or threatens to disturb the public peace or that involves face-to-face conflict
among two or more persons." James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior 16 (1968).
Order maintenance and peacekeeping are distinguished from law enforcement in that

"the goal of the latter is to enforce the law rather than to maintain a pattern of public
order." AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law

Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1984,
at 83, 84 n.3 (citing Wilson, supra, at 16). In practice, however, the distinction is somewhat
murky because police commonly use law enforcement as a means to maintain order in

public places, though they also rely heavily upon informal methods to resolve public order
problems. See Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society 28 (1977).

21. I am grateful to Bradley Karkkainen for the concept of the neighborhood
commons. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning- A Reply to the Critics, 10J. Land Use &
Envti. L 45, 68-69 (1994); see also Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1174 (discussing "tragedy of
the agora" that arises from disorder in public spaces).

22. See JaneJacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 29-54 (1961).
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by "an intimate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and
standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people
themselves." 23 Proponents of community and problem-oriented policing
do not disagree, but they have also modestly concluded that some
disorder problems can effectively be handled by either defining behavior
newly subject to criminal prosecution, or otherwise invoking police auto deal with problems without resort to the criminal justice systhority
tem. 2 4 These proponents argue, in addition, that police intervention of
this type may be critically important both to enhance citizens' quality of
life in public places and to shore up the sense of security in those neighborhoods "where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable,
25
where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people.1
For legal scholars, this new focus on addressing concerns with the
quality of life in public places raises anew the tension between traditional
rule of law concepts and the order maintenance activities of police. Police intervention to address neighborhood disorder is different, in kind,
from the straightforward investigation, arrest, and prosecution of those
who have committed serious crimes. First, problems of disorder stem not
so much from isolated behaviors as from the coming together of certain
conditions: the congruence of behavior, its location and circumstances,
its frequency, its intent, and others' reactions.2 6 The behavior appropriate in a St. Patrick's Day parade may thus be disruptive on a quiet, residential street. And while a single person loitering on a street comer is
unlikely to threaten neighborhood life, a street on which many loiter to
complete drug transactions, even apart from their success, is likely to experience decline-to be seen by many as a place where children should
not play, and where those with adequate resources should choose not to
live.2 7 But can the police be authorized to intervene on such a street by

dispersing or arresting those loiterers seemingly intent upon the narcotics trade? And can they be trusted to identify those contexts in which
intervention is appropriate-that is, to distinguish the quiet residential
Sunday morning from St. Patrick's Day on Main Street? Second, police
23. Id. at 31-32.

24. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 18, at 128-31, 134-35; Herman Goldstein,
Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 Crime & Delinq. 236, 253 (1979)

[hereinafter Improving Policing]; see also Mark H. Moore &George L. Kelling, "To Serve
and Protect": Learning from Police History, Pub. Interest, Winter 1983, at 49, 61 (arguing

for increased attention to police obligation to maintain public order).
25. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly, Mar.

1982, at 29, 38.
26. See Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline 163-64 (1990); see also George L

Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order The Community and the Police, 33 Crime &Delinq.
90, 95 (1987) (noting that public disorder is condition "resulting from behavior that,
depending on location, time, and local traditions, is offensive in its violation of local
expectations for normalcy and peace in a community").
27. Cf. Kelling, supra note 26, at 94 ("One prostitute or one person drinking on the

street may not create disorder in any community; two prostitutes or drunks may. Every
community has perceptual thresholds that when approached threaten basic order.").
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intervention to address neighborhood order is often invisible to formal
legal processes, since intervention often begins-and ends-with an admonition to "knock it off' or requests to "quiet down" or "move along."
Should police intervene in this way? Should they intervene except by employing their resources to enforce laws against serious crime? Acknowledging the ambiguous character of neighborhood order, the resulting
difficulty in framing legal rules to prohibit behavior threatening it, and
the defeasibility that characterizes the enforcement of such rules, police
scholars James Q. Wilson and George Kelling provocatively put what may
be the ultimate question for legal scholars, a question frankly posed by
the new focus on quality-of-life concerns that is part of community and
problem-oriented policing: "Should police activity on the street be
standards of the neighborhood rather
shaped, in important ways, by the
28
than by the rules of the state?"
This Article begins the task of addressing these complicated questions through a reassessment of the ways in which courts have confronted
the tension between the order maintenance activities of police and rule
of law concerns. Public order laws can potentially implicate a tangle of
constitutional doctrines, from explicit First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendment concerns, for instance, to the unenumerated rights to travel
and privacy. 29 This Article, however, will focus on the ways in which
courts have employed the void-for-vagueness doctrine to mediate this tension through the facial invalidation of such laws. The problem of police
discretion in the enforcement of laws regulating minor forms of street
misconduct most directly implicates the vagueness doctrine and its stated
concern with indefinite laws that encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. A close examination of courts' invocation of this doctrine
thus casts light on the broader question of how police discretion can be
appropriately constrained as communities enlist police assistance to preserve the quality of life in local neighborhoods. Such an examination can
also clarify the choices that many communities now face among various
ways in which police might be granted authority to address problems of
public disorder: whether in civil or criminal law, for instance, and
whether in general ordinances or through use of civil injunctions.
The Article's overall argument is simply stated. Contrary to the implications of some scholarship in the police literature, the police cannot
perform substantial order maintenance tasks without legal authority. At
the same time, the many new laws addressing problems of public
disorder, even those laws that are far more specific than ones struck down
in the 1960s and 1970s, raise many of the same concerns that led courts
of that period to invalidate public order laws for vagueness. Courts have
thus been tempted to invoke the open texture of vagueness review to
28. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 34.
29. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (assessing
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to City of Miami's
enforcement of ordinances against the homeless).
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facially invalidate even reasonably specific public order laws-a temptation that, when not resisted, retards positive changes in American policing. While it plays an important role in pruning the legal code of outright delegations of authority to police to maintain public order as they
deem appropriate, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself an inadequate
and even potentially destructive mechanism for constraining police discretion in the performance of order maintenance tasks. Courts cannot
"solve" the problem of police discretion by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws-as some have attempted-without seriously impairing legitimate community efforts to enhance the quality of neighborhood life. Nevertheless, because the recent legislative trend does raise
many of the same concerns that led courts of the 1960s and 1970s to
invalidate vague laws, there is a need for renewed focus upon those political, administrative, and other "subconstitutional" controls that might assist in constraining arbitrary police enforcement.3 0 The philosophies of
community and problem-oriented policing posit a new way of thinking
about police and about the exercise of police discretion that themselves
suggest ways in which these controls might work.
Part I of this Article examines the emergence of community and
problem-oriented policing, the central ideas contained in these new policing theories, and the interest that these theories have engendered in
the role that police might play in ameliorating problems of neighborhood disorder. This close examination is necessary for several reasons.
First, this examination helps make the case that laws regulating minor
street misconduct are important-a case that has not been a standard
part of the legal literature. Second, by starkly illuminating the significance of the order maintenance task, this examination sets the stage for
the argument, in Part II, that aggressive employment of the facial vagueness doctrine is an inappropriate mechanism for controlling police discretion in the enforcement of reasonably specified public order laws.
The theories of community and problem-oriented policing also inform
the discussion in Part III of the direction in which subconstitutional controls might helpfully develop.
Part II begins by reassessing the legal transformation that resulted in
the invalidation of many public order laws in the 1960s and 1970s. This
Part next examines the ways in which courts in subsequent decades have
employed the facial vagueness doctrine in the review of public order laws.
Here, the Article argues that some courts have extended the vagueness
prohibition beyond its stated concern with indefinite laws that encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement to deal with the broader issue
of police discretion in the regulation of street behavior. The resulting
confused pattern of decisions reveals profound judicial ambivalence
about the inevitable discretion that police employ in performing order
30. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 380 (1974) (noting "greatAmerican vacuum" of subconstitutional controls upon

police practices).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:551

maintenance tasks. This Part argues that when public order laws are not
facially aimed at rendering some people outsiders to the community, but
instead at articulating the behavioral standards that make a community's
public life possible, courts should not invalidate them. Aggressive employment of the facial vagueness doctrine could impair positive change in
the direction of community and problem-oriented policing. At the same
time, the mere invalidation of public order laws can never be an adequate
solution to the problem of police discretion in this context. The constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s are not inconsistent with today's
community and problem-oriented policing strategies. These constitutional reforms, however, did not-and could not-resolve the problem of
police discretion in order maintenance. The extension of these constitutional reforms similarly cannot resolve this problem, except at substantial
cost to communities' ability to enlist police assistance in enhancing the
quality of neighborhood life.
Part III argues that ideas contained within the philosophies of community and problem-oriented policing-particularly those ideas suggesting the need for greater reciprocity between police and communities-may themselves imply ways in which police discretion in quality-oflife enforcement can be made more firmly subject to meaningful democratic control. This Part makes a case for enhancing community-police
reciprocity through renewed focus on those long neglected political and
administrative controls upon police practices, as exercised by responsible
mayors, legislatures and city councils, civilian oversight boards, and police
departments themselves, among others. The Part concludes with a brief
reassessment of the ways in which courts might employ the vagueness
doctrine in the review of public order laws.
I. POLICE, COMMUNITY, AND NEIGHBORHOOD ORDER

The emergence of community and problem-oriented policing-what
one scholar has termed the "quiet revolution" in American policing philosophy 3l-sets the stage for this examination of quality-of-life policing
and the legal framework surrounding such policing. The philosophies of
community and problem-oriented policing may fundamentally change
the character of modem American policing or they may fade, as fads that
have been oversold.3 2 There are nevertheless good reasons for beginning
31. George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, Persp. on
Policing (National Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Washington, D.C.)June 1988, at 1.
32. CompareJerome H. Skolnick & David H. Bayley, The New Blue Line 212 (1986)
(terming community policing the "wave of the future"), with Samuel Walker, Putting
Justice Back into CriminalJustice: Notes for a Liberal CriminalJustice Policy, in Criminal
Justice: Law & Politics 503, 512 (George F. Cole ed., 1993) (noting that the "juryis still
out on community policing"); see also Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community
Policing, in Community Policing- Rhetoric or Reality 239, 240 (ack R. Greene & Stephen
D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (arguing that community policing is best understood "as the
latest in a fairly long tradition of circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and
legitimate police distribution of nonnegotiably coercive force").
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with an account of the move, within American policing and in public
debate about policing, from a philosophy dominated by notions of police
professionalism to one increasingly marked by ideas of community-police
reciprocity.
First, whatever the verdict of history on the move to community and
problem-oriented policing, this move has already sparked widespread debate and experimentation within police departments concerning the
proper allocation of police resources. "The direction of change in policing," said police scholar Herman Goldstein in 1987, "has turned an important corner."3 3 Those on the cutting edge, he said, are experimenting
with new forms of policing in which police are a visible presence in communities, oriented toward crime prevention and problem-solving, and
working toward partnership with communities.34 While the direction, rapidity, profundity, and permanence of change, George Kelling and Mark
Moore said a few years later, may be the subject of scholarly debate, polic35
ing in the United States, they concluded, "is changing."
These changes are important and interesting in their own right.
They have also refocused attention on problems of neighborhood
disorder in ways particularly important for courts and legal scholars to
consider. Proponents of these policing theories have increasingly
stressed the importance of police efforts directed at enhancing the quality of life in public places. Some have even posited a direct link between
crime and disorder, contending that the failure of police to address
neighborhood problems like vandalism, fire-damaged buildings, public
drunkenness, littering, and loitering may well "launch community careers
in crime that eventuate in high serious-crime rates. '36 These scholars'
arguments are worth detailed examination because they challenge an implicit assumption in much legal scholarship of the last thirty years:
namely, that police might best legitimate their role, limit their intrusion,
and at the same time secure the public peace by focusing upon serious
37
crime.
Next-and more important-community and problem-oriented policing theorists have also developed a sophisticated argument about the
role that community support and community-police partnership should
33. Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic
Requirements, and Threshold Questions, 33 Crime & Delinq. 6, 6 (1987).
34. See id. at 6-10.
35. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to Community:
The Evolving Strategy of Police, in Community Policing Rhetoric or Reality, supra note
32, at 3; see also Stephen D. Mastrofski, Community Policing as Reform: A Cautionary
Tale, in Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, supra note 32, at 47, 67 (noting policing
change).
36. Reiss, supra note 20, at 111.
37. See Moore &Kelling, supra note 24, at 60 (charging that historical focus of police
on serious crimes has been encouraged by legal scholars "who think the enduring social

interest in non-intrusive and fair policing can best be served by focusing attention on a few
serious and visible crimes").
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play in addressing problems of neighborhood disorder. In community
policing, the community, rather than police professionalism and the law,
becomes a principal source of legitimation for many police efforts directed at ameliorating disorderly conditions.3 8 The police look to the
community in formulating police initiatives; broad authorization, at the
neighborhood level, is deemed essential to involving the police significantly in efforts to lessen disorder problems.3 9 Community and problemoriented policing thus suggest a new way of thinking about police discretion in order maintenance-a way of thinking that has implications for
the manner in which courts and legal scholars have traditionally conceived of the problem.
Finally, whatever the future of community policing itself, the new
focus on problems of disorder that is part of community policing will
lead-as it already has led-to more contention over the proper bounds
of police authority. But traditional criminal law and procedure scholarship does little to illuminate-much less mediate-the virtual standoff
between civil libertarians and "law and order" advocates on the subject of
order maintenance. It is the thesis here that recent scholarship about the
police can shed new light on the confusion that has characterized the
legal system's attempt to define the proper limits of police authority in
quality-of-life enforcement. Situated in the realities of policing and based
upon a nuanced understanding of the order maintenance task, this social
scientific scholarship may also help clarify a question only recently raised
in the legal literature: whether community policing is at all consistent
40
with our commitment to the rule of law.

The theories of community and problem-oriented policing are based
upon a fundamental reassessment of the purposes, strategies, and bases
of legitimacy of modem policing. 4 ' To understand these theoretical developments thus requires a somewhat extended discussion of both the
historical emergence of the community policing phenomenon and the
ideas contained within community and problem-oriented policing. This
Part, then, will first consider the historical and ideological roots of the
new policing philosophies before examining the new focus on the policing of public order that has become part of the new philosophies.

38. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 19-20.
39. See Jerome H. Skolnick & David H. Bayley, Community Policing: Issues and

Practices Around the World 11-12 (1988) (order maintenance activities fit within theory of
community policing and properly broaden police role to include "the development of

liveable communities," provided that such activities are "a knowledgeable response to
disorder problems that trouble a neighborhood, reflecting the wishes of the majority").

40. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1076 (1995).
41. See Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-solving and Community Policing, in Modem
Policing, 99, 119-20 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992).
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A. From Crisis to Community
1. Emergence of the New Policing Theories. -

Community policing has

become fashionable, some scholars say, "not because it has been proved
to work," but because the policing strategies that preceded it have been

shown to fail.4 2 George Kelling and Mark Moore have provided a useful
categorization of police history that portrays the emergence of community policing as a result of perceived inadequacies in the ideas associated
with what they term the "reform era" in American policing-a period

that they posit to have extended roughly from shortly after the turn of the
century into the 1970s. 43 This Part draws principally upon their account
to summarize the historical development of both community policing
and the closely associated theory of problem-oriented policing.
Before the advent of the reform era, nineteenth-century municipal
police were so tied to local politics-to ward politicians and local political
leaders-that historians have dubbed these early police "adjuncts to local
political machines." 44 Beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, reformers sought to insulate the police from the
corrupting effects of local politics. Civil service systems were introduced
to lessen ward influence over the hiring and firing of officers.4 5 Police
42. Jerome H. Skolnick &JamesJ. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use
of Force 251 (1993); see also Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 24 (arguing that risks
attending implementation of community policing reforms "are not as great as attempting
to maintain a strategy that failed on its own terms during the 1960s and 1970s").
43. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 9-17.
44. Id. at 7; see also Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police 22 (1977) (political machines
at end of nineteenth century exerted profound influence over urban police structure,
personnel, and function); Samuel Walker, The Police in America 7-11 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter The Police in America] ("Politics influenced every aspect of American
policing in the nineteenth century. Inefficiency, corruption, and lack of professionalism
were the chief results.") (quoted material at 8). Though formally engaged in law
enforcement, police at the turn of the century "were little oriented toward legal norms,"
but relied on strong bonds to "local politics, neighborhood institutions, and ethnic
communities" as a basis for authority and support. Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of
Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, 10 L. & Soc'y Rev. 303-08 (1976) (quoted material
at 303, 308); see also W. R. Miller, Police Authority in London and New York City
1830-1870,J. Soc. Hist., Winter 1975, at 81, 85 (during nineteenth century, New York City
police officer derived authority from "closeness to the citizens and their informal
expectations of his power instead of formal bureaucratic or legal standards"). Political
machines "recruited and maintained police in office" and the police, in turn, helped
political candidates by rounding up voters, discouraging or harassing the opposition, and
even, on occasion, by "assisting in rigging elections." Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 7.
Police enforcement not surprisingly tended to reflect the predilections of police patrons
and constituents: "undesirables" were prone to harassment while the police overlooked
the enforcement of laws that ran counter to the mores of dominant groups. See Samuel
Walker, "Broken Windows" and Fractured History, in The Police & Society 53, 61 (Victor
E. Kappeler ed., 1995) [hereinafter "Broken Windows" and Fractured History].
45. See Charles R. Swanson et al., Police Administration: Structures, Processes and
Behavior 5-6 (3d ed. 1993). Civil service systems were implemented with the design of
"eliminat[ing] patronage and ward influences in hiring and firing policing officers."
Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 10. Turnover in early American police departments
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chiefs began to centralize command and control within the police organization, sometimes drawing on military analogies to justify the centralized
command with which they sought to wrest control of local precincts from
ward bosses. 46 Law-especially criminal law-and police professionalism
first rivaled and then eclipsed the role earlier played 47by close neighborhood or political ties in legitimating police authority.
These significant changes during the reform era-the move toward
greater autonomy of the police organization, centralized control within
it, and the evolution in the grounds of police legitimacy-are key to understanding the current movement toward community and problemoriented policing. The reform era's legacy, after all, is the police department characteristic of recent times: a department that is formally hierarchical and quasi-military; in which police managers, "in the interests of
ensuring impartiality and avoiding corruption," promote distance between the police and communities, sometimes even prohibiting officers
from talking to citizens except in the line of duty; 48 and in which "it is

taken for granted that the most important responsibility of the police is to
control crime and that the most powerful instrument for achieving that
objective is to make arrests under the criminal law."49 The reform era,
however, also brought change to American policing in other important
areas.
First, as the police organization grew in autonomy during the reform
period and as the grounds of its legitimacy changed, the character of the
police mission also evolved. In the nineteenth century, the police performed a large number of social service and constabulary functions.
They ran soup kitchens and disciplined young people for harmful but
non-criminal behavior; they maintained order in public places, preventing public alcohol use, for instance; they also provided temporary lodging
often resulted from local political elections: "When a local ward leader or alderman got
dumped, the patronage police he appointed got dumped too." Carl Klockars, The Idea of
Police 43 (1985). The National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement,
popularly known as the Wickersham Commission, was created by President Herbert
Hoover in 1929 to study and report on the American criminal justice system. Civil service
classification was "central" to the commission's suggested reforms of the police
organization. See Swanson et al., supra, at 6.
46. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 14. The organizational form favored
by the police reformers was premised on the scientific or classical theory of Frederick
Taylor. Reformers sought to routinize and standardize police work and to centralize
control in the chief's office. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 11-12. Until the
reform era, police chiefs had exercised little real control over their departments, in some
cases lacking the authority even to fire individual officers. See Klockars, supra note 45, at
43.
47. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 10-11.
48. Mark H. Moore & Robert C. Trojanowicz, Corporate Strategies for Policing, Persp.
on Policing (National Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1988,
at 6; see Goldstein, supra note 18, at 22 (recounting rules prohibiting unnecessary talking
with citizens).
49. Moore, supra note 41, at 99, 108.
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for recent immigrants. 50 During the reform era, however, the police
mandate focused more and more narrowly on crime control and the police retreated from the routine provision of social services. 5 1 Although
peacekeeping and order maintenance were still a large part of the police
officer's day-to-day activities, 5 2 police departments, founding their legitimacy in the criminal law and in professional law enforcement, began to
measure their performance by reference to crime statistics: by growth
and decline in the rate of serious crimes, as measured in a uniform system of crime classification developed by police reformer August Vollmer
in the early part of this century, and today known as the Uniform Crime
53
Reports.
Second, the operational tactics of the police changed during the reform era. The patrol car appeared just before World War J.54 Spurred in
part by the theories of police reformer O.W. Wilson, who opined that
random police patrol in automobiles would provide efficient patrol coverage and also deter crime, American police departments in big cities had
largely abandoned foot patrol in favor of automobiles by the 1960s. 5 5
The two-way radio and the telephone further altered modem policing.
These two devices "completed a communications link between citizens
and the police" so that "[r] outine police work became dominated by citizen requests for service,"
and citizens "became socialized into the habit of
56
'calling the cops.'

Along with patrol by automobile, rapid response to

calls for service on 911 emerged as a "primary tactic[ ] of the reform strategy" in the area of police patrol.57 Retrospective investigation of serious
offenses by detectives rounded out the modem police department's
"crime-fighting" strategy.58
Particulars of Kelling's and Moore's interpretation of modem police
history-self-consciously written to influence police executives to con50. See Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920, at 86-87 (1981);

Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 7; Moore & Kelling, supra note 24, at 54-57.
51. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 11. The police performed significant
social welfare work during much of the nineteenth century. As conceptions of the police
role changed, however, and as new social work professionals emerged, this work was
gradually taken over, in this century, by professional social work agencies. See The Police
in America, supra note 44, at 10. Eric Monkkonen argues that this change in the character
of the police mission was completed as early as 1920. See Monkkonen, supra note 50, at
155-56.

52. See "Broken Windows" and Fractured History, supra note 44, at 60.
53. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 14. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
took over responsibility for the Uniform Crime Reports in 1930 and continues to maintain
these crime statistics today. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 18; Kelling &
Moore, supra note 35, at 14.
54. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 16.
55. See id. at 16-18; Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 13-14.
56. The Police in America, supra note 44, at 16 (emphasis omitted); see Kelling &

Moore, supra note 35, at 14.
57. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 13.

58. See Moore, supra note 41, at 108; Moore & Kelling, supra note 24, at 56.
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sider problem-oriented and community policing strategies 5 9-have been
the subject of criticism and debate. 60 But the broad outline of this account-the rise of police professionalism in this century, the transition to
principles of scientific management with centralized command and military-style discipline, the reconceptualization of the police officer as law
enforcement agent focusing on serious crimes, and the movement of patrol officers into automobiles and to rapid dispatch-has become part of
the textbook story of the modern American police. 6 1 It has also become
common wisdom that many of the central assumptions of this story (assumptions about how the police can best do theirjob and, indeed, about
what that job is) have been drawn dramatically into question in the cur62
rent era.
There are many reasons for this development. Crime began to rise
dramatically during the 1960s; it continued to rise until the mid-1970s,
remaining thereafter at high levels, with only modest periodic declines,
63
despite expenditures for more and better-equipped police officers.
Fear, too, climbed during this period: "Citizens abandoned parks, public
transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches, as well as entire neighborhoods. '6 4 Community crime control efforts-block
watches, citizen foot patrols, and the like-mushroomed, in part due to
the public's eroding confidence in the urban police.6 5 Eventually, as the
perception spread that public police departments might not be able to
deliver what citizens demanded in the way of crime control and fear reduction, departments also began to lose out in municipal budgetary
66
battles.
Next came the dramatic growth in private sector policing over the
last two decades-a major stimulus to critical self-examination for the
public police and an impetus for reflection among students of police or59. See George L Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, in
The Police & Society, supra note 44, at 3, 3-4.

60. See, e.g., Victor G. Strecher, Revising the Histories and Futures of Policing, in The
Police & Society, supra note 44, at 69; "Broken Windows" and Fractured History, supra
note 44, at 75; Hubert Williams & Patrick V. Murphy, The Evolving Strategy of Police, A
Minority View, in The Police & Society, supra note 44, at 29.

61. See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 45, at 3-7; The Police in America, supra note
44, at 12-19.
62. See, e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 250-51 (discussing how police

researchers and managers in 1970s and 1980s learned of serious shortcomings of
traditional reform era techniques); "Broken Windows" and Fractured History, supra note
44, at 53 (noting "doubt and disorientation" produced by research demonstrating
inadequacy of reform era patrol strategies).

63. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 15; see also Skolnick &Bayley, supra note
39, at 43 (attributing interest in community-oriented policing in 1980s in part to rising
crime rates of 1970s).
64. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 15.

65. See id. at 17.
66. See id. at 16-17.
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ganization.6 7 By 1990, there were two million private security agents in
the United States, as compared to approximately 650,000 public police
officers. 68 During the 1990s, the number of private security agents was
69
projected to grow annually at "double the rate of the public police."

The police, observers noted, "have quietly been supplanted in shopping
malls, stores, banks, office buildings, apartment houses, single-family residential communities, urban cul-de-sacs, schools and colleges, and factories" by private security guards "who have become the first line of practical defense against crime in much of modem life."'70 Police scholars
noted that the growing reliance on policing services for hire raised troubling questions of equity, since the middle class, small businesses, and especially the poor are less able, or completely unable, to procure the private security patrols that have come to characterize wealthy
neighborhoods and large businesses. 7 ' And lurking in the background
was concern that if the most advantaged in society continued to opt out
of primary reliance on public policing, eventually a significant and perhaps irreversible withdrawal of political and economic support for public
police would occur.72
At the same time, significant academic research challenged both the
efficacy of "reform era" crime control tactics and key assumptions of reform ideology. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, a
landmark social scientific study conducted in 1972 and 1973, concluded
that the study's experimental variations in the level of random, motorized
police patrol in Kansas City, Missouri, had no significant effect on crime
73
statistics, citizen fears, or the response time of police to calls for service.
The experiment suggested to many that police resources which might
once have gone to increasing the level of random patrol might better be
directed elsewhere. 74 A number of studies completed a few years later
67. See Moore, supra note 41, at 118-19.

68. See David H. Bayley, Police for the Future 10 (1994).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 11.
71. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 51-52; see also Moore, supra note 41,
at 119 (noting that rise of private security has resulted in "a more unequal distribution of

security").
72. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 144.
73. See George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A
Summary Report 8-4 (1974).
74. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 101-03 (by challenging traditional
assumptions about routine patrol, Kansas City experiment "launched a new period of
creative thinking" that led to experiments in community and problem-oriented policing);
see also Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski, The Police and Serious Crime, in
Thinking About Police 181 (Carl B. KMockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 2d ed. 1991)
("It makes about as much sense to have police patrol routinely in cars to fight crimes as it

does to have firemen patrol routinely in fire trucks to fight fire."); Skolnick & Fyfe, supra
note 42, at 251 ("Police managers... have learned that random motorized patrolling
neither reduces crime nor improves the chances of catching suspects."); James Q. Wilson,
Thinking About Crime 67-68 (rev. ed. 1983) (Kansas City experiment suggested that
patrol officers should be used in different ways).
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similarly concluded that rapid response to citizen calls for service had
little effect on apprehending criminals and might not be necessary to
public satisfaction-suggesting to some that the substantial police resources put into rapid response might be misallocated. 75 Researchers
during this period also repeatedly pointed out that contrary to the "law
enforcement" ideology of the reform era, police officers did not appear
to spend the bulk of their time enforcing the criminal law; most policecitizen encounters seemed to involve peacekeeping or order maintenance. 76 Even the "detective mystique" 77 of the reform era came under
scrutiny. Most crimes are not solved, researchers concluded. 78 Moreover, in those crimes that are solved, the efforts of patrol officers and the
cooperation of citizens, rather than use of specialized techniques, are
usually responsible. 79
75. See, e.g., William G. Spelman & Dale K Brown, Response Time, in Thinking
About Police, supra note 74, at 164. Spelman and Brown found that 75% of serious crimes
reported to the police are discovery crimes-crimes that are discovered after they have
been completed and "for which there is virtually no chance for response-related arrests."
Id. Even when citizens are present when crime occurs, the likelihood of a response-related
arrest "drops dramatically" when they delay more than one minute before calling the
police. Id. at 165. Researchers also found that while citizens expect speedy response to
genuine emergencies, which probably represent no more than 5% to 7% of emergencyline calls to the police, they view the predictability of police response as more important
than response time in all other cases. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 6-7. See generally
Klockars & Mastrofski, supra note 74, at 131 ("Police currently make on-scene arrests in
about 3 percent of the serious crimes reported to them. If they traveled faster than a
speeding bullet to all reports of serious crimes, this on-scene arrest rate would rise no
higher than 5 percent."); Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 251-52 ("slicing response time
to crime incidents" does not raise likelihood of "arresting the criminal or satisfying the
crime victim"); The Police in America, supra note 44, at 95-97 ("Several studies have
found'that response time has little effect on clearance rates."); Wilson, supra note 74, at 71
(noting that speed of response does not appear in the main to affect the chances of solving
any particular crime).
76. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 176; Kelling & Moore, supra note 35,
at 16.
77. See Klockars & Mastrofski, supra note 74, at 135-36 (discussing "detective
mystique").
78. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 148. The Department of Justice
reported in 1980, for instance, that a perpetrator is identified in fewer than 20% of
robberies, with an even smaller clearance rate for burglaries around the country. See
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States 180 (1980). The percentage of violent crimes cleared by arrest in 1980 was
43.6%, and rose modestly to 45.6% by 1990. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 7. During that
same period, however, violent crime rates increased 22.7%, suggesting that "the crime rate
is not affected by the rate of success the police have in solving crimes." Id. at 7.
79. A Rand study estimated that in all but about 2.7% of serious crimes in which a
perpetrator is identified, detectives "solve" the crime not on the basis of specialized
investigative techniques, but only because a patrol officer makes an arrest at the scene,
witnesses or victims identify the perpetrator, or detectives undertake routine investigative
procedures that could easily be performed by clerical personnel. Seejan M. Chaiken et al.,
The Criminal Investigation Process: A Summary Report, 3 Pol'y Analysis 187, 192 (1977);
see also Bayley, supra note 68, at 7 ("The critical ingredient in solving crimes is whether
the public-victims and witnesses-provide information to the police that helps identify
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Finally, one of the most fundamental challenges to reform era ideology came during the urban riots between 1964 and 1968-a period when
hundreds of disorders erupted nationwide, predominantly among
African American residents of inner cities, almost all sparked by incidents
involving the police. 80 The National Advisory Commission on Civil

Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission, was established in
the wake of the 1967 Detroit riot to examine, among other things, the
causes of the riots.81 In its final report, the Commission found "deep
hostility between police and ghetto communities" as a primary cause of
the disorders.8 2 The Kerner Commission criticized various police practices as contributing to hostile relations between police and African
Americans in the inner city. Aggressive, "stranger" patrol-including the
use of roving task forces "which move [d] into high-crime districts without
prior notice and conduct[ed] intensive, often indiscriminate, street stops
and searches" 3 -caused community resentment, while the patrol car removed the officer from the street, contributing to his alienation from
citizens. 8 4 Significantly, however, the Commission also observed that the
intensity of inner city residents' anger about hostile police conduct in

their communities might even be exceeded by the animosity that they
expressed over another matter: "the conviction that ghetto neighbor-

hoods [were] not given adequate police protection.

85

The Commission

noted two basic complaints: that police tolerated in poor neighborhoods

"illegal activities like drug addiction, prostitution, and street violence"
that they would not permit elsewhere, and that police treated complaints

86
and calls for help from such neighborhoods with less urgency.

the suspect." (citation omitted)); Klockars & Mastrofski, supra note 74, at 131, 135-36
(discussing Rand study).
80. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 21 (discussing the 1960s urban
unrest); Moore, supra note 41, at 132 (noting that urgency of closer connection between
police and community was "brought home to professionally oriented police departments
toward the end of the 1960s when they confronted large-scale urban unrest"). Police
departments in the 1960s and 1970s came under fire for their treatment of minority
citizens: for affirmative misconduct, particularly against African Americans, for the failure
to provide adequate services to minority communities, and for departments' overall lack of
representativeness. The civil rights and antiwar movements also probably helped stimulate
reevaluation of the means and ends of American policing by drawing into question the
legitimacy of police authority. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 16.
81. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 21-22.
82. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 157 (1968)
[hereinafter Kerner Commission Report].
83. Id. at 159; see also Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 39, at 40 (characterizing
aggressive patrol as involving "large numbers of police-initiated citizen contacts that [are]
not responsive to calls for help or assistance").
84. See Kemer Commission Report, supra note 82, at 159-60.
85. Id. at 161.
86. Id. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, popularly known as the Crime Commission, had issued only the year before a
report containing a message strikingly similar to that contained in the Kemer Commission
report. The Crime Commission said that citizen hostility to the police, prevalent in
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Professionally oriented police departments, in which the aspirations
of reform era leaders for neutral, detached law enforcement had been
realized to a significant degree, confronted their inability to deal with
urban unrest and their profound estrangement from many of the communities they policed. They began to experiment with community relations approaches to policing.8 7 Some departments noted that centralized
dispatch of patrol cars had removed essential neighborhood links between patrol officers and neighborhood residents, contributing to the
mutual alienation of police and communities, and also reducing the level
of citizen cooperation that research suggested was essential to gaining
intelligence about criminal activities and to identifying suspects. 88 Team
policing, based on geographic assignment and accountability, came into
vogue in the 1970s. 89 Community relations units were also created. 90
The effectiveness of these and other attempts to reconnect police and

minority communities, was jeopardizing police effectiveness, provoking citizens to fail to
report crimes or to withhold cooperation from investigations, and depriving inner city
residents of police protection that they both wanted and needed. "Police agencies,"
asserted the Commission, "cannot preserve the public peace and control crime unless the
public participates more fully ...in law enforcement." The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society: A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice 99-100 (1967) [hereinafter Crime Commission Report]. But cf. George L.
Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows 82-83 (1996) (noting that despite
Crime Commission's recognition of the need for public participation in law enforcement,
Commission "strongly validated" reform era policing).
87. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 22-24 (racial disturbances of the 1960s prompted
professionally oriented police departments to begin experimentation with community
relations programs); Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 39, at 40-41 (noting that Kerner and
Crime Commission reports are "essential" to understanding origins of community relations
approach to policing); Moore, supra note 41, at 132 (noting that large-scale urban unrest
prompted police to recognize the "urgency of maintaining a close connection between the
police and the community").
88. See Wilson, supra note 74, at 68 ("community service" approach to policing
undertaken, in part, to gain citizen cooperation in crime control); Moore, supra note 41,
at 132 (centralized dispatch contributed to the police losing touch with communities by
rendering police department's focus "citywide rather than local").
89. See Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 39, at 42-43; Moore, supra note 41, at 132-34.
In team policing, lieutenants were given responsibility for improving conditions in
assigned neighborhoods, with their authority extending not only over patrol units in these
neighborhoods, but sometimes over detectives and representatives of specialized units
such as traffic or narcotics, depending upon a local area's problems. By the mid-1970s,
many departments were experimenting with variants of team policing. See Moore, supra
note 41, at 133.
90. See Skolnick and Bayley, supra note 39, at 41-42; Moore, supra note 41, at
134-36.
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communities varied. 91 These efforts set the stage, however, for92the devel-

opment of community and problem-oriented policing theory.

2. Community and Problem-OrientedPolicingTheory. - Community and
problem-oriented policing have been so often defined by so many scholars in an ever burgeoning literature that it is difficult to state their contents simply, much less to account for the many and varied police initiatives that have been undertaken in their names. While theoretically
distinct, moreover, the two philosophies are today the subject of simulta-

neous experimentation in many police departments. Because both community and problem-oriented policing have helped to refocus attention
on problems of neighborhood disorder in ways that have important implications for legal scholars, some separate discussion of the orienting
ideas in both philosophies is in order. Thereafter, however, they may be
considered together for the legal analysis that follows.
a. Problem-OrientedPolicing. - Herman Goldstein provided the first
major reexamination of the reform era model in 1979, when he articulated the concept of problem-oriented policing.9 3 He contended that the
dominant perspective on American policing too narrowly defines the police mission as enforcement of the criminal law in response to isolated,
individual events. 94 In fact, Goldstein argued, "policing consists of developing the most effective means for dealing with a multitude of trouble-

some situations," 95 from the widespread sale of drugs in a neighborhood
to complaints about unreasonable noise. The police, Goldstein said,
devote excessive resources responding to individual calls from citizens
and reserve "too small a percentage of their time and energy for acting

on their own initiative to prevent or reduce community problems." 96 Police should move beyond handling incidents to carefully identifying substantive problems and developing more effective, customized police re91. Compare Moore, supra note 41, at 133 (noting that many team policing programs
experienced apparent success in terms of citizen popularity and improvement in
neighborhood conditions, but that programs were hard to introduce and sustain in
departments maintaining overall traditional orientation), with Skolnick & Bayley, supra
note 39, at 42-43 (recounting failure of one team policing experiment due to opposition
from middle managers who felt threatened by loss of status when authority for
neighborhood conditions was placed in hands of lieutenants). Community relations units
enjoyed limited success, in part because creating a specialized unit to deal with the
community relieved the department as a whole of the burden to improve community
relations and also isolated the officers assigned to the specialized unit. See Moore, supra
note 41, at 135.
92. See Moore, supra note 41, at 133-34; see also Robert Trojanowicz & Bonnie
Bucqueroux, Community Policing 68 (1990) (noting that basic ideas "that would
ultimately coalesce" into community policing began to be discussed in the early 1970s).
93. See Improving Policing, supra note 24, at 236. Goldstein built on the points made
in his 1979 article in a book published in 1990. See Goldstein, supra note 18.
94. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14.
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sponses to these problems. 97 These responses might involve a wide range
of methods, with "law enforcement" being only one method among
98
many.
Goldstein's work was in tension with the prevailing reform ideology
in several ways. First, it implied the need for a much closer connection
between the police and the community. The objective in problemoriented policing is "to focus on problems of concern to the community."99 Identifying and developing a response to a problem, Goldstein
argued, can often require the police to engage significantly with those
people affected by the problem or by the proposed police response.' 0 0
Reform era police leaders, in contrast, strove to insulate police from the
corrupting influences of ties to the community. The professional model
depicted officers as "impartial law enforcers who related to citizens in
professionally neutral and distant terms."10 1 Second, Goldstein's problem-oriented approach was proactive and implied that line officers and
their relatively low-ranking supervisors would exercise a great deal of discretion in developing appropriate strategies to manage or even solve particular community problems. This, too, differed from prevailing practice.
In the reform era model, police were ostensibly to be treated as professionals.' 0 2 Police administrators, however, actually managed more in
keeping with Frederick W. Taylor's classical theory and thus attempted to
routinize and standardize police patrol.'0 3
Finally, Goldstein's work challenged the "law enforcement" orientation of police departments. Problem-oriented policing does not preclude
97. See id. at 32-49.
98. See id. at 11.
99. Id. at 70.
100. See id. at 21-27.
101. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 12.
102. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 12-14.
103. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 11-12, 16. These attempts were made
notwithstanding the fact that the police officer's job is hardly similar to the production line
worker's; the police officer typically works alone or as one of two and encounters
nonroutine situations. See Moore, supra note 41, at 108. Numerous scholars note that
"police professionalism" has a distinct meaning. "[T]he professional departments were the
ones that adopted O.W. Wilson's principles of police administration: specialization,
hierarchy, clear lines of authority, written rules and policies, and so on." The Police in
America, supra note 44, at 363. In effect, professional police departments were more
bureaucratized; they used written rules and centralized, quasi-military command to limit
officer discretion, rather than to encourage its intelligent exercise. See id. at 362-63.
Patrol officers in particular were "low status, their work was treated as if it was routinized
and standardized, and petty rules governed issues such as hair length and off-duty
behavior." Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 16. Kelling and Moore argue that the
Taylorist managerial principles to which line officers were subjected contributed, in part,
to the problems that beset the reform ideology beginning in the late 1960s. See id. Line
officers, offered little guidance in exercising discretion and afforded few opportunities to
help develop police strategy, became disenchanted and increasingly were attracted to
militant unionism. See id.
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04
using the criminal justice system to respond to a community problem.
In fact, Goldstein was one of the first scholars to note that police departments in some communities might need new, tailored criminal statutes
(or some other form of legal authority) to deal with public order
problems, because these problems often persisted after courts invalidated
disorderly conduct, loitering, and vagrancy statutes, leaving officers with
no legal authority to intervene. 10 5 Goldstein also urged, however, that
the central task of policing is to develop the most effective way to deal
with problems. And the police response to a problem, he argued, can
alternatives than the mere arrest and proseoften involve more effective
10 6
cution of offenders.
Several police departments experimented with problem-oriented policing in the early 1980s. For example, in Newport News, Virginia, police
interviewed residents of New Briarfield, a crime-ridden housing project,
as part of a problem-oriented initiative. When police learned that residents were concerned not only about frequent burglaries in the project,
but also about the physical deterioration of their homes, police worked
with other city agencies to fix up the project by removing trash and abandoned cars and otherwise improving neighborhood conditions, pending
the project's planned replacement. 10 7 The thirty-five percent drop in
New Briarfield burglary rates that accompanied the police department's
work-accomplished without a single arrest-is often cited to evidence
the potential of problem-oriented strategies.' 0 8
b. Community Policing.- Community policing literature often incorporates the "problem" orientation in Goldstein's work into community
policing; the concepts of community and problem-oriented policing are
frequently used interchangeably.' 0 9 Community policing, however, is a
more general and somewhat less well-articulated theory that focuses less
attention upon the need for close analysis of policing problems and more
attention on the idea that "working partnerships between the police and
the community can play an important role in reducing crime and promoting security." 1 0 Contemporary community problems--"crime, fear
of crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay"-can be

104. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 131.
105. See id. at 134-35; Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23.
106. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 102-04.
107. See John E. Eck & William Spelman, Problem-Solving- Problem-Oriented
Policing in Newport News, in Critical Issues in Policing 451, 460-64 (Roger G. Dunham &

Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 2d ed. 1993); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making
Neighborhoods Safe, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1989, at 46, 46-47.

108. See, e.g., Eck & Spelman, supra note 107, at 462.
109. See Kenneth J. Peak & Ronald W. Glensor, Community Policing and Problem
Solving xxiii (1996); see also Moore, supra note 41, at 126 ("To a great extent, problemsolving and community policing are overlapping concepts.").
110. Moore, supra note 41, at 123; see also id. at 126 (noting that while the two
philosophies often merge in practice, "distinctive thrust" of problem-oriented policing is
analysis of problems while community policing focuses on "cooperation with the

community").
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effectively addressed, proponents say, only if police departments develop
working relationships with people in the community, "allowing them a
greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods.""'
Community policing is perhaps best understood as a new policing philosophy that draws upon the idea of community-police reciprocity "to redefine the overall purposes of policing, to alter the principal operating programs and technologies on which the police have relied, and
to found
1 12
the legitimacy and popularity of policing on new grounds."
So understood, the characteristic elements of a community policing
strategy are readily identified. If reform era police relied upon neutral
enforcement of the criminal law and detached professionalism as the bases for their authority, community police place renewed emphasis on
community or political support: "Certainly, law continues to be a major
source ofjustification, but it is not sufficient to authorize police actions to
maintain order, negotiate conflicts, and solve problems. Neighborhood
or community support and involvement are required to accomplish those
tasks." 1 3 Next, partly because the police in a community policing regime
are open to community-nominated problems, the definition of the police
role is broader, more dynamic, and more proactive than beforeinvolving not simply crime control through rapid response, random patrol by automobile, and reactive investigation, but also a renewed focus
on order maintenance, crime prevention, and (borrowing from
Goldstein's work) problem-solving. 1 4 In theory, community policing is a
"preventive, penetrating, consensual," as opposed to "reactive, restricted,
procedural due process model" of policing. 1 5 By focusing on order
maintenance and prevention, advocating a more visible presence in policed areas, and basing its legitimacy on the consent of policed populations, community policing emulates police services that private security
firms now offer the well-to-do in the protection of their private
6
property."
The police organization itself, and its tactics, are also different in a
community policing department. Since operational and tactical decisions come from local assessment of problems and require neighborhood
input, corrimunity policing necessitates decentralized decisionmaking
within the large, urban department." 7 Reform era police chiefs sought
to centralize command and control and to formulate elaborate rules and
111. Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, supra note 92, at 5.
112. Moore, supra note 41, at 101-06, 111 (quoted material at 106).
113. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 19.
114. See id. at 20; see also Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, supra note 92, at 14 (noting
that in community policing, "police must accept new responsibilities in dealing with fear of
crime, disorder, and quality-of-life issues").
115. David H. Bayley, Community Policing- A Report from the Devil's Advocate, in
Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, supra note 32, at 225, 234.
116. See id. at 233-34; Sherman, supra note 11, at 338-39.
117. See Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 32, at 214-15.
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policies to limit the discretion of lower ranking officers. Community policing implies the opposite: "Consulting with community groups, problem solving, maintaining order, and other such activities are antithetical
to the reform ideal of eliminating officer discretion through routinizadon and standardization of police activities."1 18 Participative management that involves line officers and sergeants in the development of police initiatives (effected through use of temporary task forces, matrix-like
units, and other organizational innovations borrowed from the private
sector) is part of the concept.11 9 So, too, are many police tactics, like foot
patrol and community organizing, that bring officers into a more inti20
mate relationship with the community.
Today, hundreds of police departments across the country (not to
mention local prosecutors in places like Washington, D.C., Philadelphia,
and Indianapolis) are experimenting with both community and problemoriented policing.' 2 ' Though largely sympathetic to this experimentation, academics have warned that the concept of "community" in community policing is imprecise at best, and even idealized.' 22 They have observed that a bewildering and sometimes inappropriate variety of police
123
initiatives could well be implemented in community policing's name.
Old concerns about the proliferation of police corruption within decentralized departments have resurfaced, 2 4 and new worries have emerged
about whether police time will be properly allocated when police are free
118. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 20.
119. See id. at 20-21.
120. See id. at 22.
121. See Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, supra note 92, at 4; Weekend Edition Saturday:
Community Policing Movement Seeks to Include DAs (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, July 6,
1996).
122. See, e.g.,Jerome E. McElroy et al., Community Policing- The GPOP in NewYork
3-4 (1993) ("Virtually all commentators agree that the concept of 'community' as used in
the rhetoric of community policing is imprecise, perhaps interchangeable with the
concepts of neighborhood, district, or beat, and largely uninformed by a century of
sociological usage and study."); Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 254 (recognizing that if
community "implies a commonality of interests, traditions, identities, values and
expectations," community does not exist in many areas); Klockars, supra note 32, at 247-50
(noting that "genuine communities are probably very rare in modem cities") (quoted
material at 248).
123. See Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 39, at 2. In particular, commentators have
warned that the interests of minorities or the poor in local neighborhoods could be given
short shrift by the police "because of their desire to be responsive to the wishes of the
majority." McElroy et al., supra note 122, at 5 (minorities may be underserved); see Bayley,
supra note 115, at 233-34 (because of greater difficulty in organizing the poor, community
policing may exacerbate existing dualism between police services available in ethnically
homogeneous, middle-class communities and services for the "poor and uneducated
underclass").
124. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 33, at 21 (noting that given extent to which
community policing grants "greater freedom and independence to the officers assigned to
specific areas," in cities where police corruption is prevalent, community policing may not
be a viable policing strategy); Moore, supra note 41, at 144 (noting concern that
community policing may reinvigorate police corruption).
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to work with other city agencies and with community residents. 125 Even
proponents of the new strategies attest to the value of central ideas within
the reform era paradigm. They caution that community policing, by rejecting the predominantly reactive posture of reform era police in favor
of proactive, community-based crime prevention, presents heightened
risks of discriminatory law enforcement and inappropriate police involvement in community life and private affairs. 126 Nevertheless, community
and problem-oriented policing-perhaps the first movements in
American policing, despite all the cautions of academics, that have been
based upon a realistic assessment of policing's complexities127-are the
orienting philosophies structuring change in policing today.
B. Community Policing and Neighborhood Disorder
1. Broken Windows. - Community and problem-oriented policing
have implications for all aspects of police operations, from the ways in
which police respond to repeat domestic assault calls to their efforts at
dealing with a plague of robberies in a rundown housing project. The
popularity of these new policing philosophies, however, has prompted
and even become synonymous with a particular new focus on the quality
of life in public places. This is not surprising. When police meet with
citizens to enlist their help in identifying problems of concern in local
neighborhoods, citizens commonly express concern with "prevalent and
low-key troubles" like abandoned buildings, chronic vandalism, gangs, loitering youth, and unsafe parks.' 28 James Q. Wilson and George Kelling,
moreover, provided a theoretical argument about the importance of at29
tending to such problems in their 1982 essay entitled Broken Windows.'
Because Broken Windows powerfully provoked this new attention to
quality-of-life concerns and helped stimulate what became the community policing movement of the 1980s,13 0 this Part begins with Broken
Windows before turning to the legal questions revived by the new focus on
the policing of public order.
Broken Windows's overall prescription for modern American policing
is easily stated. The essay argued that reform era police departments'
focus on law enforcement-on solving more serious crimes, making more
arrests for their commission, and gathering better evidence to ensure
125. See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 115, at 234 (noting that community policing
requires "more successful internalization of norms of conduct" to avoid "increased
slackness, time-wasting, inattention, and mismanagement"); Wilson & Kelling, supra note
107, at 50 (noting concern that police officers may not be well trained to deal with other
city agencies and that with decentralized decisionmaking that community policing implies,
no one may know "precisely how patrol officers spend their time").
126. See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 115, at 230-32; Moore, supra note 41, at 138-40,
143-46.
127. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 28-29.
128. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 106; Kelling, supra note 31, at 2.
129. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 38.
130. See Walker, supra note 32, at 512.
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conviction-had resulted in the neglect of a vital police role in promoting the quality of life in local neighborhoods.13 1 With the appropriate
caution that no one knows for certain how police resources should be
deployed, Broken Windows suggested an alternative: urban police patrol
should be significantly neighborhood-oriented, more officers should be
deployed on foot, at least in those neighborhoods where they might help
in a
strengthen informal social-control mechanisms, and police officers
3 2
neighborhood should attend to its minor disorder problems.'
There was an element of paradox in this prescription. Police scholars, including Wilson, had long contended that patrol officers, whatever
the implications of reform era ideology, actually spend more of their time
maintaining order than enforcing laws against serious crime. 133 Indeed,
the "sharp contrast between the crime-fighting imagery of the police and
the peacekeeping reality of police activities" was a major finding of the
police research that began in the 1960s and that helped set the stage for
34
the development of problem-oriented and community policing theory.'
Some maintain that more police time may today be spent on crime-related
matters (primarily assisting in the aftermath of victimizations) than the
major sociological studies conducted in the 1960s and early 1970s suggest.' 3 5 But all police scholars agree that police have always spent substantial time attempting to maintain or restore public order.
Wilson and Kelling argued, however, that the rise in crime beginning
in the 1960s had coalesced with the earlier evolution in conceptions of
the police role to dramatically shift attention away from the quality of life
in public spaces. Police managers began to focus all their training and
resources on enforcing laws against serious crime, rather than on managing street life.' 3 6 "We may have encouraged [these managers] to suppose," the authors suggested, "on the basis of our oft-repeated concerns
about serious, violent crime, that they [would] be judged exclusively on
their capacity as crime-fighters." 13 7 Reform era ideology had unquestionably deprived order maintenance of an important place in the strategic
planning of police departments.' 3 8 Wilson and Kelling suggested that
since the early 1960s, the police department's role in helping to maintain
131. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 32-33, 38.
132. See id. at 36-38.
133. See, e.g., The Police in America, supra note 44, at 112 ("Most police work
involves noncriminal events. Order maintenance or peacekeeping activities comprise an
estimated two-thirds of all calls to the police....."); Wilson, supra note 20, at 17-18 (in "larger

or more socially heterogeneous cities," patrol officer "encounters far more problems of
order maintenance than opportunities for law enforcement, except with respect to traffic
laws").
134. See "Broken Windows" and Fractured History, supra note 44, at 60; supra note
76 and accompanying text (noting earlier research).
135. See, e.g.,Jack R. Greene & Carl B. Klockars, What Police Do, in Thinking About
Police, supra note 74, at 273, 273-83.
136. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 33, 38.
137. Id. at 38.
138. See Egon Bitmer, Aspects of Police Work 12-13 (1990).
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order had, in fact, become almost entirely latent, the focus of wholly inadequate attention and insufficient concern. The isolation of patrol officers consigned to motorized patrol had only exacerbated this situation
by removing neighborhood connections that the authors deemed essential to the police playing a vibrant role in "reinforc [ing] the informal control mechanisms of the community itself."13 9
Wilson and Kelling presented a simple but intuitively compelling argument for placing new emphasis on public order. First, they said, the
anxiety "endemic in many big-city neighborhoods" may stem as much
from fear of disorderly conditions as from a realistic appraisal of residents' likelihood of being victimized by serious crime. 140 Relieving this
anxiety, however, might be extremely important not only to reassure citizens that the police can effectively aid in a task-maintaining neighborhoods-that citizens view to be vital, but also to reinforce informal socialcontrol mechanisms: "In response to fear, people avoid one another,
weakening controls." 14 1 Second, Wilson and Kelling contended, crime
and disorder may themselves be linked at the community level in a developmental sequence. If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, the rest of the windows will soon be broken, because the unrepaired window "is a signal that no one cares." 142 Similarly, signs of
disorder-abandoned property, accumulating litter, inebriates slumped
on the sidewalk, and teenagers loitering or fighting in front of the corner
store-prompt fearful residents to use the streets less often and to avoid
involvement in the matters that occur there. 143 Such streets, the authors
argued, are then more vulnerable to criminal invasion: "Though it is not
inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people
are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls,
drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be
stripped." 14 4
Broken Windows stimulated a flurry of scholarship on the subject of
order maintenance. 45 Reform era efforts to reconceptualize patrol officers as law enforcement agents and subject them to legal and adminis139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Wilson &Kelling, supra note 25, at 34.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 31.
See id. at 32.

144. Id.; see Wilson & Kelling, supra note 107, at 48 ("[Llaw-abiding citizens who are

afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of
these streets ....
that fear.").

A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of

145. See, e.g., George L. Kelling, Order Maintenance, the Quality of Urban Life, and
Police: A Line of Argument, in Police Leadership in America 296 (William A. Geller ed.,

1985); Carl B. Klockars, Order Maintenance, the Quality of Urban Life, and Police: A
Different Line of Argument, in Police Leadership in America, supra, at 309; Carl B,
Klockars, Street Justice: Some Micro-Moral Reservations: Comment on Sykes, 3 Just. Q.
513 (1986); Gary W. Sykes, Street Justice: A Moral Defense of Order Maintenance

Policing, 3Just. Q. 497 (1986) [hereinafter StreetJustice]; Gary W. Sykes, The Functional
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trative constraints, said one scholar, might have been misconceived, since
the police function includes "inherently discretionary powers in order
maintenance," the exercise of which is likely to be abandoned once these
constraints are imposed. 146 "To deny street officers the informal powers
to act intuitively and spontaneously in the face of [neighborhood]
problems cuts at the very heart of the police function as it has evolved in
the neighborhood context."' 47 The poor and powerless, this scholar suggested, are then the losers: for though the street harassment and threatening behavior common in many poor neighborhoods may not be
deemed serious by law enforcement officials, they are "not perceived to
be minor by the victims in the community" and they contribute "to a
generalized fear that alters the social fabric of a neighborhood." 148 Cognizant of lessons drawn from the 1960s riots, police scholars advocating
focus on neighborhood disorder also cautioned that employing resurrected disorderly conduct statutes and reform era methods to "sweep up,"
intimidate, "move along," and arrest persons threatening some conception of public order was dangerous, and contrary to the role for police
that they endorsed. 149 These scholars argued, however, that neighborhood officers, closely integrated with the communities they policed,
could and should focus new attention on the police role in enhancing the
50
quality of life in urban neighborhoods.
The argument in Broken Windows-that reducing fear of crime, as
well as crime itself, is an important police task, and that neighborhood
disorder is linked both to fear and more serious crime-was also assessed
in light of the available empirical evidence. In the most comprehensive
empirical work on the subject of disorder, political scientist Wesley
Skogan provided important support for the Broken Windows thesis. 151 He
noted that research on vandalism, littering, and building abandonment
and decay supported Wilson's and Kelling's thesis that some disorder
breeds more disorder, since research suggests that all of these disorderly
conditions are "contagious."' 52 He also concluded, based primarily upon
his examination of survey evidence of forty residential neighborhoods in
six cities, that disorder fosters social withdrawal, sparks concern about
53
neighborhood safety, and plays an important role in urban decline.'
Nature of Police Reform: The "Myth" of Controlling the Police, 2 Just. Q. 51 (1985)
[hereinafter The Functional Nature of Police Reform].
146. The Functional Nature of Police Reform, supra note 145, at 58.
147. Id. at 62. Sykes argued, further, that "reform era" efforts to standardize and
routinize the patrol officer's role may have faltered or met with only partial success
precisely because these reform efforts were inconsistent with the sort of informal
community peacekeeping supported by both police and citizens. See id. at 61-64.
148. Id. at 62; see StreetJustice, supra note 145, at 506-07.
149. See, e.g., Kelling, supra note 145, at 307.
150. See, e.g., id. at 306-08.
151. See Skogan, supra note 26, at 1-84.
152. See id. at 49.
153. See id. at 2-3, 10-12, 18-20, 65, 72; see also Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Why Are
Communities Important in Understanding Crime?, in 8 Communities &Crime 1, 8 (Albert
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Significantly, Skogan concluded that neighborhood residents of differing
race, class, and age can express broad consensus in identifying "loiterers,
drug use or sale, vandalism, gang activity, public drinking . . . street
harassment," and physical disorder as neighborhood problems. 54 Finally, Skogan noted a strong correlation between disorder and crime,
though his data only allowed him to conclude that disorder may cause
crime; that disorder, along with other variables, is sequentially linked to
crime; and that "disorder needs to be taken seriously in research on
neighborhood crime, and that both directly and through crime it plays
155
an important role in neighborhood decline.'
Criminologists and police scholars also assessed evidence suggesting
that police efforts directed at disorderly conditions might make a difference by reducing fear of crime and perhaps even the incidence of serious
crime. Kelling walked a beat with several Newark foot-patrol officers as
part of a Police Foundation study. The study concluded that while foot
patrol as employed in the Newark experiment had not reduced crime, it
had succeeded in lowering citizens' fears of crime and their protective
measures to avoid crime, as well as heightening citizens' perception of
the safety of foot-patrolled neighborhoods. 15 6 Sociologists Robert
Sampson andJacqueline Cohen, moreover, concluded from their statistical study of the enforcement of disorderly conduct and drunk driving
laws, that such enforcement was negatively correlated with robbery

J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1986) (noting that "soft crimes" such as harassment,
panhandling, chronic loitering, and other offensive or threatening behavior "lead to the

depopulation of organizations as well as people from central city and other business
districts, particularly as they contribute substantially to fears of victimization by crime").
154. Skogan, supra note 26, at 9, 51-57 (quoted material at 51).
155. Id. at 10, 73-75 (quoted material at 75). But see Jack R. Greene & Ralph B.
Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in
Community Policing- Rhetoric or Reality, supra note 82, at 195, 201-03 (concluding that

physical and social disorder have not been demonstrated to weaken informal social
control, that the link between disorder and fear of crime holds in only some
neighborhoods, and that the connection between disorder and crime "appears to be

largely driven by the linkage of both concepts with social class and does not exist
independently") (quoted material at 202).

156. See Police Foundation, The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment 122-24 (1981); see
also Hubert Williams & Antony M. Pate, Returning to First Principles: Reducing the Fear
of Crime in Newark, 38 Crime & Delinq. 58, 66-69 (1986) (reporting on later Newark

study concluding that community policing effort that combined focus on social and
physical signs of crime with directed police-citizen contact lowered fear of personal
victimization and increased citizen satisfaction). In a similar study, Robert Trojanowicz, a

professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results of a foot patrol experiment in
Flint, Michigan, and noted both increased citizen satisfaction and a significant drop in

crime. See Robert Trojanowicz, An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program
in Flint, Michigan 85-87 (1982). But see Greene & Taylor, supra note 155, at 207-10

(explaining that "high level of respondent dropout from the citizen panels, lack of
statistical tests, and wide variations in crime rates across program areas" preclude any
confidence in Flint study's conclusions about effect of foot patrol).
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rates.' 5 7 The empirical evidence could not be termed conclusive and important questions were not yet answered: for example, whether officers
addressing disorder should emphasize legalistic enforcement or informal
techniques. 15 8 Many scholars concluded, however, that community police might help ameliorate disorders, such as public drunkenness and
rowdy teenagers, "that often spark serious outbursts of predatory criminality."'159 And whatever the effect on more serious crime, these scholars
noted, broadly-supported police efforts to deal with disorder that truly
troubles a neighborhood certainly fit within the philosophies of community and problem-oriented policing. These efforts, moreover, might be
60
important to enhancing citizens' quality of life.'
Whatever the reservations of academic commentators, Broken
Windows immediately became an important part of the ongoing discussion among police scholars and police executives about community and
problem-oriented approaches to policing.'61 Police departments, too,
were soon employing the Broken Windows idea in their ongoing experi16 2
mentation with community and problem-oriented policing reforms.
In short, Broken Windows, and its critique of dominant trends in American
157. See RobertJ. Sampson &Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on
Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 163, 169, 176 (1988).
Sampson and Cohen examined all American cities with 1980 populations over 100,000 and
found a significant negative correlation between robbery rates and the number of
disorderly conduct and DUI arrests per police officer. See id. at 169-70, 176.
158. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Attacking Crime: Police and Crime Control, in
Modem Policing, supra note 41, at 198-99 (noting evidence that suggests legalistic
enforcement of laws against minor crimes may increase crime in some contexts, and also
harm community relations).
159. John J. DiIulio, Jr., Comment on Douglas S. Massey's Getting Away with Murder.
Segregation and Iiolent Cime in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1275, 1282 (1995); see also
Bayley, supra note 68, at 103 ("Although the police can do little to prevent particular
instances of crime, they can reduce the 'disorder' that, as research shows, encourages and
facilitates crime.") (citations omitted); cf.Jerome H. Skolnick, Making Sense of the Crime
Decline, Newsday (New York), Feb. 2, 1997, at G6, available in 1997 WL 2681361
(attributing recent decline in crime in part to adoption of quality-of-life policing and to
new focus on community-nominated disorder problems in community policing).
160. See, e.g., Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 39, at 11-12 (discussing police order
maintenance as a means of "neighborhood stabilization" and developing "livable
communities").
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3J.L. & Pol'y 447, 448-50, 463-64 (1995) (former
New York City Police Commissioner who instituted quality-of-life enforcement program
expresses unabashed support for "broken windows thesis" and also affirms his belief in
community policing); Paul Scott Abbott, Operation Clean Sweep, Sun-Sentinel (Ft.
Lauderdale), Mar. 8, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 2491646 (Broward County, Florida
sheriff's deputy who is head of crime prevention unit cites "broken-window syndrome" in
explaining new enforcement of public drinking law and similar misdemeanors); Ronald
Brownstein, Taming the Mean Streets, LA Times, May 4, 1994, at Al, A20 (network of
"law enforcement officials, architects and urban theorists" are invoking "broken windows"
theory to address disorderly conditions from "coast to coast"); Edmund Mahony, Taking It
to the Streets, Hartford Courant, Apr. 15, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 534483 (New
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policing that had deemphasized the order maintenance function, was
"widely cited,' 63 has become "one of the most influential articles on policing," 164 and has helped to create what some have termed a "consensus"
in community and problem-oriented policing circles that the neglect of
quality-of-life problems was a deficiency of urban policing in the period
into the 1980s. 16 5
2. Legal Questions. - All this might have been of little concern to
legal scholars. In keeping with the new policing philosophies, many police efforts directed at the quality of life in public spaces involve the police neither in law enforcement nor in coercive encounters with citizens
on the street. Thus, community-oriented police may call upon sanitation
departments to clean up "trash-strewn vacant lots," 166 work with building
inspectors to condemn abandoned buildings used as crack houses, 16 7 or,
as in a Los Angeles neighborhood, organize citizens' groups and Boy
Scouts to quickly paint over graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop
signs, rather than attempt simply to "catch the gang youths... wielding
the spray cans." 168 These ameliorative measures are consistent with the
Broken Windows's argument that police "ought to protect communities as
well as individuals," and that protecting communities demands attention
to those causes of fear and apprehension often not reflected in crime
statistics, but present in parks, at bus stops, and on playgrounds where
disorderly conditions prevail. 169 Such measures, however-necessitating
no new police authority to respond to a community-nominated problem,
and avoiding resort to the criminal justice system or to coercive police
authority-raise few issues within the traditional scope of legal scholars'
concerns.
Wilson and Kelling, however, implicitly acknowledged in Broken
Windows that the police role they endorsed was in tension with legal
presuppositions. For example, they recounted how one Newark officer
with whom Kelling patrolled contributed to calm in the dilapidated area
around a busy bus stop by enforcing "informal but widely understood
rules" among the regulars there: drunks and addicts were allowed to sit
on the stoops, but not lie down; people could drink on the side streets so
long as bottles were kept in paper bags, but there was no drinking at the
main intersection; bothering or begging from the people waiting at the
bus stop was strictly prohibited. 170 The officer's enforcement of these
"neighborhood rules," the authors admitted, sometimes "could be deHaven, Connecticut police chief and proponent of community policing "has taken the
broken-window theory to heart").
163. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 23.
164. The Police in America, supra note 44, at 28.
165. See McElroy et al., supra note 122, at 1-2 (citing consensus).
166. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 110.
167. See id.
168. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 107, at 48.
169. Wilson & Keling, supra note 25, at 38.
170. See id. at 0.
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scribed as 'enforcing the law,' butjust as often it involved taking informal
or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided
was the appropriate level of public order."17 1 Some of the officer's actions, the authors acknowledged, probably could not withstand legal challenge. 172 The authors also related how police in the Robert Taylor
Homes in Chicago had allegedly assisted residents in dealing with youth
gangs that terrorized the public housing project when patrolling officers
could obtain sufficient evidence to arrest for only a "tiny fraction" of gang
members' crimes: "What the police in fact [did was] chase known gang
members out of the project.... Project residents both [knew] and [approved] of this." 173
Broken Windows thus implicitly recognized that police officers might
lack legal authority to perform some of the order maintenance tasks that
the essay suggested might be useful in dealing with disorder problems in
public spaces. This was not always the case. Before the constitutional
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, laws permitting arrest on charges like
vagrancy and loitering gave police officers broad authority to intervene in
minor public order problems.' 74 Critics of these laws charged, with good
reason, that they amounted to an improper delegation of discretion to
the police "to intervene in a great range of minor conduct, difficult or
impossible legally to specify in advance, in which the police find it desirable to act."175 When many such laws were declared constitutionally void
for vagueness in the 1960s and 1970s, however, police departments lost
the power to arrest in such interventions. This meant that in many places
police officers were unable to remove people threatening neighborhood
order when informal attempts to preserve order had failed.' 76 They were
also unable, at least in some cases, to use persuasion, negotiation, or
counseling informally to resolve minor disorder problems in the first
place.' 7 7 The constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s in fact con171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 31.
See id.
Id. at 35.
See Robert Force, Decriminalization of Breach of the Peace Statutes: A

Nonpenal Approach to Order Maintenance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 367, 399 (1972); see also
WilliamJ. Stuntz, Crime Talk and Law Talk, 23 Reviews Am. Hist. 153, 157 (1995) ("Prior
to the 1960s, vagrancy and loitering laws made it possible for police to arrest pretty much

anyone, or at least anyone on the street: the laws were so broad as to plausibly cover
anything anyone might do in public.").
175. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 Am. Crim. L.Q. 17, 30
(1968).
176. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 35 (opining that laws against vagrancy
and public drunkenness exist not to punish vagrants or drunks, but to provide officers with
the legal tools to remove disorderly people when "informal efforts to preserve order in the

streets have failed").
177. See Force, supra note 174, at 405 (noting that various informal techniques used
by police in 1960s and 1970s to preserve order were "directly related to and dependent
upon the policeman's ultimate weapon-the power to arrest"); Kelling & Coles, supra note
86, at 148 (noting importance of arrest authority to informal resolution of many public
order problems); cf. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 134 (with invalidation of vagrancy-type
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tributed to a small degree to police departments'
historical retreat from
78
concern with problems of public disorder.'
Broader ideas within legal scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s also
played some role in limiting police officers' public order activities. 179 Coincident with the constitutional challenges to public order laws that increased in frequency in the 1960s, legal scholars mounted an impressive
critique against overcriminalization. 8 0° The assembly-line justice meted
out in lower criminal courts for offenses like drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, gambling, and prostitution, these scholars contended, was
itself one of the surest signs that the criminal sanction was being misapplied.' 8 ' Scholars rightly charged that many existing public order laws
disregarded "basic and essential elements of effective criminal theory" by
replacing actual causation of criminal harm with "suspicion causation"
and by substituting status-as a vagrant, drunkard, or common prostitute-"for the traditional requirement of conduct."'18 2 They also questioned, however, whether the criminal sanction itself was not improvidently used (whatever the statutory language) to address matters like
prostitution, drunkenness, and "petty misbehavior" they deemed "harmstatutes, "police authority to maintain order is much less clear than the average citizen
assumes it to be"); Stuntz, supra note 40, at 1077 (police today lack "informal authority"
provided by invalidated loitering and vagrancy statutes).
178. See Stuntz, supra note 174, at 157 (observing that invalidation of vagrancy and
loitering statutes "accelerated the decline" of preventive foot patrol and contributed to
current reactive styles of policing).
179. See Moore & Kelling, supra note 24, at 57, 60.
180. See, e.g., Frances A. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 1-24 (1964);
Norval Morris & Gordon Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control 2-28
(1969); Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 261-363 (1968); Kadish,
supra note 175, at 30-33.
181. See Packer, supra note 180, at 292. Caleb Foote wrote what became the classic
examination ofjudicial administration of vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and drunkenness
laws based upon a field study in Philadelphia conducted between 1951 and 1954. See
Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603 (1956).
Foote recounted how Philadelphia magistrates' courts routinely handled 50 or more cases
in 15 minutes or less and described a host of procedural deficiencies: for instance, that the
mostly uncounseled defendants were rarely even informed of the charges until "trial" was
completed; that "[tihere was no pretense of proving the crime charged with competent
evidence;" and that the summary procedures failed to screen out defendants who were
innocent or against whom there was insufficient evidence. Id. at 606, 644-47; see also
President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and the Admin. ofJustice, Task Force Report:
The Courts 29-36 (1967) [hereinafter Task Force Report: The Courts] ("conditions of
inequity, indignity, and ineffectiveness" widespread in lower criminal courts dealing with
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, petty gambling, prostitution, and similar
offenses).
182. Gary V. Dubin & Richard H. Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered:
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 102, 104 (1962); see Forrest
W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203,
1203-04, 1219-28 (1953) (reasoning that because crimes of being a "common drunkard,
common prostitute, common thief, tramp or disorderly person" are "defined in terms of
being rather than in terms of acting," they present "peculiar constitutional problems").
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less, although annoying."'18 3 Some suggested, without much resistance
from reform era police managers, that police might be most justified in
focusing their scarce resources on the "most threatening" and "strongly
condemned" of crimes, such as willful homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery and others listed near the top of the Uniform
Crime Report's Index of Serious Crimes.' 84 At any rate, arrests for ofand disorderly conduct declined dramatically in
fenses like drunkenness
85
ensuing years.'
Police scholars advocating renewed attention to the quality of life in
public places do not seek return to a legal regime in which police are
given broad discretion to arrest almost anyone who happens to be found
loitering on a public street. Nor do they take issue with the entirety of
legal scholars' critique of the overreach of the criminal sanction. These
scholars do recognize, however, that the most community-integrated and
problem-oriented of approaches to street disorder cannot obviate the
need for coercion in dealing with some neighborhood problems. If the
proper purpose of police patrol in neighborhoods is "actively and visibly
[to] assist in creating a climate of order, security, and trust in public
places, especially in locations in which crime is concentrated," patrol officers cannot always ignore-or negotiate solutions to-problems of
"public intoxication, playing loud music, panhandling, 'hanging out,'
dangerous skateboarding and cycling" and the like.' 8 6 The Newark patrol officer in Broken Windows relied upon informal authority to enforce
87
Some suggested
purportedly neighborhood-based rules of conduct.'
that reliance on such extralegal authority is necessary.' 8 8 Others argued
that the close, local examination of community problems required by the
new philosophies could generate narrowly drawn legislation that would
8 9
In
provide a constitutionally adequate basis for police intervention.'
most
the
addressing some disorder problems in some communities,
thoughtful of these scholars recognized that there may be a need for
more rather than less law enforcement, and for more law-criminal, civil
and administrative-if only so that it might serve as a basis of authority to
183. Morris & Hawkins, supra note 180, at 12; see Packer, supra note 180, at 328-31,

345-47.
184. E.g., Packer, supra note 180, at 297 (suggesting that criminal sanction should be
limited to conduct of a character like willful homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault,
and robbery); Kadish, supra note 175, at 26 (suggesting that "releasing enforcement

resources from the obligation to enforce vice laws must be taken seriously").
185. In 1960, there were 2.3 million arrests for drunkenness, disorderly conduct,

vagrancy, and suspicion, a number that constituted 52% of all non-traffic arrests in the
United States. See Skogan, supra note 26, at 89. Despite considerable population growth,

in 1985 "there were only 1.4 million arrests in these categories," and they comprised only

16% of non-traffic arrests nationwide. See id. (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation
yearly statistics).
186. Bayley, supra note 68, at 103.
187. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 31.
188. See, e.g., StreetJustice, supra note 145, at 498.
189. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 18, at 134-35.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:551

permit the officer to accomplish informal resolution of a street order
problem. 190
And so the legal questions arise. The first set of questions are difficult enough. To the extent they addressed quality-of-life concerns, reform era police relied on statutes so vague as to be prone to abuse. Can
the new focus on local disorder produce statutes and ordinances that provide a constitutionally acceptable basis for police to assist in dealing with
neighborhood problems? Alternatively, must communities choose between permitting police to use informal, extralegal authority-implicitly
sanctioning police practices that may not comport with the rule of lawor limiting the police to reactive, restricted forms of patrol that may not
address disorder problems of real concern in particular neighborhoods?
Next, even assuming that the order maintenance function can be
"legalized"-captured in adequately definite laws-the problem of police
discretion in enforcement remains. As Egon Bittner described in his classic 1967 work on policing skid row, patrol officers charged with "keeping
the peace" in local neighborhoods treated "the lesser norms of the criminal law"-laws against public drunkenness, disturbing the peace, and the
like-as not simply "defeasible," but as something entirely distinct from
laws to be enforced. 19 1 When deemed necessary to handle a situation, an
arrest was made; often, however, police officers did not arrest people simply because they had committed minor offenses, but instead used their
authority to arrest as a basis for otherwise resolving the matter.1 9 2 Bittner
argued that the patrol officers he encountered came "to view minor offense arrests made solely because legal standards are met as poor craftsmanship." 193 To these officers, laws regulating public conduct, unlike
the laws against homicide or robbery, were not something to be invariably
enforced, but "a resource to solve certain pressing practical problems in
190. See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 68, at 114 (noting that problem-solving orientation

"often requires more law enforcement, not less"); Goldstein, supra note 18, at 127-41
(discussing ways in which police might use ordinances, administrative regulations, criminal
and civil law to address particular policing problems); Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23-24
(suggesting that "vacuum" left by invalidation of public order statutes should be filled by

"enactment of more specifically drawn statutes or ordinances," rather than informal police

activities).
191. Egon Bitmer, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 Am. Soc.
Rev. 699, 710 (1967) (describing field work in two large cities west of the Mississippi); see
also Wilson, supra note 20, at 31 (patrolman approaches order maintenance "not in terms of
enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the situation,'" with law being one resource to

accomplish this end); BrandtJ. Goldstein, Panhandlers atYale: A Case Study in the Limits
of Law, 27 Ind.L. Rev. 295, 337, 340-41, 350 (1993) (public order laws often not enforced
against panhandlers in New Haven's business district when warnings were sufficient to stop
behavior).
192. See Bitmer, supra note 191, at 702, 710.
193. Id. at 711; see also id. at 710 (when intoxicated people "can be induced to leave,
or taken to some shelter, or remanded to someone's care," patrol officer on skid row

maintains that "an arrest would serve no useful purpose").
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keeping the peace." 194 Police intervened "not in the interest of law enforcement but in the interest of producing relative tranquility and order
on the street." 195 An arrest even defeated this objective, at least in one
sense, because it required the officer to leave his beat for a period of time
to process the offender.
Many would agree that a neighborhood's foot patrol officer might
effectively address the problem posed by college students who loiter
outside a fraternity, drinking beer and harassing passersby, by approaching the young people, advising them of the ordinance against public
drinking, and sending them on their way without citation or arrest. The
patrol officer's discretion not to cite or arrest for minor offenses, however, can easily degenerate into discretion to do so for improper reasons:
"[H] ow do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless
mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do
not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?"' 196 Patrol officers have
long exercised the discretion not to enforce the law in all circumstances,
with traffic enforcement being probably the most recognizable arena in
which officers commonly exercise discretion to warn rather than cite offenders. 19 7 The "low visibility" of the police officer's discretion not to
enforce, however, sufficiently concerned some legal scholars in the 1960s
that they called for outright abolition of police discretion not to invoke
the criminal law. 198 With its focus on foot patrol officers attending to
neighborhood disorder, community policing again brings to the forefront these pressing concerns. Police scholars recognize that "it is especially desirable" in the community policing context "that officers have the
option, except when a serious offense is committed, to choose not to enforce the law if another alternative appears more effective."'199
Finally, there is the concern that even if minor disorder problems
can be addressed in narrowly-drawn legislation that affords officers authority to intervene, this legislation might be used simply to broaden officers' discretion to search and seize. The "preventive, penetrating" and
yet "consensual" neighborhood police patrol contemplated in Broken
Windows and in the broader community and problem-oriented policing
194. Id. at 710.
195. Id. at 713.
196. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 35; see Wilson, supra note 20, at 284 (noting
that "benevolence" of "friendly cop" who disregards minor offenses is inevitably
discriminatory, since officer "must choose which and whose misdeeds to ignore").
197. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 136 (intervention without arrest is "built into the
response of most police agencies to motor vehicle violations" and "[m]any more drivers
who violate rules of the road are stopped and warned than are cited or arrested").
198. See, e.g.,Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration ofJustice, 69 Yale LJ. 543, 586 (1960) ("The
ultimate answer is that the police should not be delegated discretion not to invoke the
criminal law.").
199. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23.
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philosophies has already produced more substantive street law in many
communities that purports to regulate the quality of life in public
places. 20 0 These new substantive prohibitions, however, have procedural
effects: increasing the scope of the patrol officer's discretion to stop
people on the street (for playing loud music, harassing passersby, or
loitering around an ATM), to frisk them if the patrol officer has reason to
fear for his safety, and even to search them if the officer is authorized to
and elects to make an arrest. 201 In New York City, for example, where
quality-of-life enforcement has been aggressively pursued by police executives invoking the Broken Windows idea, the police have enthusiastically
proclaimed that vigorous enforcement of petty offenses has permitted
them to conduct more weapons searches, and thus to remove guns from
20 2
the street and deter people from carrying guns in the first place.
While local neighborhoods (or the larger polities of which they are a
part) may well applaud this result, the social-scientific basis articulated in
Broken Windows for addressing neighborhood disorder had nothing to do
with locating guns, narcotics, or other objects on the persons of
disorderly people. Police officers, however, like to make arrests for more
serious crimes. 20 3 Legislative authorization of order maintenance, premised on community and problem-oriented policing ideas, could tempt
police to employ the same aggressive patrol strategies that alienated
ghetto communities in the 1960s, with sometimes tragic results, and that
are themselves inconsistent with the neighborhood-based, broadly consensual patrol envisioned in community policing.
Changes in police theory--the "quiet revolution" 2 04 of community
and problem-oriented policing and the new focus on quality-of-life concerns stimulated by Broken Windows-have already produced changes, on
200. Bayley, supra note 115, at 233-34 (describing character of community-oriented
patrol) (quoted material at 234). For examples of the new "street law," see supra notes 13,
14.
201. See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 1026 (noting that substantive laws have procedural
consequences).
202. See, e.g., Ruben Castaneda, As D.C. Police Struggle On, Change Pays Off in New
York, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1996, at Al (citing New York City Deputy Police Commissioner
for proposition that enforcement of quality-of-life laws against graffiti, aggressive
panhandling, and drinking in public causes people not to carry guns "because they know
they might get stopped"); Clifford Krauss, New York City Crime Falls But Just Why Is a
Mystery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1995, at 1 (New York police officials relate how patrolman who
stopped motorcyclist in lower Manhattan for not wearing helmet "arrested him when he
found two loaded pistols"); Eric Pooley, One Good Apple, Time, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54, 56
(New York City police official notes that enforcement of public drinking law often permits
officers to locate weapons on the people stopped).
203. The typical patrol officer "rarely makes a felony arrest." The Police in America,
supra note 44, at 61. However, just as the popular media present a distorted image of
policing by overemphasizing detective work and the crime-solving ability of the police and
by underemphasizing routine police patrol, many officers in traditional departments value
felony arrests, since these arrests validate their self-image as "crime fighters." See id. at
61-63.
204. Kelling, supra note 31, at 1.
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the ground, in how police departments use their resources and how legislatures and city councils seek to assist them with new legislation. 20 5 But

these changes, which resurrect some old concerns, have not yet been
closely considered in light of the legal transformation in public order law
that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. This Article next turns to reassess
the legal framework surrounding order maintenance and to suggest ways

in which courts and legal scholars might view both the courts' role in
constraining police discretion and the police role in helping people to

maintain, or in some places regain, livable conditions in their
neighborhoods.

II.

POLICE DISCRETION AND THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER

Neighborhood problems-congregations of drug sellers and buyers
on public streets or in parks, the intimidation of residents by young gang
members, aggressive panhandlers who disrupt the flow of people in transportation centers, even the raucous noise that nightly attends the closing
of neighborhood bars-can pose real and substantial threats to communities. Proponents of community and problem-oriented policing have argued that police, closely integrated with the communities they serve,
might assist in ameliorating these problems. Notably, there is an appropriate sense of limit, rectitude, and constraint surrounding their discussion of the positive role that police might play in improving the quality of
life in local neighborhoods. 20 6 There is also a growing recognition, however, shared by some legal scholars, 20 7 that the narrow focus of the past
on the seeming triviality of incidents of minor disorder ignores the communal harms that can be visited upon a neighborhood when these incidents multiply into a neighborhood problem: "[I] n cases where behavior
205. For reports of various local efforts to enhance patrol officers' ability to manage
the quality of life in public places, see supra notes 13, 14, 162; see also Jane Meinhardt,
Police See Fewer Prostitutes on Road, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 17, 1996, at 5, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File (outlining how community policing squad in
Clearwater, Florida, addressed neighborhood street prostitution problem by offering to
assist landlords in screening tenants, asking that convicted prostitutes be prohibited from
returning to besieged streets as condition of probation, working with social service agency
to facilitate drug treatment, and enforcing city ordinance prohibiting loitering for
prostitution); Anne O'Connor & James Walsh, A Place of Hardship and Hope, Star
Tribune (Minneapolis), Dec. 18, 1995, at 10A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File (community policing officer in violence-ridden neighborhood in south Minneapolis
opines that working with community to focus on small crimes like curfew violations,
truancy, prostitution, drug sales, and loitering is necessary to address more serious crime);
Judi Villa, Police Win Back Streets, Ariz. Republic/Phoenix Gazette, Nov. 11, 1995, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File (community police officer in Mesa, Arizona
neighborhood that generated numerous incident calls for stolen vehicles, shootings,
assaults, rapes, and loud parties now talks with residents, mediates noise disputes, passes
along employment information to teenagers, and enforces trespassing and loitering laws).
206. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 33, at 21 (noting that in those police
departments where police abuse is not uncommon, traditional reactive policing may be the
best strategy).
207. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1171-72.
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that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions
of the others-fear, withdrawal, flight-may ultimately make matters
worse for everyone, including the individual who first professed his indifference. '20 8 Maintaining the "invitingness of streets, sidewalks, and
parks," these scholars increasingly assert, "is essential to the viability of...
urban neighborhood[s]."209
More important for present purposes, the advent of the "new policing" raises the question whether police can be authorized, within constitutional constraints, to perform the order maintenance tasks that communities might designate. To answer this question, this Part examines
the ways in which courts have employed the facial vagueness doctrine to
invalidate public order laws. Though such laws can potentially implicate
many constitutional doctrines, courts most directly confront the hard issues implicated in the order maintenance role in the vagueness evaluation: the situational character of this role, in which determining whether
behavior presents a public order problem often depends upon a highly
contextualized assessment of surrounding circumstances; the diminished
importance of "law enforcement" as a primary police objective and the
frequent discretionary use of law as a basis for informal resolution of
street order problems; the resulting relative invisibility of order maintenance to formal legal processes and the problems that this invisibility is
thought to pose forjudicial control. As a result, the vagueness cases most
clearly illuminate courts' ambivalence regarding the inevitable discretion
that police employ in performing order maintenance tasks.
This examination can also help clarify the limited role that facial invalidation of local public order laws can play in constraining police discretion. The need to control police discretion was a principal reason for
the judicial invalidation of many local laws and ordinances in the 1960s
and 1970s. 2 10 Courts invoked the void-for-vagueness doctrine to invali208. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 25, at 36.
209. Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1171.
210. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-68 (1972)
(finding Florida vagrancy statute void for vagueness, inter alia, "because it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests," is broadly written merely "to increase the arsenal of the
police," and because of "unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville
police"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 n.4, 614 (1971) (holding ordinance
prohibiting three or more persons from congregating on sidewalk and conducting
themselves in a manner "annoying to persons passing by" unconstitutionally vague where
violation "may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed");
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (concluding that ordinance
making it "unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk... after
having been requested by any police officer to move on" was void if literally read since "this
ordinance says that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the
whim of any police officer of that city"); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness,
Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205, 222 (1967)
(Supreme Court decisions in 1960s demonstrated concern with laws "which give the police
dictatorial power over the streets").
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date public order laws where the indefiniteness of such laws was believed
to confer excessive discretion upon their street-level enforcers and thus to
promote arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The vagueness doctrine, however, is itself of indefinite reach. It requires that laws be "meaningfully precise" so that citizens can know what conduct is prohibited and
so that the discretion of enforcement authorities is adequately constrained. 21 ' But because vagueness is a matter of degree, the void-forvagueness inquiry is "evaluative rather than mechanistic."2 1 2 The courts
that invoked its open texture to limit police authority in the 1960s and
1970s achieved laudatory results, constraining the police from misuse of
their authority (albeit imperfectly), and offering some protection against
local laws, institutions, and police practices that were imbued with persistent hostility to the poor, to dissidents, and especially to racial minorities.
The open texture of their constitutional reforms, however, has led some
courts in subsequent decades to invalidate reasonably specific public order laws based upon a flawed understanding of the role that facial invalidation plays.
The constitutional invalidation of local laws and ordinances cannot
today be relied upon as the only mechanism-or even a principal onefor restraining police discretion in the exercise of order maintenance
tasks. Even when local laws and ordinances regulating minor forms of
street misconduct establish quite specific substantive criteria to govern
their enforcement, as many recently enacted public order laws do, the
police officer on the street still retains significant discretion: to find the
facts in one-on-one encounters (at least initially, and often without any
subsequent review); to apply the law to the facts (honestly or dishonestly,
with prudence or abandon); to enforce the law with citation or arrest; to
use the law as a basis for informal resolution of a street order problem; or
to ignore its violation altogether. The police department also retains significant discretion: whether to establish policies regarding the enforcement of laws regulating street misconduct; whether to allocate its officers
to neighborhoods where infractions are likely to be observed. Limiting
the discretion that police exercise on the street simply by demanding
specificity in the laws that they enforce is so hopeless, in fact, that one is
tempted to borrow Professor Mashaw's observation about the futility of
attempts to constrain the discretion exercised by administrative agencies
through aggressive employment of the nondelegation doctrine: "Elimithat
nation of discretion at one choice point merely causes the discretion
2 13
had been exercised there to migrate elsewhere in the system."
211. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 196-97 (1985); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983) (vagueness doctrine "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
212. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 196.
213. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L Econ. & Org. 81, 97 (1985).
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Courts have sometimes failed to recognize the limited role that the
vagueness doctrine can play in constraining arbitrary police enforcement
and have attempted to resolve the problem of order maintenance discretion by facially invalidating even quite specific public order laws. This
Part argues such invalidation is a mistake. Judges cannot "solve" the
problem of police discretion on the streets, as some have attempted, by
invalidating the reasonable efforts of communities to authorize police to
deal with a neighborhood's disorder problems. Such invalidation could
prevent communities from experimenting with the more preventive,
quality-of-life police patrol advocated in the new policing theories. The
evidence that this new form of police patrol might prove beneficial,
moreover, is substantial enough to warrant this experimentation.
The argument proceeds in three parts. First, this Part examines the
constitutional reform of public order law that occurred in the 1960s and
1970s. It situates this reform most profoundly in the struggle for civil
rights. Here, the Article depicts how Supreme Court decisions of the period transformed the existing legal regime by introducing due process
concepts into the realm of public order law and by facially invalidating
laws that provided police with virtually blanket authority to regulate public conduct and even public presence as police saw fit. This Part concludes, however, that the period's reforms left unanswered the question
of how far courts should go in attempting to constrain arbitrary police
enforcement through the facial invalidation of public order laws.
Next, this Part turns to two contemporary accounts of how courts
have employed the facial vagueness doctrine in the review of public order
laws. Using these accounts as a framework to discuss the cases, this Part
suggests that some courts have implicitly infused the vagueness prohibition with reform era assumptions about police and the police role. These
courts have sometimes discounted the significance of minor forms of
public misconduct to the quality of urban environments. The result is an
erratic body of decisions, in which some courts have upheld the constitutionality of public order laws, while others have not. This Part concludes
that neither account of the vagueness prohibition, each powerfully descriptive of how courts have understood it, can serve, prescriptively, to
make more definite its indefinite contours.
Finally, this Part contends that the indefinite reach of the vagueness
prohibition could pose a problem for the ongoing experiment with the
new policing. This Part concludes, however, that the case law is not resolutely arrayed against the constitutional validity of public order laws.
Communities electing to focus on quality-of-life concerns may employ an
amalgam of civil, criminal, and administrative law to authorize order
maintenance tasks. The Part argues that unlike the broad public order
laws of the 1960s and 1970s, these new, more specific laws are not facially
aimed at rendering some people, like racial minorities, transients, and
the poor, outsiders to the community. When public order laws are not
directed at such exclusion, courts should not invalidate them. At the
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same time, this Part also concludes that placing reasonable restraints on
the exercise of police discretion remains vitally important even when public order laws are reasonably specific. This is a task, however, that courts
alone cannot perform. This conclusion serves as a prelude to Part III's
discussion of subconstitutional controls.
A. The Legal Transformation
1. The Transformation and Its HistoricalContext. - Before the constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, police operated, at least as a legal
matter, under a broad delegation of authority that licensed them to maintain order in public places largely as they deemed appropriate. Most
states had loitering, drunk and disorderly, and vagrancy statutes, in addition to laws "prohibiting breaches of the peace, disorderly conduct, and
specific forms of public disorder .... ,,214 Though these statutes varied
significantly in approach, they commonly had the effect, singly or in combination, of conferring a remarkable amount of discretion on the local
police. Many citizens were rendered almost perpetually subject to arrest
pursuant to catchall vagrancy laws that criminalized the status of "rogue,"
"vagabond," "habitual loafer," and "common prostitute, drunkard, or
gambler."2 15 Such laws, Justice Frankfurter asserted in the late 1940s,
constituted "a class by themselves" in which statutory precision was "designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men
to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense." 2 16 Prior to
this period of constitutional reform, however, even conduct-based statutes were characteristically quite broad. 21 7 One contemporary commentator characterized (with only mild exaggeration) the then-existing legal
214. See Force, supra note 174, at 384 & n.99.
215. See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 (citing Jacksonville, Florida ordinance
classifying rogues, vagabonds, common gamblers, common drunkards, common night
walkers, disorderly persons, and habitual loafers, inter alia, as vagrants subject to
punishment); People v. Craig, 91 P. 997, 1000 (Cal. 1907) ("Vagrancy differs from most
other offenses in the fact that it is chronic, rather than acute; that it continues after it is
complete, and thereby subjects the offender to arrest at any time before he reforms.");
Model Penal Code § 250.6 cmt. 1 (1980) (noting that loitering statutes commonly
criminalized "living in idleness without employment and having no visible means of
support," as well as "being a common prostitute, drunkard, or gambler"); Jeffrey S. Adler,
A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 27 Criminology 209, 216 (1989) (vagrancy
laws, dating back to colonial America, had become "bloated and distorted" by middle of
this century, and codes grew "longer and more detailed as legislators ... continued to
confront challenges to social order and community life by enlarging [their] scope").
216. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
217. See, e.g., State v. Aucoin, 278 A.2d 395, 396 (Me. 1971) (discussing ordinance
prohibiting loitering "in, on, or adjacent to any of the streets, ways, or public places" in
Portland, Maine); Model Penal Code § 250.2 cmt. 1 (1980) (citing Wisconsin statute that
prohibited any person from engaging in "violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous,
unreasonably loud, or otherwise disorderly conduct" in circumstances in which such
conduct "tend[ed] to cause or provoke a disturbance").

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:551

regime: "Statutes against breach of the peace, vagrancy, drunkenness,
disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, and curfew are so broad that they
'legally' authorize the police to arrest virtually anyone.9"218
This regime was politically acceptable for an extended period because the police, in the main, did not arrest just anyone. Instead, they
used their authority primarily against traditional subjects of heightened
police surveillance who lacked effective political power to complain: "undesirables" of various sorts, and especially minorities, the poor, and the
young.2 1 9 The regime, however, came increasingly under fire in the period leading into the 1960s. Reformers noted that the breadth of vagrancy-style laws rendered them prone to police abuse, citing evidence or
allegations that such statutes were used, among other things, temporarily
to detain classes of people during conventions, elections, or other special
occasions; to break strikes; to "round up" ostensible suspects (for whom
there was no individualized suspicion) when a crime had been committed; and occasionally to suppress the speech of a local mayor's political
opponent. 22 0 These abuses, critics charged, were a product of defects in
the substantive laws. Any criminal statute, they admitted, "can be administered capriciously by officials intent on prosecuting or harassing an
identifiable class or group." 22 ' Vague in terminology and often not predicating arrest and conviction on the commission of any specific act, however, vagrancy laws were peculiarly ill-suited to effective judicial supervision and thus invited arbitrary enforcement and the violation of
constitutional rights. 222
To reformers, the problems posed by these broad laws were only exacerbated by the shocking fact-finding deficiencies in lower criminal
courts. Conditions of "inequity, indignity, and ineffectiveness" characterized the courts in which disorderly conduct, vagrancy, public drunkenness, and petty gambling charges were summarily adjudicated. 223 In fact,
these courts did not operate as trial courts at all, but at best offered informal review of cases "resolved, for all practical purposes, by the police." 22 4
218. Force, supra note 174, at 899.
219. See, e.g., Bitmer, supra note 138, at 97-100 (noting that policing has historically
concentrated on "some ethnic and racial minorities, the poor living in urban slums, and
young people in general," with socially divisive effects) (quoted material at 98); Malcolm
M. Feeley, The Process is the Punishment 4 (1979) (noting prevalence of minorities,
"poor, often unemployed, usually young" as defendants in lower criminal courts); William
J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 553, 560 (1992) ("old-style" loitering and vagrancy laws "politically tolerable" because
people approved police authority exercised against "undesirables").
220. See Lacey, supra note 182, at 1218-19.
221. Dubin & Robinson, supra note 182, at 133.
222. See id. at 132-33, 135.
223. Task Force Report: The Courts, supra note 181, at 29-36 (quoted material at
29).
224. Force, supra note 174, at 404. Writing in 1972, Force argued that the
inadequacies of petty sessions courts stemmed not from their limited resources, but from
"the function they [were] called upon to perform." Id. He noted that the trial of minor
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Magistrates who presided over the courts administering such laws not infrequently sentenced uncounseled indigents to jail without even the semblance of a trial, often on the recommendation of police officers who
observed that they needed to "dry out. '2 25 By 1953, Justices Black and

Douglas were carefully parsing trial court records to make the point that
"dragnet legislation" purporting to render criminal all "idle, or lewd,2 or
26
dissolute" persons was not being fairly administered in lower tribunals.
By 1961, drafters of the Model Penal Code were proposing ways to narrow
the traditional crimes of vagrancy and disorderly conduct.2 27 The wide

discretion afforded police on the street and the administration of 'justice" in lower tribunals were to come increasingly under scrutiny in the
succeeding years. Both would end up substantially transformed.
The mechanisms for this transformation are well understood and so
need no extended elaboration here. Suffice it to say that the transformation was not primarily a product of emerging calls for legislative reform.
Instead, it was the result of federal constitutional decisionmaking- of decisions that extended the right to counsel to petty offenses where a prison
sentence was imposed; 228 that rejected status as a basis for the imposition
of criminal sanctions; 22 9 that employed overbreadth analysis to overturn
offenses was generally superfluous, since significant penalties were rarely imposed and the
real punishment for such infractions-inflicted on the guilty and innocent alike-was the
inconvenience and embarrassment of arrest and prosecution. See id. at 403-04. "Order
maintenance," he argued, "operates at the street, and not the judicial, level." Id. at 402.
The police officer's street level intervention resolved "the immediate problem"; any
injustice that occurred there might be compounded by courts, but was rarely corrected
since as a practical matter, "the arrest and consequent harm [had] already occurred." Id.
225. See Foote, supra note 181, at 632-33 (observing that magistrates in Philadelphia
in early 1950s sentenced those believed to be chronic inebriates tojail on recommendation
of police officers, and in absence of competent evidence presented at a hearing to sustain
any charge of habitual drunkenness).
226. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari); see Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 258-54
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
227. See Model Penal Code §§ 250.1 cmts. 1-9, 250.12 cmts. 1-3 (Tentative Draft No.
13, 1961).
228. See Argersinger v. Hanlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that "absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel"). At the
time Argersinger was decided, 12 states provided counsel for indigents accused of serious
misdemeanor crimes and 19 others provided counsel in most misdemeanor cases. See id.
at 27 n.1; see also Feeley, supra note 219, at 7 (noting extent to which Supreme Court
holding in Argersinger transformed process in lower criminal courts). Parenthetically, the
extension of the jury trial right was also an important ingredient in the transformation of
procedure in the lower criminal courts. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)
(holding that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized").
229. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding violative of
Eighth Amendment state law providing for imprisonment of narcotics addict "even though
he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular
behavior there"); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-34 (1968) (plurality opinion)
(interpreting Robinson to hold that punishment of "mere status" violates Eighth
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convictions where statutes threatened the criminalization of protected
that invalidated statutes and ordinances
First Amendment activity; 23 023and
1
as unconstitutionally vague.
The immediate impetus for much of this transformation came from
mounting evidence that broad laws were being used against participants
in peaceful sit-ins and civil rights demonstrations in the South. 23 2 The
loitering, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy statutes in place in jurisdic2 33
tions across the country were infrequently challenged until the 1960s.

Amendment). The scope of the Robinson holding was much debated in the period before
Powel was decided. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 236 (offering four alternative
interpretations of Robinson). Its precise scope has not been fully clarified by subsequent
decisions, but the plurality in Powel endorsed the narrowest reading available, interpreting
Robinson to mean merely that "criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act... which society has an interest in preventing." 392 U.S. at 533. This
interpretation was sufficient to call into question traditional vagrancy-style laws to the
extent that these laws were interpreted to permit conviction without proof of the
commission of some act. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. ScottJr., Criminal Law § 2.14,
at 182 (2d ed. 1986).
230. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974) (ordinance
making it unlawful "to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or
with reference to" police officer performing his duties is susceptible of application to
protected speech, and therefore overbroad in violation of First and Fourteenth
Amendments); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518-20, 528 (1972) (statute providing for
punishment of any person "who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his
presence... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace," when not narrowed to apply only to fighting words, was on its face
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad) (quoted material at 519).
231. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)
(invalidating vagrancy ordinance as "void for vagueness"); see also Robin Yeamans,
Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 782, 782 (1968) (noting that
only a few state legislatures had attempted to make substantial changes in vagrancy
statutes).
232. As early as 1961, drafters at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute
were advising that revision of disorderly conduct laws was "extremely important" given
evidence that desegregation struggles were provoking frequent arrests for disorderly
conduct, often in the absence of any showing that the person arrested had engaged in any
disruptive conduct whatsoever. ALI, Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting, Proceedings 180
(1961) (remarks of Professor Louis B. Schwartz). Lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, representing students in the sit-in cases, developed sophisticated
legal challenges to the convictions that often followed these arrests. See Jack Greenberg,
Crusaders in the Courts 270-79 (1994) (recounting how Southern blacks who violated
local custom by requesting service at all-white lunch counters were arrested for trespass or
breach of the peace, "cart[ed] off to jail like common criminals, and tr[ied] ... so that
they might be duly fined or imprisoned, or both, for their offense against local custom")
(quoted material at 270). The Supreme Court decided numerous cases in the 1960s
arising from the employment of public order laws against peaceful civil rights
demonstrators. For a partial listing of such cases, see infra note 235.
233. See Yeamans, supra note 231, at 783, 791 (noting 1960s challenges). The early
history of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is well chronicled in Professor Amsterdam's
classic note. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 67 (1960). "Street-cleaning" statutes had, on occasion, been invalidated by courts
by 1960. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 452, 458 (1939) (invalidating
statute providing for punishment of any person "not engaged in any lawful occupation,
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In the context of the ensuing decade's civil rights struggles, however, the
Supreme Court was increasingly called upon to invalidate laws punishing
vagrancy, loitering, trespass, and disorderly conduct.2 3 4 In the face of
such calls, the Warren Court did not rush to embrace wholesale constitutional attacks on admittedly broad laws. Instead, the Court undertook
painstaking factual review in several cases to overturn convictions not because the statutes authorizing punishment were infirm, but because "no
evidence whatever" supported the convictions.23 5 As the limited power of
the Court to reexamine facts in case-by-case adjudication became clear,
however, and as commentators provided substantial theoretical support
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted [of a crime or at least three disorderly persons offenses]") (quoted material at
452); Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 171 (9th Cir. 1931) (invalidating statute
prohibiting any person from habitually "loaf[ing], Ioiter[ing], and/or idl[ing] upon any
public street or highway or in any public place"); In re Newbern, 350 P.2d 116, 124 (Cal.
1960) (finding statute declaring that every "common drunk" is a vagrant unconstitutionally
vague); People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934) (invalidating vagrancy law for
vagueness). But as a general rule, even "exceedingly general" language had been upheld
by most courts in the face of vagueness challenges. See Lacey, supra note 182, at 1221; see
also Stuntz, supra note 219, at 560 n.29 (constitutionality of vagrancy-style laws "fairly clear
prior to the 1960s").
234. See Louis Henkin, Supreme Court Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 63, 66 (1968) (noting increasing calls upon Supreme Court to invalidate ordinances
and statutes "designed to exclude or control those deemed likely to commit crime, and
other 'undesirable elements'") (citation omitted).
235. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 148 n.2, 151 (1964) (no
evidence to support convictions of African Americans who engaged in sit-in at lunch
counter under statute prohibiting any person from engaging in "breach of the peace, any
riotous or disorderly conduct, open obscenity, public drunkenness or any other conduct
grossly indecent or dangerous to ... citizens"); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 165,
173-74 (1961) (holding totally devoid of evidentiary support conviction of African
Americans for sitting at "white lunch counters" under catch all provision prohibiting
commission of any act "in such a manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the public,"
where the act would foreseeably have this result) (quoted material at 170, 165); see also
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969) (no evidence to support disorderly
conduct conviction where demonstrators pressing claims for desegregation of public
schools were not disorderly); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, 596 (1968) (per curiam)
(reversing conviction for violation of Florida vagrancy statute prohibiting "wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object" in absence of
evidence that person seated on bench at bus stop at 4:25 A.M. had wandered or strolled);
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (convictions for loitering and
disorderly conduct supported by "no evidence whatever" and violative of due process);
Greenberg, supra note 232, at 274, 308 (arguing that Warren Court, when it first
articulated "no evidence" doctrine in Thompson, understood that it would be used to deal
with sit-in cases then making their way through lower courts, and noting that Gamei"Court
was "wary of making far-reaching doctrine"); cf. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544,
544-45 (1971) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutionally vague ordinance subjecting to
punishment person who "wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is found
abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who
does not give satisfactory account of himself," as applied in circumstances of defendant's
case).
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for facial invalidation, 23 6 the overbreadth and facial vagueness doctrines
were increasingly employed. These doctrines were used first by the
Warren Court, and then most dramatically by the Burger Court, to strike
down statutes conferring broad authority on the237police over "undesirable" people and ill-defined "disorderly" conduct.
Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville238 was the most dramatic of these
decisions. The case invalidated a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance that
classified "rogues and vagabonds," "lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,"
"common gamblers," "thieves," "habitual loafers," and a medley of others
as vagrants subject to punishment.2 3 9 By the time the Burger Court decided the case in 1972, there was an impressive array of state and lower
federal court authority suggesting that catchall criminal statutes of this
236. For examples of the theoretical literature supporting facial invalidation, see, e.g.,
Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 539-41 ("In
order not to chill conduct within the protection of the Constitution ... it may be necessary
to throw the mantle of protection beyond the constitutional periphery.... ."); Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844,863 (1970) ("The claim that
a statute is bad on its face because overbroad does not turn on evaluation of the factual
data generated by a particular application."); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 75 (interpreting void-for-vagueness doctrine to have
been used by Supreme Court "almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer
zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms," to
protect others not before the Court, and to ensure efficacy of the federal judicial
mechanism for protecting constitutional rights); see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch 149-52 (1962) (expressing support for use of vagueness doctrine both
to invalidate statutes that "may deter conduct that should on principle be altogether free
from governmental regulation" and to constrain discretion of administrators by requiring
legislature to specify clearly the prohibitions that it wishes to enact).
287. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971) (holding facially
void-for-vagueness ordinance making it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to
assemble... on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by" (citation to ordinance omitted)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 536, 544, 551 (1965) (holding "unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad
scope" statute prohibiting congregating with others in or upon a public street, "with intent
to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace
may be occasioned," and refusing to disperse upon request of police officer (citation to
ordinance omitted)).
238. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
239. The relevant law, Jacksonville, Florida Ordinance Code § 26-57, provided:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common
drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places,
common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons,
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D
offenses.
405 U.S. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting ordinance).
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type were unconstitutional. 240 Indeed, the use of status as a basis for imposing criminal punishment had already been rejected by the Supreme
Court on one occasion: the majority of the provisions in Jacksonville's
vagrancy ordinance could have been invalidated simply upon the authority of Robinson v. California, at least in the absence of a showing that
Florida courts required the commission of some act to convict under the
Jacksonville ordinance.2 4 ' Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Douglas instead relied upon the void-for-vagueness doctrine, stating that
the ordinance at issue violated due process by failing to give ordinary
persons fair notice that contemplated conduct was forbidden and by encouraging "arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." 24 2 Stress was
laid, in particular, on the by then well-understood and widely criticized
fact that vagrancy ordinances were designedly cast "to increase the arsenal of the police." 243 An "all-inclusive and generalized" list of crimes that
included such things as wandering or strolling about from place to place
without lawful purpose, Douglas wrote, made possible criminal conviction
for no more than an affront to police authority. 244 "Where, as here,
there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted
by the ordinance," he concluded, such a broad and ill-defined legislative
enactment "permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory en245
forcement of the law."
2. Papachristou and Its Legacy. - Justice Douglas's opinion in
Papachristouhas been so often and so recently hailed as a triumph of the
rule of law246 that even to analyze the Papachristoureasoning seems a trifle sacrilegious. Since it is the constitutional reform of street law symbolized by cases like Papachristou, however, that has led some scholars to
question whether the preventive, consensual patrol envisaged in community policing is even possible in the current legal environment, 247 analysis
is important. Papachristou,a Burger Court decision, was a far cry from the
earlier Warren Court decisions that found ways to afford relief on narrow
grounds to defendants who were misused by police and by lower criminal
courts, at the same time resisting "broadside constitutional challenges" to
240. See Petitioner's Brief at 14 & n.4, Papachristou(No. 70-5030).
241. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that state law
providing for imprisonment of narcotics addict, in the absence of any requirement that he
engage in any "irregular behavior" in the state, violates Eighth Amendment).
242. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
243. Id. at 165.
244. Id. at 166-67.
245. Id. at 170.
246. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 102 (1996)
(void-for-vagueness doctrine "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law"
and Papachristou "exemplary" on its application). But see Ellickson, supra note 14, at
1210-11 (expressing frustration with Papachristou opinion's lack of regard for
"maintenance of basic civility in public spaces") (quoted material at 1211).
247. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 40, at 1076.
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underlying order maintenance laws. 248 Papachristouwas a broad and selfconfident opinion and, in the historical circumstances (given the widespread criticism to which vagrancy laws had been subjected by 1972), not
surprisingly so. The opinion, however, did not so much resolve questions
of how and of how much discretion can be afforded local police to maintain order in public places-a police task, after all, that is an essential part
of the reason, in any historical period, that a society has public police-as
to make apparent that the questions were constitutionally problematic.
At the start, the PapachristouCourt sidestepped the difficult question
lurking behind challenges to vagrancy laws: the character of any substantive constitutional limits that might exist to prevent legislatures from
criminalizing conduct. Public drunkenness, drug use, gambling, begging, loitering around a school yard or for the purpose of selling narcotics (not to mention habitual loafing, or wandering around without lawful
purpose) were all behaviors potentially implicated by the Jacksonville ordinance, and thus made subject to control byJacksonville police. 249 By
1972, legal scholars were already questioning, rather fiercely, the propriety of local police devoting resources to control many of these behaviors
in the face of rising crime rates.250 Significantly, the PapachristouCourt
did note that a provision that criminalized wandering and strolling without lawful purpose implicated traditional privileges "not mentioned in
the Constitution... [but] responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity" essential to
American political character. 251 Though the Court thus "trembled at the
brink" of a difficult substantive analysis, however, the Papachristouopinion ultimately stepped back from this line of thought.252 The Court's
holding did not address whether localities might legitimately concern
themselves with minor street disorder, but only the form in which
Jacksonville had purported to address it.
That is not to say that V'apachristou and other cases of the period,
though cast in procedural terms, were without substantive result. The
legal transformation of the 1960s and 1970s was most profoundly about
imposing upon local street law a requirement that statutes and ordinances regulating public conduct be, to an extent significantly not capable of clear articulation, "transparent."253 Laws should not only deal with
248. See Henkin, supra note 234, at 66 (noting Warren Court's early resistance to
facial challenge). For a representative sample of Warren Court cases, see supra note 235.
249. For the text of the pertinent ordinance, see supra note 239.
250. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
251. Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).

252. See Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social
Orders, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 491, 497, 507 (1994) (quoted material at 497).
253. Cf. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65,
67 (1983) (using transparency to refer to degree to which rules employ "words with welldefined and universally accepted meanings within the relevant community," and citing this
quality as the "virtue chiefly celebrated in the 'void-for-vagueness' doctrine").
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prohibited acts, rather than statuses, 25 4 they should do so, in their own
words or as construed by state courts, in language of adequate definiteness-though to a degree admittedly "not calculable with precision."255
On their face or as interpreted, they should "aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of [governmental] control," while clearly excising potential applications (at least of substantial magnitude) to protected
First Amendment activity.25 6 These doctrinal developments-each purporting to impose no bar to legislative activity, but merely to address the
appropriate manner in which legislatures might act-were adequate to
transform utterly the existing legal regime. 25 7 At the conclusion of this
transformation, however, it was not at all clear what new, more appropriately narrowed regime might be legislated to authorize police to enforce
standards of civility and maintain order in public places:
Papachristou'sinvocation of vagueness doctrine is illustrative. In theory, the void-for-vagueness doctrine implements the principle of legality
254. See supra note 229.
255. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-31, at 1033 (2d ed. 1988);
see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) ("'In evaluating a facial challenge to
a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state
court or enforcement agency has proffered.'") (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)).
256. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 105-06 (1940) (statute prohibiting all
picketing void on its face since it bans peaceful picketing protected by the First
Amendment). Overbreadth doctrine had its genesis in the Thornhill decision, though its
salience in the context of challenges to common breach of the peace laws became clear
later. For some notable examples, see supra note 230 (citing cases). The doctrine has
been traditionally understood as an exception to conventional standing concepts. It
permits individuals to challenge a statute on its face, even when their own conduct might
validly be prohibited, where "protected [First Amendment] activity is a significant part of
the law's target," and "there exists no satisfactory way of severing the law's constitutional
from its unconstitutional applications so as to excise the latter clearly in a single step from
the law's reach." Tribe, supra note 255, § 12-27, at 1022-23 (quoted material at 1022). But
see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (1981) (interpreting
overbreadth doctrine as involving application of conventional standing concepts-to the
effect that litigant has right to be judged in accordance with constitutionally valid rule of
law-in First Amendment context). By 1973, the Court had cautioned that the doctrine's
facial invalidation approach, premised on the theory that case-by-case invalidation of
improper applications is inadequate to prevent overbroad statutes from deterring First
Amendment activity, is "strong medicine," to be employed only when the overbreadth of a
statute regulating conduct is both real and substantial "judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973). Efforts
to develop any clear, limiting conception for the doctrine, however, have had limited
success, and overbreadth doctrine, as Professor Monaghan recognized in 1981, is "widely
perceived to be erratic and confusing." Monaghan, supra, at 2; see also Geoffrey R. Stone
et al., Constitutional Law 1127 (2d ed. 1991) (ultimate impact of Broadrick's "substantial
overbreadth" requirement "remains obscure"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 853 (1991) (First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, fifty
years after inception, "remains little understood").
257. See Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1209 ("Especially in the period between 1965 and
1975, judges ... made dozens of constitutional rulings that swept away the preexisting
legal code of the streets.").
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by policing the criminal code, demanding that penal statutes be drafted
"with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement." 258 The doctrine's principal concern,
implicit in Papachristouand made apparent in subsequent cases, is to require that laws provide adequate guidelines for enforcement so as to narrow the discretion of law enforcement authorities and to limit their opportunity to "'pursue... personal predilections"' in enforcing indefinite
laws. 259 It is by now a truism, however, that the judicial invalidation of
vague statutes is itself an indefinite enterprise. 260 As ProfessorJeffries has
said, "there is no yardstick of impermissible indeterminacy" in evaluating
statutes and ordinances. 2 6 ' The void-for-vagueness doctrine, both before
and after Papachristou,was not without orienting interpretive principles:
where the uncertain reach of a statute implicates First Amendment interests, more precision in drafting is required; 262 criminal laws must be
more precise than laws imposing only civil penalties.2 63 But in the absence of any precise metric with which to assess the permissible indeterminacy of public order laws, courts after Papachristoutook on the difficult
task of deciding just when the indefinite reach of such laws invited arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Papachristouprovided no framework for this inquiry beyond the substantive overtones lurking in the
opinion-overtones that suggested to some that the Court's judgment in
258. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
259. Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)); see alsojeffiries,
supra note 211, at 206-10, 218 (approving of Kolenders emphasis on susceptibility of vague
law to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and arguing that notice rationale for
vagueness doctrine is unsatisfactory). Papachrislouinvoked the notice rationale, but the
Court's emphasis was on the extent to which the vagrancy ordinance invited arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71
(1972).
260. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (unconstitutional indefiniteness "is itself an indefinite concept");Jeffries, supra
note 211, at 197 (vagueness inquiry "cannot be quantified"); Mark Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 660 (1981) (vagueness
review administered "in a very un-rule-like fashion"); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 233, at 70-71 (void-for-vagueness decisions
habitually lack informing reasoning).
261. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 196.
262. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982) (if law "interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more
stringent vagueness test should apply"); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573 ("Where a statute's literal
scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression
sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity
than in other contexts."); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("[T]his Court has
intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a
statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech .... ").
263. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99 (explaining that Court has
expressed greater tolerance of vagueness in enactments with civil rather than criminal
penalties); Winters, 333 U.S. at 515 (standard of certainty "in statutes punishing for offenses
is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement").
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Papachristouwas not about vagueness at all, but was an implicit judicial
may not enforce "middle-class virtue" in dealing
conclusion that police
64

2
with the public.

Not surprisingly, challenges to various public order laws produced

disparate results in jurisdictions across the country. Consider, for instance, laws prohibiting loitering around particular places, like school
grounds. A foot patrol officer whose beat includes a neighborhood
school might well employ a school loitering ordinance as a basis to approach persons lingering without apparent reason on or around school
property, to investigate, or to request that such people move along. By
1981, however, a provision prohibiting loitering in or about a school
building or its grounds, "not having any reason or relationship involving
custody of, or responsibility for, a pupil or any other specific, legitimate
reason for being there, and not having written permission from a school
administrator," was a trap threatening the criminalization of innocent

acts, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, and therefore void for
vagueness. 26 5 In the eyes of New York's highest court, however, a similar

provision expressed appropriate concern with the protection of young
people from narcotics peddlers, sex offenders, and those who might inad-

vertently cause fires or other disasters around school buildings; it was

"sufficiently clear and unambiguous" to withstand constitutional chal-

public order laws likewise received different treatment in
lenge.2 66 Other 267
different courts.

264. See Post, supra note 252, at 498, 507; see also John Kaplan & Robert Weisberg,
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 990 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that commentators have
argued that vagueness doctrine, "although framed as a procedural protection, is in fact a
substantive one," and posing question whether recharacterizing the doctrine in substantive
terms "provide[s] a more compelling justification for invalidating certain statutes");
Kelman, supra note 260, at 661 (noting that though vagueness doctrine is framed as a
procedural protection, it is used to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds).
265. See People ex rel. C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 594, 595-96 (Colo. 1981) (en banc)
(school loitering statute ambiguous, inter alia, in use of word "about" school or its grounds
and in requirement that loiterer have no "specific, legitimate reason" for loitering in area)
(quoted material at 595, 596).
266. People v.Johnson, 161 N.E.2d 9, 10, 11 (N.Y. 1959) (upholding statute providing
for punishment of "[any person not the parent or legal guardian of a pupil in regular
attendance at said school who loiters in or about any school building or grounds without
written permission from the principal, custodian or other person in charge thereof, or in
violation of posted rules or regulation governing the use thereof") (quoted material at
10). The NewYork Court of Appeals cited the Johnson holding with approval in 1988. See
People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (N.Y. 1988). New York's school loitering statute
was subsequently amended, so that New York's current statute is now an almost precise
replica of the statute invalidated in Colorado. See N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(5) (McKinney

1989).
267. Consider, for instance, laws that prohibit loitering with the purpose of engaging
in criminal conduct like prostitution or drug-related activity. The Supreme Court
dismissed a vagueness challenge to such a law for want of a substantial federal question
only a few years after Papachristou. See State ex rel.Juvenile Dep't v. D., 557 P.2d 687 (Or.
1976) (evaluating law prohibiting loitering "under circumstances manifesting" unlawful
purpose of "inducing, enticing, soliciting or procuring another to commit an act of
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The legal transformation symbolized by Papachristou-atransformation concerning the character of the substantive criminal law-was seldom even mentioned in the lively contemporary debate over the Warren
Court's criminal procedure revolution and its subsequent treatment by
the Burger Court.2 68 By the time Papachristouwas decided, reform era
police had already retreated from the order maintenance tasks that oldstyle vagrancy legislation authorized. While they stridently decried decisions intruding upon their investigatory practices, police were less likely
to consider Papachristoua substantial hindrance to the performance of
policing tasks. 2 69 Indeed, police managers might well have viewed the
decision as a constitutional justification for abandoning order maintenance and focusing on a reform era agenda.
The Burger Court's decision in Papachristouand similar cases of the
period, however, were at least as important to policing as were some of
prostitution"), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 914 (1977). Though many courts have upheld
such laws against constitutional attack, their treatment by federal courts and state supreme
courts in the aftermath of the Papachristoudecision has been far from uniform. Compare
Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding unconstitutionally
overbroad ordinance prohibiting loitering "in a manner and under circumstances
manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting, or procuring another to commit
an act of prostitution, lewdness, or assignation"); Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, 584
P.2d 35 (Alaska 1978) (holding void for vagueness ordinance prohibiting loitering for
purpose of solicitation of prostitution); E.L. v. Florida, 619 So.2d 252, 252 n.2 (Fla. 1993)
(ordinance prohibiting loitering "in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the
purpose to engage in drug related activities" unconstitutional as vague, overbroad, and
violative of substantive due process); Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1993) (holding
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad ordinance prohibiting loitering "in a manner and
under circumstances manifesting the purpose" of soliciting for prostitution); and City of
Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993) (only available constructions of ordinance
prohibiting loitering "in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to
engage in drug-related activity" render it either unconstitutionally vague or overbroad),
with Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 250 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1978) (prostitution-loitering
ordinance not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032 (N.Y. 1978)
(statute proscribing loitering for purpose of prostitution not invalid for vagueness); City of
Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (drug loitering statute neither
vague nor overbroad); City of Seattle v. Slack, 784 P.2d 494 (Wash. 1989) (prostitutionloitering statute not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); and City of Milwaukee v.
Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1980) (statute prohibiting loitering with intent to solicit for
prostitution not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
268. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 43 (noting that constitutional decisions
that "shielded" disorderly conduct from constitutionally acceptable regulation received less
attention than Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions).
269. See id. at 42-43 (noting police criticism at the handing down of major Warren
Court criminal procedural decisions). Ironically, the criminal procedural reforms of the
Warren Court not only helped constrain police abuse in the criminal investigative process,
they also stimulated police to refine their investigative methods-thus implicitly
supporting reform era goals. See id. at 43, 74. The Warren Court reforms were largely
accepted within the police community in succeeding years: "[Flew in policing believe
today that the decisions had a serious deleterious effect on the ability of police to carry out
criminal investigations or prepare cases for court." Id. at 43.
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the procedural innovations of the Warren Court.270 The immediate effect of the Papachristou transformation was markedly positive. Police
could no longer be empowered-or from the perspective of a progressive
police executive, dangerously required-to devise their own standards of
public decorum and to enforce those standards by controlling people
they deemed undesirable. Laws were required to be sufficiently clear,
delineating their scope and the limits on the authority they vested in police, so that courts might have a meaningful opportunity to review their
enforcement and so that the Supreme Court, in light of its inability to
police the administration of public order laws case by case, would have
some assurance of an overall probability of regular administration. 2 71 Reformers could legitimately be optimistic that the period's constitutional
decisions, by demanding clarity in substantive laws and narrowing their
permissible scope, would improve the quality of adjudication in lower
criminal courts. Parenthetically, the constitutional requirement that
counsel be provided in a wider category of minor criminal offenses had
already substantially improved, though not rendered unproblematic, the
2 72
administration of justice in these lower tribunals.
Nevertheless, there was no clear answer-there could be no clear
answer within the open texture of the period's constitutional reforms-to
the question of how far courts should go in limiting police discretion by
demanding specificity in public order laws. The historical record reflects
that in invoking doctrines like void-for-vagueness to invalidate such laws,
courts of the period were concerned, quite apart from considerations of
semantics and the disembodied precision of language, with a social context and with social issues: namely, with the civil disorders of the 1960s
and their provocation, in part, by the racially segregated police departments that adopted aggressive and discriminatory patrol tactics in ghetto
neighborhoods; 2 73 with police who seemed bent on repressing civil rights
270. See id. at 49-64 (noting importance of both street disorder and criminal
procedure decisions).
271. Professor Amsterdam has interpreted the vagueness doctrine as a mechanism for
use by the Supreme Court to assure some degree of regularity in local law administration,
so as to preserve the Court's status "as the final arbiter between the competing wills and
needs of the whole people (represented in its legislatures) and of the individual." Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 233, at 89-90.
Subsequent commentators have noted the strength of this analysis, while recognizing that
it cannot now account for the common invocation of the doctrine by state and local courts.
SeeJeffiies, supra note 211, at 196 n.19.
272. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Court Reform on Trial 31 (1983) (noting that despite
continuing problems, defendants in criminal courts, as of early 1980s, "are better served by
the courts... than ever before").
273. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 616 n.6 (1971) (striking
down ordinance making it a crime for "three or more persons to assemble.., on any of
the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by," and citing Kerner Commission Report for proposition that "alleged discriminatory
enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil
disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967").
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protest and enforcing segregation in the South. 2 74 By the mid-1980s,
commentators assessing the admittedly open-ended character of vagueness review could affirm that the invalidation of some public order laws
could "plausibly be viewed as a prophylactic" against racial discrimination.2 75 They could recognize that in invoking the vagueness doctrine,
judges "seem to entertain differing assumptions about federal law enforcement as compared to state, and especially local, law enforcement,"276 and that "street-cleaning statutes'-those "local ordinances directed against some form of public nuisance, typically involving trivial
misconduct, usually with no specifically identifiable victim, and carrying
minor penalties"-are especially vulnerable.2 77 The appropriate bounds
within which police might be granted authority to perform order maintenance tasks, however, remained relatively unexplored at the theoretical
level and ill-defined in practice. This void in the discussion surrounding
the period's reforms would assume greater salience as communities in
subsequent decades faced new problems and called upon police to assist
in their amelioration.
B. The Legal Transformation Revisited
To assess the effect of the Papachristoureforms on the present aspiration of many communities to address quality-of-life concerns, one must
acknowledge that these reforms, however sweeping, also involved courts
in a narrow and traditional role: the essentially negative one of checking
legislative delegations of governmental power. Police scholars have long
contended that despite periodic appearances to the contrary, courts
"have no control over police work," that they have never asserted such
control, and that "it is exceedingly unlikely that they will claim such powers in the foreseeable future, all things being equal."27 8 In assessing the
constitutional reforms symbolized by Papachristou,and in particular their
effect on taming police discretion, one is inclined, with some significant
reservations, to agree. Courts invalidated vagrancy laws that licensed police to maintain order as they deemed appropriate-imposing traditional
rule-of-law constraints on the exercise of governmental authority over private individuals-and in doing so, placed significant (and appropriate)
274. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (holding breach of peace
statute "unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope" in case involving peaceful
demonstration by students protesting segregation and arrest of fellow students who had
picketed stores that maintained segregated lunch counters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
275. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 197.
276. Id. at 197. See alsoJeffrey I. Tilden, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness,
67 Va. L. Rev. 1543, 1556-57 (1981) (noting that Supreme Court has rarely found federal
statutes void for vagueness and suggesting that "extra measure of solicitude" for federal
statutes is reflection of Supreme Court power "to construe, and oversee the administration
of, federal statutes," and also belief that "federal courts are ...more sensitive to the due
process concerns that underlie the vagueness doctrine").
277. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 215-16.
278. Bitmer, supra note 138, at 112.
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restrictions on the order maintenance activities of police departments.
The reforms, however, were limited. Cast in procedural terms, these decisions invited localities to enact new, narrower public order laws. The
period's constitutional reforms left untouched the patrolman's discretion
to enforce or not enforce valid public order laws-a discretion that, as
commentators have long understood, can be a convenient mask. concealing failures of equal protection.2 79 Important aspects of police discretion
in maintaining public order-the establishment of police priorities, the
allocation of scarce foot patrol officers alternatively to politically powerful
or poverty-ridden neighborhoods, and the formulation of policies concerning when laws against truancy and panhandling in subways will be
enforced-remained (and remain) largely outside judicial control.
Nevertheless, these constitutional reforms signaled that courts would
"police" legislative enactments authorizing order maintenance, while at
the same time the imprecise contours of these reforms left the terms of
this "policing" largely unspecified. The Supreme Court has struggled,
with only qualified success, to articulate limiting conceptions on the circumstances in which facial invalidation of public order laws is appropriate.28 0 Meanwhile, in Papachristou'saftermath, some state courts have
279. Arrest and prosecution deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification is a denial of equal protection. The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that a defendant "may demonstrate that the
administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a particular class of
persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system of prosecution
amounts to 'a practical denial' of equal protection of the law." United States v. Armstrong,
116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
Wayne LaFave's observation over 30 years ago, however, that equal protection. claims
constitute only a limited control over the exercise of police discretion given the "extremely
heavy burden of proof" that defendants must bear in overcoming the presumption of
regularity attached to criminal prosecutions, remains true today. See Wayne R. LaFave,
Arrest 163, 161-164 (1965); see also Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. at 1486 (to dispel presumption
that prosecutor has not violated equal protection, "a criminal defendant must present
'clear evidence to the contrary'" (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926))); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365, 1373 (1987) (because of many factors that can affect
decision to bring charges and difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, requirement of
proof in selective prosecution cases that prosecution was impermissibly motivated "disables
most selective prosecution claims from succeeding, which they almost never do"):
280. Within months of the Papachristou decision, Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority in upholding an ordinance prohibiting any person from willfully making, in the
environs of a school, "'any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace
or good order'" of classes, was warning that "mathematical certainty" in the language of
public order statutes could not be required and that "the exercise of some degree of police
judgment" is necessary in the enforcement of statutes. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108, 110, 114 (1972). The Court, however, has been less than clear as to when
facial vagueness challenges should be entertained and has had difficulty setting out
definitively the circumstances in which overbreadth review is appropriate. See Fallon,
supra note 256, at 904 n.309 (Supreme Court "has sent mixed signals as to whether a party
may challenge a statute, which clearly applies to her conduct, on the ground that it would
be impermissibly vague as applied to the different conduct of someone else"); Monaghan,
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read the Court's case law as a broad directive to invalidate any public
order law that seems to require the exercise of police judgment or that
has theoretical application, however attenuated, to activity protected by
the First Amendment. 28 1 The issue at the heart of this erratic and confusing body of case law is the control of police discretion and the appropriate role ofjudicial invalidation of indefinite laws in constraining that discretion in the maintenance of public order.28 2 Since this concern is
central to modem vagueness review, this Part examines the two principal
contemporary accounts of the void-for-vagueness doctrine's application
to public order laws-suggesting, along the way, that some courts have
inappropriately extended the facial invalidation technique. The Part
concludes that neither account of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, each
powerfully descriptive of the ways in which courts have invoked the doctrine, can serve to clarify for prescriptive purposes the appropriate role of
judicial invalidation in constraining police discretion in the performance
of order maintenance tasks.
1. Rules and Standards.- The first account of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine answers the question whether public order laws invite "arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement" 2 83 in light of legislative choices between
precise rules and indefinite standards. ProfessorJeffries has explained an
apparent anomaly in vagueness review-the relative tolerance for imprecise standards in many criminal laws and the more common invalidation
of public order laws embodying such standards-in terms of the promotion of what he terms, "rule of law" values. 284 Where a public nuisance

involves trivial misconduct, usually with no identifiable victim, and ensupra note 256, at 2 (Supreme Court and commentators "have struggled with various
limiting conceptions" on when overbreadth's facial scrutiny approach is appropriate).
281. In one case, for example, even the best effort of Model Penal Code drafters to
address a classic form of disorderly conduct-public brawling-was struck down as

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See Marks v. Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 645-46
(Alaska 1972) (invalidating as vague and overbroad Model Penal Code-patterned
ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, "[elngaging in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior" with "purpose and intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance

or alarm, or recklessly creat[ing] a risk thereof" (quoting Anchorage Code of Ordinances
§ 15-1 (1970))); see also Model Penal Code § 250.2(1) (a) cmt. 3 at 330 (1980) (noting that
one of the chief uses of disorderly conduct statutes is to prohibit public brawling, and

discussing provision in light of that purpose).
282. This concern is central to modem vagueness review, see, e.g., Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (invalidating suspicious loitering statute on view that it
vested "virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police" to determine whether it

had been violated, and noting that predominant concern of vagueness doctrine is whether
statute contains "minimal guidelines" to govern enforcement), but also appears as a
consideration, albeit less frequently, in overbreadth case law. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963) (in invalidating champerty statute, noting concern that broad,
vague law at issue "len[t] itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes").

283. Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (noting vagueness
prohibition against laws that "encourage[ ] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
the law").
284. See Jeffries, supra note 211, at 215-16.
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forcement must be left to cops on the beat, there is increased danger of
abusive enforcement not present in the administration of laws against serious crimes-where the public attention afforded to such crimes, the
monitoring of enforcement by victims and their families, and the early
involvement of prosecutors all promote regular administration. 28 5 In this
account, the invalidation of open-ended suspicious-loitering and disorderly conduct laws thus constrains police arbitrariness-serving almost
as a prophylactic against racial discrimination-by imposing higher standards of specificity on public order laws than are necessary elsewhere,
and even by expressing a preference that police should be guided to the
extent possible by rules or rule-like provisions. 286 The void-for-vagueness
doctrine might plausibly be argued to require a "rule-like criminal
code;" 28 7 ProfessorJeffries's elaboration has the virtue of explaining why
the doctrine is only rarely used to this end, and then usually in the context of laws against minor disorder.
This subtle account of the concerns animating vagueness review in
the context of "street-cleaning" statutes is powerful as a descriptive matter-providing a cogent explanation, for instance, of the Supreme
Court's result in Kolender v. Lawson.288 Kolender struck down as facially
vague a statute that as construed required "persons 'who loiter or wander
on the streets' to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification" when
requested by police in "circumstances that would justify a stop under the
standards of Terry v. Ohio."28 9 Though a state court had further defined
"credible and reliable identification" to mean identification that carried a
"reasonable assurance" of its authenticity and provided "means for later
getting in touch with the person," the Court's focus was upon the absence
of even more specific guidelines to govern the police officer's discretion. 290 The result is not explained by the notice rationale for the vagueness doctrine, since "liability attaches only after [an offender] has been
asked to identify himself and has refused to do so."'2 91 Furthermore, the
285. See id. at 216.
286. Note the word "preference." Professor Jeffries recognizes that the "practical
inability to vindicate legitimate societal interests in any less threatening way" may require
"tolerance for indefinite standards," but argues that this tolerance is reduced in the
context of public order laws, in large part because of the special danger of arbitrary
enforcement that such laws pose. Id. at 215-18 (quoted material at 215-16, 218).
287. See Kelman, supra note 260, at 660.
288. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
289. Id. at 353 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The statute provided that
loiterers had committed a misdemeanor when they loitered without apparent reason and
refused to identify themselves and to account for their presence upon request by a police
officer "if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that
the public safety demands such identification." Id. at 353 n.1 (quoting Cal. Penal Code
§ 647(e) (West 1970)). The statute had been construed by the California Court of Appeal
to require "that an individual provide 'credible and reliable' identification when
requested" in circumstances that would "justify a Terry detention." Id. at 355-56.
290. Id. at 355-58 (quoted material at 357).
291. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 217.
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Court's demand for specificity in the statutory language as construed was
particularly exacting. As Professor Jeffries argues, this suggests that the
Court's principal concern was the susceptibility of the law to abusive enforcement by police officers, who were vested with discretion on the
street "to determine whether the suspect ha[d] satisfied the statute and
29 2
must be permitted to go on his way."
Despite its descriptive power, however, the "rule-of-law" perspective
on public order statutes has its difficulties as a prescriptive guide to judicial review. First, some courts appear to have taken Papachristouas settling the rules-standards dilemma in favor of rules-and rather specific
ones-in the context of public order laws that are considerably more circumscribed than the vagrancy, suspicious loitering, and disorderly conduct laws with which Professor Jeffiies was concerned.2 93 So a prohibidon against loitering "about" a school building or its grounds, to the
Colorado Supreme Court, "illustrates the broad sweep of the statutory
proscription," since "[h]ow close to the bounds of the school grounds
29 4
one must be .. .cannot be answered with any degree of certainty."

Few would dispute that the police should be authorized to separate combatants in a bar dispute-a common form of public nuisance. To the
Alaska Supreme Court, however, an ordinance prohibiting any person
292. Id. at 218 (quoting Kolende, 461 U.S. at 358). The facts in Kolnder would seem to
bear out the Court's concern. The case arose when Edward Lawson, an African American
diskjockey and promoter of rock music, was arrested fifteen times by the San Diego police
between March 1975 andJanuary 1977 during his late night walks "in lily-white San Diego
neighborhoods." Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 98-99. These walks resulted in
frequent stops by police, who would ask for identification which Lawson invariably refused
to provide. He was "prosecuted only twice, was once convicted; the second charge was
dismissed." Id. at 99. Lawson collected substantial civil damages from the City of San
Diego as a result of his legal challenge to its suspicious-loitering law. See id.
293. As Ehrlich and Posner have recognized, though exposition is sometimes
facilitated by treating rules and standards as dichotomous, the difference between the two
might be more accurately characterized as a matter of degree involving the relative
precision of legal language. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3J. Legal Stud. 257, 258 (1974). This observation is particularly apt
in considering vagueness challenges to public order statutes. Consider three ordinances
prohibiting loitering "unreasonably close to an ATM," "about an ATM," and "within 100
feet of an ATM." In conventional parlance, the first ordinance states a standard, while the
second and third state rules, one more precise than the other. Each of these ordinances,
however, might be subject to invalidation for vagueness, depending upon the degree of
specificity demanded by the reviewing court. Compare Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500
P.2d 644, 653 (Alaska 1972) (prohibition on making "unreasonable noise," with "'purpose
and intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,'" impermissibly vague,
inter alia, in use of word "unreasonable" (quoting Anchorage Code of Ordinances § 15-1
(1970)) (emphasis omitted)), with People ex rel. C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 595-96 (Colo. 1981)
(prohibition on loitering "about" school building or its grounds impermissibly vague, inter
alia, in use of word "about'); with State v. Aucoin, 278 A.2d 395, 396 (Me. 1971)
(ordinance prohibiting person from loitering "in, on, or adjacent to any of the streets,
ways, or public places" in Portland impermissibly vague in use of word "loitering," at least
"without more as a criterion of criminal conduct").
294. People ex. rd. C.M., 630 P.2d at 595-96.
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from "'fighting,"' "'threatening,"' or engaging in "'tumultuous"' or even
"'violent"' behavior, with the intent to cause "'public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,"' is "peppered with indefinite words," so that "it is particularly subject to the abuse of uneven enforcement," to the point that

"there is no escape from the conclusion that the ordinance is... void for
vagueness." 295 "No fighting," at a minimum, would seem to state a rather
precise rule. But the exercise of police judgment required to recognize
that behavior, according to the Alaska court, was impermissible, and the
296
ordinance void in its entirety.

The problem with the quest for "rules" in the formulation of public

order laws is that the task of maintaining order is itself inherently one of
judgment. In many cases, this task cannot be optimally authorized in
rules of ministerial character.2 97 Consider noise. Though unaffected citizens would likely "be inclined to rank it at the bottom" in any list of police priorities, as much as twenty-two percent of all calls made to the police during early morning hours concern noise-some from
cantankerous and unreasonable complainants, but many from seriously
aggrieved people who have lost sleep or suffered the aggravation of emotional problems, and whose homes may have become uninhabitable because of unreasonable noise at inappropriate times. 2 98 Police spend a
great deal of time mediating disputes between neighbors about noise or,
in some cases, enforcing laws against noise. Noise abatement is a classic
"low visibility" police activity, however, that involves comparatively trivial
misconduct, often the absence of an identifiable victim, and the dispersed enforcement authority associated with a heightened risk of abusive administration.
295. Marks, 500 P.2d at 645, 652-53 (quoting Anchorage Code of Ordinances § 15-1
(1970)).
296. To be fair, the Alaska Supreme Court did not consider severability, based on its
conclusion that the prefatory language containing the mens rea for the specifically
enumerated prohibited acts was itself impermissibly vague. See id. The Model Penal Code
language has been upheld by other courts. See, e.g., State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986, 988
(Conn. 1994) (holding prefatory language that person, "'with intent to cause
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,'" commits
prohibited acts to be adequately definite, and rejecting facial challenge to Model Penal
Code-derived statutory provision prohibiting person from engaging in "'fighting or in
violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior'" (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182 (1996))
(emphasis omitted)).
297. Professor Jeffiries's account of the vagueness doctrine recognizes that the
preference for rules is qualified. See Jeffiies, supra note 211, at 218 (noting that
commitment to "rule of law" value in having "rule-like" penal laws is neither "dogmatic
[n]or unqualified," and "is often compromised in the name of competing interests").
298. Improving Policing, supra note 24, at 247 (noting that while unaffected citizens
rank noise abatement as a low priority "many are seriously aggrieved and justified in their
appeal for relief'); see Goldstein, supra note 18, at 92-93 (citing percentage of noise
abatement calls observed in one study); Bratton, supra note 162, at 460 (citing excessive
street noise as a "chronic problem" in New York City and "perhaps the most common
complaint to the police").
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So what degree of specificity is appropriate in laws regulating noise?
Model Penal Code drafters included within their proposed disorderly
conduct law a standard aimed at noise constituting a public nuisance.
The model law, approved by the American Law Institute in 1962, prohibits persons from making "unreasonable" noise "with purpose to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof."299 By 1980, however, commentators to the Model Penal Code
(with the intervening case law in mind) were speculating that "it is certainly open to question" whether this prohibition "could survive a constitutional attack for vagueness." 00 Courts, moreover, have reached divergent results in reviewing ordinances patterned on the Code. s01
Noise abatement is something that police must be authorized to do.
One could imagine, then, an alternative to the Model Penal Code formulation: a rather complicated legal code that would attempt to state
volumes (in decibel formulation as measured from specified distances)
permissible at different parts of the city, at different times of day, and in
different circumstances. In effect, this code would aspire to distinguish
between volume levels appropriate for the orator drawing a friendly
crowd in a public park and the feuding couple driving customers away
from the pizza parlor down the street. Such a code, if constitutionally
imposed, might in theory diminish the necessity of police judgment in
enforcement, though it would admittedly still leave the officer with substantial discretion to enforce or not to enforce. It would also be both
over and underinclusive, difficult if not impossible to learn and administer, burdensome in localities not already equipped with noise meters, and
arguably less immediately accessible to many citizens who might want to
299. Model Penal Code § 250.2(1)(b) (1980).
300. Id. cmt. 4(d) at 347.
301. Compare Price v. Indiana, 622 N.E.2d 954, 966-67 (Ind. 1993) (rejecting
vagueness and overbreadth challenge to anti-noise ordinance patterned on Model Penal
Code); People v. Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d 738, 739 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam) (same); and
Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. 1980) (rejecting vagueness challenge
to Model Penal Code-derived anti-noise law), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 894 (1980), with
Langford v. City of Omaha, 755 F. Supp. 1460, 1462-63 (D. Neb. 1989) (invalidating
Model Penal Code-derived anti-noise ordinance for vagueness); Marks v. City of
Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 652 (Alaska 1972) (invalidating Model Penal Code-styled
prohibition on unreasonable noise as both overbroad and vague); and State v. Compher,
No. 1174-1175, 1985 WL 17456, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1985) (holding anti-noise
ordinance patterned on Model Penal Code void-for-vagueness). Parenthetically, though
noise regulation implicates First Amendment concerns, these concerns do not explain the
results in those cases in which Model Penal Code-derived regulations have been
invalidated. In practice, the Supreme Court has shown significant deference to contentneutral legislation promoting the state's "'substantial interest in protecting its citizens from
unwelcome noise.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989) (upholding
New York City ordinance requiring performers at band shell in Central Park to use City's
sound equipment and technician to ensure that musical performances did not disturb
surrounding area, and quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806
(1984)); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1949) (rejecting vagueness
challenge to city ordinance forbidding "loud and raucous" sound amplification).
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know how noisy they can be.3 0 2 The degree of precision appropriate to
noise regulation varies from context to context; certainly municipalities
30 3
The populardo regulate some types of noise in terms of decibel level.
ity of the Model Penal Code's approach to noise regulation, however,
suggests that affording police the discretion to enforce laws against noise
that constitutes a public nuisance and that is unreasonable in the circumstances is in many communities deemed necessary-despite the Code's
resort to an indefinite standard.
Next, if the animating concern behind vagueness review in the context of public order laws is the desire to avoid abusive and even racially
discriminatory enforcement, the invalidation of laws requiring more than
ministerial judgment in their application is a gravely limited and even
counterproductive means of addressing that concern. There is no necessary congruence between requiring rule-like provisions in individual statutory formulations enforced by police on the street and constraints on
abusive police enforcement in the broader legal regime. In fact, the aggressive invalidation of laws embodying indefinite standards (such as statutes and ordinances prohibiting various forms of "unreasonable" behavior in public places) could put pressure on localities to adopt "rule-like"
formulations that substantially broaden police authority, as in the now
common example of juvenile curfews. 30 4 Moreover, police officers enforcing specific rules against conduct like public drinking, jaywalking,
and unlicensed street vending have substantial opportunity to abuse their
authority by enforcing these rules in discriminatory ways. The problem
of police discretion in maintaining order is not resolved or even substan302. See Bratton, supra note 162, at 460 (relating difficulties in enforcing New York
prohibition on operating vehicle's audio amplification system in excess of eighty decibels,
measured at fifty feet, inter alia, because police were not equipped with sound meters or
trained to measure sound levels); cf. Diver, supra note 253, at 67-71 (describing three
dimensions of rules in terms of transparency, accessibility, and congruence with underlying
policy objectives and explaining that these qualities do not always correlate with each
other, so that trade-offs among them are sometimes necessary).
303. See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 375(47) (a) (McKinney 1996) (proscribing
operation of vehicle's audio amplification system in excess of 70 decibels, measured at 25
feet).
304. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality ofjuvenile curfews,
but the Fifth Circuit recently upheld one such curfew against constitutional attack even
though applying strict scrutiny analysis. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.
1993). Curfews have been enacted in some cities to empower police with authority to
approach gang members in public "because gang members often congregate in public and
set up an environment where criminal activities take place." Id. at 494 n.8. The recent
widespread resort to juvenile curfews may, in fact, illustrate a recognized weakness in
vagueness theory. the effort to avoid vagueness and imprecision in defining core concepts
in an authorizing statute (like any statute addressed to "gang members" who adopt "turf'
and "annoy," "harass" or "intimidate" others) may in practice lead to increased breadth of
enforcement authorization and so, ironically, to broadened enforcement discretion. Cf.
Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (Parts I & II), 87 Colum. L. Rev.
661, 720 (1987) (discussing how efforts to avoid vagueness in RICO's core concepts of
"infiltration" and "organized crime" account for statute's "extraordinary breadth").
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tially ameliorated by requiring that public order laws be spelled out with
"rule-like" precision.'
This point is worth illustrating by one example demonstrating that
laws requiring the exercise of more police judgment in their application
may sometimes limit police authority at least as effectively as laws that
can, in theory, be ministerially applied. Consider the flurry of legislation
recently enacted in several municipalities to address the problem of
young people "cruising" in automobiles up and down city streets.30 5 Police officers, legislators, and city officials in the affected places cited several problems associated with the pastime: traffic congestion, which
slowed down emergency vehicles in affected areas;3 05 "'excessive noise
from [car honks], racing of engines and squealing of tires"';3 0 7 an increase in citizen complaints about matters ranging from the profanity
used by reveling young people to their public alcohol consumption;3 0 8
and, in some places, observed increases in fighting, vandalism, and drug
trafficking in neighborhoods in which cruising was common.3 0 9
The ordinances passed in reaction to these community problems
took two principal forms. Most cities opted for a "rule-like" formulation
by prohibiting persons from driving past a traffic control point in a designated area over a specified number of times within a fixed period, and
during specified night hours-the times at which, these cases suggest,
teenagers like to cruise.31 0 Laws modeled on this formulation were
facially ministerial in application but, like many rules, overinclusive in
305. See, e.g., Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1990) (reviewing York,
Pennsylvania cruising ordinance enacted in 1988); State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 904
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (noting 1988 passage of anti-cruising ordinance in Anoka,
Minnesota); Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Wis. 1996) (citing recent
passage of cruising ordinances in four Wisconsin municipalities); Scheunemann v. City of
West Bend, 507 N.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (citing recent passage of West
Bend, Wisconsin anti-cruising ordinance).
306. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 257; Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 904; Brandmiller,544 N.W.2d at
896.
307. Brandmil&r, 544 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting affidavit of Chester D. Kass, Chief of
Police of the City of Greenfield).
308. See, e.g., Scheunemann, 507 N.W.2d at 164 (citing police chief's affidavit
concerning complaints about "'profanity, public alcohol consumption, public urination,
unreasonably loud music and other noise, loitering, littering, disorderly conduct, traffic
congestion and safety hazards, and traffic violations'").
309. See StaUman, 519 N.W.2d at 904.
310. See, e.g., Lutz, 899 F.2d at 257 (ordinance prohibited driving past a traffic
control point in designated city area more than twice in any two-hour period, between 7:00
P.M. and 3:30 A.M., and providing exceptions for municipal and commercial vehicles);
Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 905 (ordinance prohibited driving past traffic control point in "no
cruising zone" three or more times between 9:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M., and provided
exceptions, inter alia, for taxi cabs, buses, authorized emergency vehicles, or other vehicles
engaged in delivery services); Brandmiller, 544 N.W.2d at 897 (ordinances prohibited
driving past traffic control point in designated area more than twice in any two-hour
period between 8:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M., and provided exceptions for emergency vehicles
and vehicles being driven for governmental or business purposes).
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light of the purposes reasonably attributable to them-potentially reaching, as one court noted, the "downtown professional[ ]"who leaves her
office after working late to go home through a no-cruising zone, returns
to the office for any purpose, and then goes home again. 31 ' The second
formulation prohibited driving at night by a traffic control point in a designated "no cruising" area three or more times within a two-hour period,
"ina manner and under circumstances manifesting a 'purpose' of unnecessary, repetitive driving," and ensured the driver an opportunity to explain his conduct to the officer prior to citation. 312 This iteration facially
required considerably more police judgment in its application, but
avoided the problem of overinclusion.
Which formulation lessens the opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement? To courts in Wisconsin, either formulation, appropriately tailored to designated areas at designated times, was an acceptable means of "creat[ing] a safer and less congested public street so that
3 13
the general populace might more easily travel the area in question."
Unpredictably, however, the rule-like formulation proved unconstitutionally vague in Minnesota, in part because rules, while purportedly limiting
the discretion of their administrators, may sometimes broaden that discretion by achieving specificity only through overinclusion. In the
Minnesota court's view, the ordinance at issue permitted arbitrary decisionmaking by police because they would in practice differentiate, without the guidance of legislative specification, between an "'undesirable'
class of people, namely teenagers" who drive repetitively through downtown areas for cruising purposes and those "downtown professionals"
311. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 908.
312. Scheunemann, 507 N.W.2d at 165 n.2. The ordinance in Scheunemann provided
an extensive list of the circumstances that an officer might consider in determining
whether the "'purpose' of unnecessary, repetitive driving" had been manifested: inter alia,
whether persons in the vehicle attempted to gain the attention of others by "hailing, arm
waving, horn blowing, or another action or device." Id. The ordinance also required
proof of "a specific intent to cruise," and provided that no one could be convicted of
violating the law if the explanation given for his or her behavior was true and disclosed a
lawful purpose for the repetitive driving other than the simple purpose to cruise. Id.
313. Id. at 167-68 (quoted material at 167) (upholding ordinance requiring
manifestation of purpose to cruise, and providing opportunity for individual to explain his
behavior); see Brandmiller,544 N.W.2d at 901 (holding that absence of requirement that
there be "purpose to cruise" and opportunity for "on the scene" explanation in challenged
cruising ordinances did not render them invalid). Parenthetically, most courts that have
considered cruising ordinances have subjected them to intermediate scrutiny, requiring
that they be narrowly tailored to meet significant city objectives on the ground that there is
a federal or state constitutional right of intrastate travel growing out of substantive due
process. See, e.g., Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256 (ordinance outlawing cruising, which consisted of
driving repeatedly around loop of certain major public roads in heart of city, subjected to
intermediate scrutiny and held to constitute narrowly tailored and reasonable "time, place,
and manner" restriction on localized intrastate movement); Brandmier, 544 N.W.2d at
898-901 (noting that Wisconsin Constitution recognizes the right to travel intrastate and
applying intermediate scrutiny to conclude that challenged ordinances were narrowly
tailored to meet significant objectives of municipalities and were therefore constitutional).
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who drive repeatedly through the no-cruising zone for legitimate personal or business reasons.3 14 The Minnesota court thus invalidated the
ministerial rule and endorsed the statutory formulation that facially required police to exercise judgment as to the purpose of the individual's
repetitive driving in the designated zone.3 15
"Contextual," "impressionistic," and irreducibly "evaluative" in character,3 16 vagueness review has failed to elucidate questions about the optimal precision of statutes and ordinances that govern the policing of public order. Unwittingly imitating the reform era police managers who
sought with rules and regulations to routinize police patrol, some courts
have attempted to constrain police discretion by imposing a demand for
rule-like specificity in public order laws. Their efforts run aground, however, on the twin recognitions that broad and overinclusive rules enhance
police discretion, and that a plethora of narrow rules may not meaningfully constrain it, since such rules may or may not be enforced. As a result, the outcomes in vagueness challenges take on a fractured aspect.
Both laws embodying standards and laws expressed in rule-like formulations have proven, at times, to be vulnerable to vagueness review. The
Supreme Court has affirmed that the void-for-vagueness doctrine was not
"designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair
warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited."3 1 7 Some courts,
however, have created just such a dilemma in an ultimately futile effort to
constrain police discretion by requiring a sometimes unreasonably high
degree of precision in the order maintenance laws that police enforce.
2. Vagueness As Substantive Review. - The second principal account
of the vagueness doctrine involves an even more open-ended inquiry into
the discretionary authority that police exercise in maintaining civility in
public places. In this account, elaborated most powerfully by Professor
Post, the invalidation of some public order laws may best be understood
not in terms of the statutory clarity with which particular conduct is prohibited, but as an implicit substantive judgment that certain norms "are
not a constitutionally acceptable basis for ordering the relationship between police and citizen."3 18 Evaluating the ordinance at stake in
Papachristou, Professor Post contends that "competent members of up314. Staiman, 519 N.W.2d at 908-09 (quoted material at 908). The court determined
that even a rule-like formulation raised vagueness concerns because the potential
overbreadth of the ordinance could encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
See id. at 908-10. The court was also concerned by other vague and indefinite aspects of
the ordinance-for instance, that the ordinance granted police complete discretion to fix
the location of traffic control points within no-cruising zones. See id. at 910.
315. See id. at 908, 910 (comparing ordinance unfavorably to Wisconsin ordinance
requiring police to determine whether driver manifests purpose to cruise).
316. Jeffries, supra note 211, at 196-97.
317. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).

318. Post, supra note 252, at 498.
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standing Jacksonville society" (and presumably the police enforcing the
ordinance) "could with confidence determine who was targeted by the
ordinance and who was not."31 9 The ordinance invited police to make
judgments about its application by reference to the "dense network of
norms that defined middle-class rectitude and discipline", and was "anything but standardless" with regard to this purpose.320 The problem with
the ordinance, then, was not the unspecified discretion that it placed in
the hands of local police. Instead, Papachristoudecided "that it is constitutionally arbitrary and improper to use [lack of] compliance with bourgeois morals as a trigger for police control" of those deemed undesirable
in light of these morals. 32 ' In this account, vagueness doctrine is thus a
"procedure-oriented constitutional jurisprudence" sometimes used "to
322
strike down substantively objectionable statutes."
This interpretation aptly explains results in some cases that seem inexplicable on other grounds, and accounts for the focus in many cases on
the character of prohibited conduct, rather than the clarity of the language with which it is prohibited. Thus, an Alabama court invalidated for
vagueness a seemingly quite specific municipal ordinance prohibiting
"'sleep[ing] in or on a motor vehicle... while the same is parked on a
public street, avenue or alley,"' noting that the ordinance made "no distinction between conduct that is calculated to harm and that is essentially
innocent."3 23 In the immediate aftermath of Papachristou,a Florida court
struck down a more general, yet still precise ordinance providing that no
319. Id. at 496; see also Kelman, supra note 260, at 661 (noting that provision of
Jacksonville ordinance prohibiting "'neglecting all business and habitually spending...
time . . . where alcoholic beverages are sold or served'" is "not a particularly vague
description of the illicit activity" (quoting Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
156 n.1 (1972))).
320. Post, supra note 252, at 496-97.
321. Id. at 498.
322. Kelman, supra note 260, at 661.
323. Horn v. City of Montgomery, 619 So.2d 949, 949, 951 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)
(citations omitted); see also City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So.2d 468, 468, 470
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating for vagueness ordinance prohibiting sleeping "'in,
on, or about any automobile.., in any public street'" on ground that ordinance grants
police "unbridled discretion" whether or not to arrest tired children, long-distance drivers,
inebriated motorists, or those lodging in automobiles). Ordinances prohibiting sleeping
in automobiles are sometimes enacted to prevent motor vehicles, lacking sanitation
facilities, from being used as living quarters in beach communities "frequented by visitors
and tourists." Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1987)
(suggesting without deciding that prohibition on sleeping in automobile is neither
overbroad nor vague). Similar ordinances have been defended on the ground that they
are rationally related to the legislative end of preventing the victimization of sleeping
transients. See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 807 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
constitutional ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, sleeping on public streets and sidewalks as
rationally related to preventing obstruction of pedestrian traffic and victimization of
individuals engaged in such activity); People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (city ordinance prohibiting sleeping in certain public areas not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and rationally related to protection of sleeping
transients). But see State v. Penley, 276 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
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person "'shall sleep upon or in any street, park, wharf or other public
place,"' based upon its conclusion that the ordinance was markedly similar to vagrancy legislation and provided "for punishment of unoffending
behavior."3 24 Neither of these cases has the fine-textured analysis in
Professor Post's account of how vagueness doctrine can be used to exercise "discriminating, indirect, and yet effective judicial control" over "the
kinds ofjudgments that can constitutionally be exercised by the police in
dealing with the public."3 25 Yet these cases and others appear to support
Professor Post's conclusion about the essential thrust of the Papachristou
decision, and to take Papachristouas an invitation to review the substantive merits of public order laws.
Significantly, even in this substantive account of the vagueness doctrine, the procedural character of vagueness review is understood to play
a crucial mediating role. Since law "commonly inflicts social norms on
unwilling populations," and in different ways in different historical periods, the PapachristouCourt would have undertaken an imposing task to
determine explicitly when legal enforcement of such norms (prohibiting
such things as public drunkenness, loitering, gambling on public streets,
326
or even public sleeping) is so oppressive as to be unconstitutional.
Similarly, if an animating concern behind vagueness review is the susceptibility of particular public order laws to abusive enforcement by the police who administer them, the capacity of police fairly and evenhandedly
to use delineated authority (and the need for such authority to be exercised) has varied at different historical times and in different communities. Professor Post is thus correct to note the strength of a constitutional
analysis that avoids complete and explicit delineation "of the kinds of
judgments that can constitutionally be exercised by the police in dealing
with the public" in favor of a more modest form of judicial review that,
even when particular laws are invalidated, leaves future legislatures the
opportunity
in theory to draft new, more specific legislation in timeg of
27
3
felt need.

Kolender is again illustrative. There, the Court invalidated a
3 28
suspicious-loitering law that had, in fact, been misused by the police.
The dissenters charged that the reasoning was disingenuous-that the
Court had voided for vagueness a statute that was clear in many applications simply because it was "somehow distasteful to the majority. '329 The
(ordinance forbidding sleeping in public places akin to vagrancy legislation and therefore

void for vagueness).
324. Penley, 276 So.2d at 180-81 (citation to ordinance omitted).
325. Post, supra note 252, at 507.

326. Id. at 497-98 (quoted material at 497); see also Kelman, supra note 260, at
661-62 (noting that "in a culture premised on the subjectivity of value... [t]he judge must
...know what is least knowable" in context of invalidating statutes for vagueness because
they proscribe "substantively innocent" conduct).
327. Post, supra note 252, at 507.
328. See supra note 292.
329. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 374 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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Court, however, did avoid substantial constitutional questions: whether
arrest can be predicated on the failure to produce identification when
stopped with reasonable suspicion or, as in similar laws then in force in
several jurisdictions, upon loitering or prowling in circumstances that
330
warrant alarm for the safety of persons and property in the vicinity.
This is not a case, the Court observed, in which "further precision in the
statutory language is either impossible or impractical." 3 3 ' Given the observations of some commentators that the total abandonment of any
suspicious-loitering provision "would lead to a significant loss in effective
33 2
law enforcement and encounter justifiably serious political resistance,"

the provisional character of vagueness review-influencing legislative regulation but avoiding the premature decision of constitutional questions333
should in this context be counted one of the doctrine's strengths.

Nevertheless, this strength of vagueness review is also its weakness.
The implicit character of substantive vagueness review-which proceeds
by indirection, invalidating "substantively objectionable statutes" 33 4 as insufficiently precise-and the resulting deferral of substantive constitu-

tional questions can yield decisions offering little guidance to legislators
considering the constitutionality of contemplated public order legislation. Consider loitering. Police in recent times have sometimes relied
heavily on arrest without the intention to prosecute, or on orders to move
along issued without legal authority, to deal with a range of community
problems: youth gangs engaged in violent activity whose members loiter
in local neighborhoods, intimidating residents; prostitutes who have
330. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 250.6 (1962). The Model Penal Code's
suspicious-loitering law, in place in a number ofjurisdictions at the time of the Kolender
decision, prohibits loitering or prowling "in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for
law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or
property in the vicinity." Id. It reaches, theoretically, the "known professional pickpocket
... seen loitering in a crowded railroad station" or the person "not recognized as a local
resident" who is seen lurking "in a doorway and furtively looking up and down the street to
see if he is being watched." Id. cmt. 3. The model law provides that unless circumstances
make it impracticable, prior to arrest police officers are to offer a suspect the opportunity
"to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted" by identifying himself and
explaining his presence and behavior;, a truthful explanation sufficient to dispel alarm
prevents conviction. See id. Courts have reached different results in the period since the
decision in Kolender on the question whether the model law is constitutionally precise.
Compare Watts v. State, 463 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1985) (rejecting vagueness challenge to
Model Penal Code-derived law); State v. Burch, 443 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ga. 1994) (same);
and City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Wis. 1989) (same) with Fields v.
City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 1987) (Model Penal Code-derived suspicious
loitering law unconstitutionally vague); and State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43, 50 (Idaho 1990)
(same).
331. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
332. Model Penal Code § 250.6 cmt. 8 (1962).
333. See Bickel, supra note 236, at 150-52 (noting use of vagueness doctrine as
"device for avoiding . . . constitutional judgment" pending further legislative action)
(quoted material at 150).
334. Kelman, supra note 260, at 661.
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adopted particular streets for solicitation to the distress of people living
in the area; congregations of drug sellers and buyers in public parks; or
the destitute who gather in the public areas of train stations and bus terminals, and whose presence sometimes inhibits others "from making use
of public facilities."3 3 5 The prolonged use of such tactics-often either
illegal at the start or prone to degenerate into illegality-is a clear indica3 36
tion "of the need to craft a different response."
Many localities in the 1990s have enacted laws purporting to reach
specific forms of loitering deemed to constitute a community problem.
Some have prohibited loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or drug-related activities.3 37 Other communities have attempted to
prohibit loitering in designated spaces, or when specified conditions prevail: for instance, by authorizing police to disperse anyone lingering for
more than one minute within thirty feet of cash machines, 33 8 or by allowing officers to move along congregated persons in designated areas in
which drug or gang activity is a particular problem. 339 Commentators
accurately predicted that Chicago's gang loitering ordinance, which authorized police to move along groups in gang-ridden areas whenever one
of the assembled was reasonably believed to be a member of a criminal
street gang, would fail constitutional review. 340 They have expressed sup335. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 131, 137-38 (quoted material at 131); see also Frank
J. Remington, LaFave on Arrest and the Three Decades That Have Followed, 1993 U. Ill. L
Rev. 315, 320-21 (1993) (noting that arrest and release practices have become increasingly
common in response to gang activities "as a way of ridding neighborhoods of drug
activity").
336. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 137.
337. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text.
338. In 1994, San Francisco voters approved a law that made it illegal to loiter or
linger for more than one minute within 30 feet of a cash machine, but provided exceptions
for people using the machines, accompanying someone using the machines, waiting for
municipal transit, or standing in line to get into a business or theater. A municipal judge
subsequently upheld the law, but interpreted it narrowly to require that in order to be
arrested or ordered to move along, loiterers had to manifest a specific intent to commit a
crime. See Steven A. Chin,Judge Prunes City's ATM Anti-Loiter Law, S.F. Examiner, June
8, 1995, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
339. In Washington, D.C., for example, the City Council passed legislation in 1989
designed to break up open-air drug markets. The law authorized the police department in
specified circumstances to declare "drug emergency zones" that could constitute up to
1000 square feet of public street. In these zones, for a period of five days, the police would
be permitted to arrest persons gathering in a group if they disobeyed instructions to move
on. This legislation was subsequently declared unconstitutionally vague. See United States
v. Kennedy, 118 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 873, 883 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 1990).
340. See, e.g., Joel D. Berg, Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang
Loitering Laws, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 461, 484-503 (1993) (concluding Chicago ordinance
would not likely survive constitutional challenge); Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago's
Ban on Gang Loitering- Making Sense of Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws,
88 Cal. L. Rev. 379, 409-17 (1995) (same). Chicago's gang loitering ordinance was held to
violate rights of association, assembly, and expression secured by the First Amendment; to
be unconstitutionally vague; to unconstitutionally criminalize status; and to permit arrests
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This decision is now
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port, however, for alternative loitering laws to deal with the vexing problem of youth gangs that may terrify residents of local communities simply
by congregating in a menacing fashion on neighborhood comers.M1
Loitering legislation in the 1990s has often had broad community support, particularly in some predominantly minority communities plagued
by street-level drug dealing.3 4 2
By what standards should such laws be assessed? The Court in
Papachristounoted that a blanket prohibition on "'wandering or strolling'
from place to place" implicates conduct that has "historically [been] part
of the amenities of life" in this country. 343 In Coates, the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting three or more people from assembling
on any sidewalk and conducting themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by, noting that the law was vague not because "it requires a
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all."3 44 The Court, however, has also recognized that police

can be granted authority in specified circumstances to disperse loiterers.
Thus, a person who congregates with others with no bona fide intention
to exercise a constitutional right, but "'with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,"' or in reckless disregard of this risk, can
be asked to move along.3 45 The Court has even upheld a site-specific

prohibition that grants police the authority to disperse congregations apparently engaged in First Amendment activity when such congregations
are within 500 feet of an embassy, are aimed at the embassy, and are

pending before the Illinois Supreme Court. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d
34, 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), reh'g granted, 664 N.E.2d 639 (1996).
341. See Berg, supi-a note 340, at 497-503 (suggesting that anti-gang loitering
ordinances should be modeled on drug and prostitution loitering ordinances); Poulos,
supra note 340, at 414 (endorsing ordinance prohibiting loitering "so as to intimidate
others from using any public street or sidewalk").
342. See William Trosch, The Third Generation of Loitering Laws Goes to Court: Do
Laws That Criminalize "Loitering With the Intent to Sell Drugs" Pass Constitutional
Muster?, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 513, 527 & n.84 (1993). African American community leaders in
Alexandria, Virginia lobbied for a drug loitering law to combat dealing in local
neighborhoods and described the enacted law as a "hard won victory for our community."
Maxine M. Clark & Jesse Jennings, Alexandria's Anti-Loitering Law: Just What Our
Neighborhoods Need, Wash. Post, July 1, 1990, at B8. The law, however, was subsequently
invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. See Northern Va. Chapter, ACLU v. City of

Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324, 328-29 (E.D. Va. 1990); George L. Kelling & Catherine M.
Coles, Disorder and the Court, 116 Pub. Interest 57, 70 (1994) (asserting that residents in
many minority communities identify lack of police enforcement and "passivity in the face

of outrageous street behavior" as primary policing problem in their communities).
343. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (referring to
images used by Walt Whitman and Rachel Lindsay).
344. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

345. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 108-10 (1972) (quotation to statute in
question at 108).
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reasonably46 believed to pose a threat to the security or peace of that
3
location.
These cases suggest that facial vagueness challenges to local ordinances prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging in specified illegal activity should be easily rejected. Even laws that regulate loitering
without legitimate purpose around certain narrowly specified and vulnerable locations (like schools and automatic teller machines) would appear
only trivially to implicate the PapachristouCourt's concern with the unfettered discretionary authority that a blanket prohibition on loitering affords to police.3 47 As Justice White warned in his Kolender dissent, however, the indefinite and sometimes frankly substantive character of
vagueness review has at times tempted courts to assume "open-ended authority to oversee the States' legislative choices" in the area of public order regulation.3 48 This temptation, coupled with the Court's broad language in cases like Papachristouand Kolender, has made the outcome of
constitutional challenge to even the narrowest loitering prohibition uncertain in courts across the country.
Thus, some courts have recently invoked vagueness and substantive
due process to invalidate laws prohibiting loitering with a specific illegal
purpose-the narrowest form of such laws and the formulation most justifiably included in a penal code.34 9 Ordinances prohibiting loitering "in
a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose" of engaging in prostitution or drug-related activities can be interpreted to require
a specific intent to engage in these activities.3 50 To guide police discretion in their application, they commonly list circumstances that police
may consider in determining whether the purpose to engage in illegal
conduct has been manifested: for instance, whether a loiterer is a known
drug dealer and is observed, in a neighborhood in which street-level traf346. See Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 329-32 (1988).
347. This is especially true when such laws provide that police must request loiterers
to move along and authorize citation only upon their refusal.
348. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 374 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
349. See, e.g., Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 977-80 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
(prostitution-loitering ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad); Brown v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 584 P.2d at 35, 37-38 (Alaska 1973) (prostitution-loitering ordinance void for
vagueness); E.L. v. State, 619 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 1993) (invalidating drug loitering
ordinance as vague, overbroad, and violative of substantive due process); Wyche v. State,
619 So.2d 231, 236 (Fla. 1993) (invalidating prostitution-loitering ordinance, inter alia, for
vagueness); Christian v. City of Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(prostitution-loitering ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad); City of Akron v. Rowland,
618 N.E.2d 138, 145-46 (Ohio 1993) (invalidating drug loitering ordinance as vague or
overbroad as construed); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 P.2d 250, 251-52 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980) (prostitution-loitering ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad); Coleman v. City of
Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (invalidating prostitution-loitering
ordinance as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as construed).
350. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1382-83 (Wash. 1992) (quoted
material at 1382); see, e.g., City of Seattle v. Slack, 784 P.2d 494, 497 (Wash. 1989). But see
Wyche, 619 So.2d at 236; Rowland, 618 N.E.2d at 143.
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ficking is common, furtively to transfer small objects or packages for currency8 51 Papachristousuggested that a specific intent requirement ameliorates vagueness concerns and later the Supreme Court dismissed a
constitutional challenge to a loitering law embodying an intent requirement for want of a substantial federal question;3 5 2 ordinances of this type
have survived constitutional attack in many jurisdictions.3 53 To some
courts, however, even a specific intent element does not cure vagueness
problems, since such ordinances implicate innocent conduct like
"[h] ailing a cab or a friend [or] chatting on a public street," and also
a sidetrench upon "the inherent right to window shop, saunter down
3 54
arrest."
of
fear
no
with
passersby
and
friends
to
wave
walk, and
Courts invalidating such laws suggest that they are void for vagueness
because they leave to police the task of differentiating between "innocent
people [who] saunter on the streets and call to friends" and "acts reflecting the state of mind needed to make an arrest."3 55 The intent requirement in loitering ordinances, however, does serve to differentiate innocent from illicit behavior.35 6 Since criminal intent is usually inferred
from the commission of observable conduct, this element limits the potential for arbitrary enforcement: in order to disperse or arrest loiterers
lawfully, patrol officers must observe conduct sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that a loiterer has the intent to engage in a specific
crime. In addition, courts are not without procedural devices to help
ensure that innocent conduct is not punished once a facial challenge to a
loitering law has been rejected. They can find such laws unconstitutional
as applied in a given set of circumstances. They may also review individual cases for sufficiency of the evidence. Granted, these devices are not a
perfect solution to constraining police discretion in the use of such laws,
since even in those cases where formal legal processes are invoked, the
stakes involved may be small and punishment may be effectively imposed
simply by virtue of arrest.3 5 7 Facial invalidation, however, poses problems
of its own.
351. See, e.g., Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379.
352. Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972). In 1976, the Court

dismissed a vagueness challenge to a prostitution-loitering statute for want of a substantial
federal question. See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. D., 557 P.2d 687 (Or. 1976), appeal
dismised, 434 U.S. 914 (1977); supra note 267.
353. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035-36 (N.Y. 1978) (statute

proscribing loitering for purpose of prostitution not invalid for vagueness); Luvene, 827
P.2d at 1383-86 (drug loitering statute neither vague nor overbroad); Slack, 784 P.2d at
494 (prostitution-loitering statute not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); City of
Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Wis. 1980) (statute prohibiting loitering with
intent to solicit for prostitution not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).

354. Wyche, 619 So.2d at 235 (invalidating prostitution-loitering ordinance as vague
and violative of substantive due process).
355. Id. at 237.
356. See Sanford H. Radish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257, 260-61 (1987).
357. Cf. Force, supra note 174, at 402-04 (noting that trial of minor offenses in 1960s
and 1970s afforded little protection against misuse of broad laws by police, since arrest and
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Loitering-with-intent ordinances are no panacea for distressed communities in which high levels of fear and crime prevail. In practice,
though, they can be useful. They permit foot patrol officers lawfully to
disperse or arrest prostitutes who gather in particular areas or congregations of drug sellers and buyers in public parks, without devoting the substantial resources (usually trained undercover officers, with appropriate
back-up) required to make prosecutable cases for solicitation, or for drug
purchases or sales.3 5 8 Given the fact that in some cities there are literally
dozens of locations in which high levels of street trafficking are common,
efficiently allocating scarce police resources is important.3 59 There is also
an advantage in affording patrol officers, in particular, the limited authority to react to the flagrant activity that characterizes locations in
which street trafficking is prevalent. When citizens observe such officers
walk past scenes of drug dealing or solicitation that are obvious to them,
they often conclude that police "have been paid off," or that police have
no concern for their communities.3 60 Finally, the nuances of the Broken
Windows argument need not be invoked to understand that when loiterers manifest the intention to solicit or to sell narcotics in a public place,
laws prohibiting their conduct do not, as in Papachristou,aim simply at
"nipp[ing crime] in the bud" through the anticipatory control of "undesirables."3 6 1 Communal harms have already occurred. In fact, the
community in which this conduct takes place may well be experiencing
serious distress.

3 62

prosecution constituted effective punishment for such offenses and was imposed on
innocent and guilty alike).

358. In Tacoma, Washington, for instance, a drug loitering ordinance was passed at
the prompting of local police frustrated by the inability of foot patrol officers "to establish

probable cause when drug deals were obviously taking place on street corners." Deborah
Lamm Weisel, Tackling Drug Problems in Public Housing: A Guide for the Police 88

(1990). Its explicit purpose was to remove offenders from specific areas. See id. The
Washington Supreme Court construed the Tacoma ordinance that prohibited loitering "in
or near any thoroughfare, place open to the public, or near any public or private place in a
manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in drug-related
activity" to require proof that a person while loitering "perform objectively ascertainable,
overt conduct that is commonly associated with illegal drug-related activity," and for the
purpose of engaging in such activity. Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1385. The court upheld the law
against constitutional attack. See id.

359. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, National Inst. of Justice, Closing the Market:
Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida 3 (1993) (noting that during crack
epidemic in Tampa at least 61 different locations were identified by police as public drugdealing sites).

360. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 107, at 51 (noting that community residents
often conclude patrol officers have accepted bribes when such officers take no action
against neighborhood drug dealers).
361. Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405

U.S. 156, 171 (1972).

362. This account of the role of specific intent in ameliorating vagueness is different
from, though not inconsistent with, Professor Kadish's more sustained account. Professor
Kadish argues that the mental state requirement is sometimes an essential element in the
definition of the "wrong" made criminal by a given law. Loitering without an intent
requirement reaches conduct in circumstances in which "we would not want the person to
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At any rate, the substantive account of the void-for-vagueness doctrine serves no better than the procedural account prescriptively to
render more definite the indefinite contours of the facial vagueness doctrine. The point of Professor Post's subtle account of the Papachristou
decision is to say that in some cases, courts invoking the vagueness prohibition have made indirect and implicit judgments about the circumstances in which law can reflect community norms and in which these
norms should be overridden.3 6 3 The implicit character of these judgments, however, renders them inhospitable to critical refinement for prescriptive purposes. Some courts invoking the vagueness prohibition,
moreover, have discounted the importance of order maintenance to the
preservation of a neighborhood's public spaces, failing to recognize that
behavior that seems innocuous in isolation can, viewed in light of surrounding circumstances, pose serious community problems. Clarification of the role that facial invalidation might appropriately play in limiting the potential for arbitrary police enforcement is thus important in an
era in which community and problem-oriented policing styles, with their
heightened emphasis on quality-of-life problems, are widespread.
C. Community Policing and the Law of Public Order
1. Judicial Ambivalence. - The constitutional reforms of the 1960s
and 1970s did not eviscerate law regulating the quality of life in public
places, nor have courts in the years since these reforms shown unrelenting hostility to public order laws. Legislatures have enacted laws regulating unreasonable noise that some courts, though not all, have subsequently upheld. 36 Many courts have sustained laws that prohibit
loitering with the intent to engage in a specific crime; a smaller number
have upheld laws that regulate loitering around specified and vulnerable
locations, like schools. 36 5 Some courts, moreover, have recently rejected

constitutional challenges to ordinances prohibiting automobile cruising,
aggressive panhandling, and camping in designated public areas. 366 Laws
regulating these and other forms of public nuisance-however narrow
have acted otherwise." Kadish, supra note 356, at 260-61. The intent element thus serves

to identify danger of further action that will produce, if unimpeded, the ultimate harm.
See id. Loitering with criminal intent, however, may visit harm upon communities that
some might recognize as within the scope of completed criminal harms. SeeJoel Feinberg, 2
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law 1-24, 46 (1985); c. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 146-47

(noting that even if police are unable to eliminate all sales of drugs in neighborhood,
reducing number of open sales where such sales contribute to high levels of fear may
constitute significant benefit to neighborhood's public life).

363. See Post, supra note 252, at 498.
364. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.

365. See, e.g., supra notes 266, 353 (citing cases).
366. See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167-68 (Cal. 1995)

(ordinance prohibiting camping in designated public areas not impermissibly vague); City
of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1334-35 (Wash. 1990) (rejecting challenge to
ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, begging with intent to intimidate others into giving
money); supra notes 305-315 and accompanying text (citing automobile cruising cases).
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and specific-have consistently proven more vulnerable to vagueness
challenge than laws that prohibit serious crimes.36 7 The overall pattern
of decisions, however, is erratic, fractured, and confusing rather than resolutely arrayed against the constitutional validity of public order laws.
This result is an unsurprising consequence of the Supreme Court's
invocation of the vagueness doctrine to address the problems presented
by the broad public order laws of the 1960s and 1970s. The invalidation
of a law as facially vague permits courts to avoid deciding the constitutional limitations on regulation within a given sphere.3 68 Perhaps a court
does not feel ready to settle the constitutional issues presented in a given
case. 36 9 Alternatively, a court may wish to ensure simply that certain issues are decided in the first instance by the legislature.3 7 0 Professor
Sunstein has suggested that Papachristoumight best be viewed in this second light, as a case in which the Court invalidated an archaic law that
devolved law-making authority on police in order to force the processes
of democratic deliberation to work: to force legislatures to ponder the
area of public order again, while providing little or no guidance as to the
direction they might take in efforts to regulate public conduct.3 7 1 The
3 72
strengths of this form of "decisional minimalism" are substantial.
Courts do not definitively decide issues where a lack of information could
lead them to the wrong result or where changing circumstances might3
37
render their resolution of such issues inappropriate for a later time.

Minimalism, however, can also inject substantial uncertainty into an area
of law.3 74 After Papachristou, future courts were left to elaborate the
reach of the vagueness prohibition, but were given little guidance as to
what this prohibition might demand in the review of public order laws.
Underlying constitutional questions were left unanswered. 375 Disparate
results in later cases were the predictable outcome.
367. SeeJeffries, supra note 211, at 215-16.
368. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Hary. L. Rev. 6,

7-8 (1996).
369. See id. at 19 (suggesting hypothetically that the Supreme Court, lacking needed
information to resolve definitively issues regarding Internet regulation, might employ voidfor-vagueness doctrine to strike down law regulating Internet "and in the process refuse to
decide exactly how much regulation would be acceptable under a sufficiently clear law").
370. See id. at 25 (vagueness invalidation is "democracy-forcing" in that it "requires
legislatures to speak with clarity"); see also Bickel, supra note 236, at 150-52 (same).
371. See Sunstein, supra note 368, at 38 & n.153.
372. See id. at 6-7 (coining "decisional minimalism" to describe phenomenon of
courts "saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as
possible undecided").
373. See id. at 8, 19.
374. See id. at 16, 18, 25.
375. For example, First Amendment limitations on laws enacted to regulate begging
have been the subject of recent court decisions as communities have enacted new laws.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether an individual's solicitation of alms is entitled

to First Amendment protection, but has determined that a charity's solicitation efforts are
within the First Amendment. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 633 (1980); see also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505
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In fact, this outcome was overdetermined. The erratic pattern of the

vagueness cases in this area also clearly reflects courts' profound ambivalence about the order maintenance task of police. Courts have little abil-

ity to influence police departments to exercise the discretion embodied
in public order laws for the positive good of the community, and in fair

and equitable ways. The most narrow and specific law can be invoked
arbitrarily and for improper reasons. Rules regulating trivial forms of
street misconduct, moreover, can be employed in ways fully consistent
with Fourth Amendment doctrine to authorize aggressive, "stranger" patrols.3 76 These realities do not escape courts in the review of public order

laws. Judges thus cite a sordid past in which police exploited "minorities,
the homeless, and the powerless" pursuant to old-style vagrancy statutes
3 77
in the review of recently enacted prostitution-loitering ordinances.
They regard.warily the one-on-one situations in which police intervene to

perform order maintenance tasks-noting that such intervention produces cases, when intervention results in arrest, in which the evidence
boils down to the conflicting accounts of a trivial incident that are offered
by the police officer and the arrestee.3 78 Unable significantly to constrain

police discretion in order maintenance or to promote its beneficial exercise, courts are sometimes loathe to authorize its use by upholding even

reasonably specific laws that govern minor forms of street disorder.

U.S. 672, 677 (1992) (following Schaumburg's holding that solicitation by charity is speech
protected by First Amendment, but holding that ban on solicitation in airport terminal was
reasonable regulation of nonpublic forum). Some lower courts have found that begging
constitutes First Amendment activity and on this basis have enjoined the enforcement of
general statutes prohibiting loitering in public places for the purpose of begging. See, e.g.,
Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). Other courts, however,
have upheld laws that prohibit begging in specific public spaces like the subway system.
See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). Laws that
prohibit begging with the intent to intimidate others into giving money have also been
upheld. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990). Ellickson argues
that even assuming begging is a protected form of speech, Supreme Court precedents can
be interpreted to afford a city "considerable scope" to regulate it through "time, place, and
manner" regulations, with even "exceptionally strict controls" being permissible in
"narrowly selected public spaces where peacefulness is essential." Ellickson, supra note 14,
at 1232-33.
376. Last Term, in Whren v. United States, the Court made clear its view that where
probable cause exists to enforce even trivial laws-civil traffic violations, in Wren-the
Fourth Amendment does not generally require any inquiry into whether an ulterior,
investigatory motive may have prompted the officer to enforce the law in an individual
case. Even the violation of local police guidelines as to when and in what contexts such
laws should be enforced, the Court concluded, is generally irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment inquiry. See 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).
377. See, e.g., Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 239 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan,J., concurring).
378. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring in result); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987) (laws have
been invalidated for allowing police "unfettered discretion to arrest individuals [who]
annoy or offend them").
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Consider Horn v. City of MontgomeyyA 79 The Alabama court that invalidated for vagueness the Montgomery ordinance prohibiting sleeping
in a motor vehicle was quite plainly animated by the concern that a prohibition on sleeping could reach "essentially innocent" conduct and by the
officer's testimony, recounted here, that he commonly exercised discretion whether to enforce the ordinance:
"It is sufficient by the law that if he is sleeping in a motor vehicle, I could [arrest]. But under what I understand as being the
law, if I felt that he personally could get himself home, because,
like I said, you have times where you fail asleep because you are
tired, you are overworked; same thing with me. So I would overlook the situation ....He had enough courtesy to pull over and
stop his car and cut it off and go to sleep. I would check on his
well-being, as I did with the defendant [here]. I checked on his
well-being. If he was not, I felt, personally drunk, I would have
let him continue on home or whatever in his own vehicle. But I
felt he couldn't take care of himself."3 80
The court concluded that the sixty-one dollar fine assessed against the
defendant was improper and that the law was constitutionally invalid because the very admission that the ordinance was selectively enforcedhowever rationally-demonstrated that the law "encourage [d] arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement" and was therefore void for
3 81
vagueness.
The principal contemporary accounts of the void-for-vagueness doctrine's application to public order laws cannot resolve the judicial ambivalence evident in cases like Horn, nor lend coherence and predictability to
courts' invocation of the vagueness doctrine, because they cannot "solve"
for courts the problem of police discretion in the performance of order
maintenance tasks. The Horn ordinance was admirably "rule-like" in
character. By any traditional account of the vagueness doctrine, the ordinance was simply not vague. The mere specification of conduct prohibitions in "rule-like" form, however, does not remove from police the discretion that they exercise in deciding whether to enforce these
prohibitions. Similarly, substantive concerns may have animated the
court in Horn: police might employ a prohibition on sleeping in
automobiles to harass migrant laborers or the homeless. Such a prohibition, however, might also be invoked not to enforce middle-class virtue in
a community hostile to those seen not to embody it, but to address the
problem posed by middle-class teenagers who frequently camp for the
weekend in beachside communities, collectively creating a health hazard,
in the absence of outdoor sanitation facilities.38 2 In keeping with the pre379. 619 So.2d 949 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
380. Id. at 951 (quoting arresting officer in trial court record).
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940-41 n.5 (l1th Cir. 1987)
(noting that ordinances prohibiting sleeping in automobiles are sometimes enacted to
prevent motor vehicles from being used as living quarters in beach communities).
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ventive focus of the new policing philosophies, police might use such a
law to check on the well-being of those asleep in cars, to wake them up
and send them on their way, because they may be vulnerable to crime.3 8 3
2. Judicial Ambivalence and the New Policing. - The ambivalence to
police discretion evident in the judicial evaluation of many public order
laws poses at least a potential problem for the ongoing experiment with
the new policing philosophies. In theory, community and problemoriented policing should lessen resort to the legal system as the singleminded response to neighborhood problems. In those communities that
have identified a need to focus on quality-of-life concerns, however, the
police will sometimes need authority to perform order maintenance
tasks. If police scholars are correct that "[t]he police do not now have
the authority to deal with many street situations they are expected to handle,"38 4 the only way to provide such authority is through the enactment
of reasonably specific laws, based upon a close analysis of a neighborhood's problems. These laws will nevertheless present the danger of arbitrary and abusive enforcement, prompting some courts to consider their
invalidation.3 8 5 Moreover, the lack of predictability in the vagueness evaluation could itself pose a problem-dissuading communities from enacting proposed legislation since judicial broadening of constitutional tort
remedies raises at least the prospect, however theoretical, that muncipalities, police departments, and individual police officers could be held lia386
ble in damages for the enforcement of subsequently invalidated laws.
The problem posed by the fractured case law, however, is yet more
complicated. By attempting to restrain police discretion in order mainte383. See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 807 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (ordinance

prohibiting sleeping on public streets and sidewalks rationally related to preventing
victimization of individuals engaged in such activity); People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr.
736, 739 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (city ordinance prohibiting sleeping in certain

public areas rationally related to protection of sleeping transients).
384. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23.
885. See Frank J. Remington & Victor G. Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the
Legislative Process, 1960 U. Ill. LF. 481, 488-89 (noting that all laws present risk of
arbitrary enforcement no matter how carefully crafted).
386. See Blair v. Shanahan, 795 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part, and remanded, 38 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing settlement of former
panhandler's section 1983 claim against police officers and city for arrest pursuant to

unconstitutional anti-begging law); Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923, 925, 929 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting "[l]oafing, loitering, or strolling" without
lawful business and granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
municipality on issue of liability under section 1983 for arrest and prosecution pursuant to
ordinance); see also Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 57 (noting that in period after
Kolender and subsequent lower court decisions, police ceased to enforce public order laws
in many municipalities on assumption that even though their laws had not been tested,
they "probably would not pass constitutional muster"); Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1213

(after judicial decisions broadening section 1983, "an officer enforcing an ordinance
against begging or sleeping in public faced a real prospect of being personally sued for
damages" and police departments had "handy excuse" for ignoring public order
problems).
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nance through aggressive invalidation of the laws that authorize it, courts
may contribute to the increasingly dominant role that private police now
play in the provision of order maintenance policing.3 8 7 The privatesecurity industry has assumed increasing responsibility for policing those
"private public spaces" that are routinely accessible to the public but
owned by private individuals. 88 Security guards monitor shopping malls,
amusement parks, office buildings and walled communities, "on constant
lookout for things causing elevated risks of harm" to the relevant territory. 8 9 With the law of trespass on their side, security guards ensure a
high degree of safety in policed areas by intervening early in the face of
threatening conditions and even expelling from the areas for which they
are responsible those people defined as risks.3 90 The historical evidence
demonstrates compellingly that return to a legal regime in which public
police had "order maintaining" authority rivaling that of private security
patrols would be a serious mistake: when granted such authority in the
past, police sometimes exercised it indiscriminately, to the detriment of
the poor and, especially, racial minorities. 3 91 On the other hand, the
absence of narrower public police authority to address minor problems of
street disorder could contribute to some degree to individuals' reliance
on private police to perform order maintenance in the publicly accessible
areas that these individuals control.3 92 This expansion in private security
387. See Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation Between Public and Private Policing, in
Modem Policing, supra note 41, at 399, 425-27 (noting that private security industry has
emerged as principal source for order maintenance policing). Shearing has provocatively
recounted how conceptions of private police have changed in contemporary debates.
Such police were often viewed as inimical to the public interest in the late 19th and first
half of this century, when public conceptions were shaped most dramatically by "the
policing practices of railroad and mining companies, especially in their dealings with
labor." Id. at 404. In recent decades, however, "a laissez-faire view has emerged that
celebrates 'private-public partnerships' and sees private policing as an industry providing
both a service and a public benefit." Id. at 399 (quoting abstract of article).
388..See Bayley, supra note 68, at 11 (discussing extent to which private police have
assumed responsibility for policing "private public space").
389. Sherman, supra note 11, at 338.
390. See id. at 339. Parenthetically, public police do sometimes respond to
community problems by employing trespass laws that apply to private property on their
beats. See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 68, at 109-10 (recounting how police in Seattle
obtained permission from store owners along Union Avenue "to come into their entryways
to evict drug dealers"); see also National Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Community
Policing in Seattle: A Model Partnership Between Citizens and Police 5 (1992) (noting
that Seattle police obtained permission from owners of over 100 parking lots and other
business properties to enter in order to investigate, cite or arrest loiterers, and then used
this authority to disperse persons likely engaged in drug transactions); Weisel, supra note
358, at 102 (recounting how police agencies in Tampa, Atlanta, and Baltimore have used
trespassing enforcement in public housing to address drug dealing).
391. See supra notes 232-237 and accompanying text.
392. Admittedly, many factors contribute to the current prominence of private
policing-perhaps most importantly the extent to which many private actors have assumed
control over large areas. See Shearing, supra note 387, at 414-15 (discussing this
explanation for growth in private policing). In some communities, however, a more
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(and the resulting decline in support for the public police that many
scholars have assumed may attend it) poses potential difficulties of its
own: "a more unequal distribution of security; less respect for the rights
of defendants; less professional competence overall to be drawn on in
93
times of trouble."
Finally, by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws, courts
may promote, not deter, misconduct by the public police. So long as
police officers in major cities were retreating to patrol cars and focusing
their attention on serious crime, there was little need for specific authority to deal with problems of public disorder, since in practice these
problems were usually ignored. In the community policing era, however,
as police increasingly attend to community-nominated disorder
problems, laws conferring such authority assume considerable importance, and not only because they provide police with a means to assist
communities addressing local problems. They may also help constrain
police abuse. The principal reason behind this conclusion involves the
"rather complicated message" that attends all discussion of affording police new statutory authority: that granting police specific forms of legitimate authority may sometimes "be the most effective means for reducing
abuse of the authority which is now theirs; that it is the absence of propthe police to engage
erly proscribed forms of authority that often 39impels
4
conduct."
illegal
outright
or
questionable
in
Thus, when an ordinance prohibiting unreasonable noise is invalidated for vagueness, the calls made to police in early morning hours do
not cease, nor do the police fail to respond. In the absence of legitimate
authority to cite or arrest, however-an authority that also facilitates the
informal abatement of noise problems-the police are likely to operate at
the boundaries of lawful practice, misusing other laws as a basis for arrest
or otherwise abusing their position. When police in Tampa, Florida, for
example, were overwhelmed by a crack epidemic during which dozens of
open-air markets sprang up around the city, some patrol officers resorted
to informal authority to disperse the dealers:
"[W]e'd move them on. Nobody got hit, nobody got hurt, but
we made sure that corner got cleaned up. It was the only way to
preventive public police patrol that assists in the protection of the quality of life in public
places might ameliorate, to some degree, the extent to which individuals and corporate
entities contemplate heavy investment in private policing-since improvement in a
neighborhood's conditions might change the perception of such actors that they need to
insulate the areas they control from surrounding disorder. Cf. Moore, supra note 41, at
119 (noting that "professional law enforcement" has not proved able to maintain
competitive advantage over private security and suggesting that "in [this] fertile ground,"
ideas of community and problem-oriented policing have "taken root").
393. Moore, supra note 41, at 119.
394. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 72; see also Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 167
("[When police are not provided with explicit authority to deal effectively with the
problems they encounter.., they often unwittingly become dirty workers, furtively 'doing
what has to be done' through the exercise of their discretion.").
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protect the people who lived around there. And I'd go home at
night and I'd think to myself,is this legal? Answer was, probably
not. But we didn't ask anybody, we just did it. And I didn't lose
'a95
any sleep over it."
Granted, no law could have made simple the task of Tampa's police in
dealing with a crack epidemic. Nor can the problem of police misconduct be solved simply by authorizing police to engage in any activity they
choose. The absence of reasonably specified law, however, can sometimes worsen the problem of controlling police misconduct. Legitimate
authority makes possible the supervision of its exercise. It avoids placing
officers in face-to-face conflicts with citizens where the absence of any
legal means to cite or arrest may render police unable to perform the
principal mission that public order laws facilitate: informal resolution of
street order problems. As Professor Reiss has suggested, "it is much easier to control malpractice if there are prescribed methods of practice and
if discretion is constrained by legitimate ways of reaching objectives."3 96
Tragic results can emerge for both communities and the police when police take on significant tasks that they are not legally authorized to
3 97
fulfill.

395. Kennedy, supra note 359, at 5 (quoting Tampa police officer). Open-air drug
dealing was particularly flagrant during the Tampa crisis. "Dealers congregated,
sometimes by the dozen, on sidewalks, at intersections, in vacant lots, parks, and empty
buildings. Drive-by customers flocked so heavily to some spots that neighborhood streets
were choked to a standstill." Id. at 2. Tampa police eventually used a drug loitering
ordinance-subsequently invalidated-as part of a community and problem-oriented
policing-inspired effort to close down open-air drug markets. Departmental policy
authorized use of the ordinance "only for serious problem areas where other methods
were unproductive," and then only by officers specially trained in its application. Id. at 11.
The police department posted signs in afflicted areas warning that loitering for the
purpose of engaging in illegal drug activity was prohibited. Early evaluation suggested that
these efforts did appear to deter some street dealing, and the ordinance survived court
challenge during the first two and one-half years of its enforcement. See id.; see also
Holliday v. City of Tampa, 619 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1998) (invalidating Tampa ordinance
as vague, overbroad, and violative of substantive due process).
396. Reiss, supra note 20, at 109 (analogizing from studies of professional malpractice
to suggest that failure to provide police with appropriate authority to deal with less serious
crime and disorder "may lie at the core of the misuse of discretion").
397. One Los Angeles Police Department chief who testified before the Christopher
Commission in the wake of the riots gave eloquent voice to the dangers presented when
patrol officers are encouraged-by superior officers in the case of the LAPD-to perform
roles that are not legally authorized:
"We expect people to go out and aggressively identify people, and investigate
them, and that puts these police officers in the middle between what we evaluate
them on and what they are able to do legally. And so it results in police officers
bluffing their way into situations, and, when they stop people on the street,
frequently the guy knows, you don't have anything on me, you don't have any
reason, and he knows that very well. And he knows they're bluffing. And that
gets us in, time after time, into these conflict situations that end up, frequently
with uses of force, frequently with manufacturing or at least puffing of the
probable cause."
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3. Responding to JudicialAmbivalence. - The judicial ambivalence to
police discretion in order maintenance reflects serious concerns. Police
officers are sent into the community to perform their work where "it remains hard to know precisely what they are doing and how they are doing
it."3 9 8 The preventive, broadly consensual patrol contemplated in the
new policing philosophies, moreover, does involve a significant measure
of police discretion. Laws against minor misconduct may not be invariably enforced, but used as a resource to handle disruptions, mediate disputes, and promote a sense of security in public places. Enforcement
policies may vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, for as the police
well know, "what is acceptable on the waterfront may not be acceptable in
a shopping mall."39 9 At the same time, in those communities that elect to
focus on public order concerns, legal authorization for police activities
directed at protecting communal spaces is important.
The new "street laws" that might best authorize police to address disorder problems cannot be fully specified outside the contexts in which
such laws might be employed. The new policing philosophies, after all,
are highly contextual. They are premised on the idea that police efforts
directed at minor forms of public nuisance should be undertaken based
upon a careful analysis of neighborhood problems, should reflect consideration of those people affected by the problems and by the proposed
police response, and in many contexts need not involve law enforcement
at all. Nevertheless, one can observe in ongoing experiments with the
new policing philosophies different ways-each more or less appropriate
in different contexts, and likely to be used in combination with the
others-that communities are now authorizing and might authorize police intervention.
a. Traditional, but Narrower Ordinances.- For some problems, communities might simply legislate more specific laws. Police scholars have
never argued that police require the broad, "order-maintaining" authority characteristic of the pre-Papachristouera, but have instead stressed the
desirability of reasonably specific public order laws. 40 0 Narrow laws adReport of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 99 (1991)
(quoting Assistant Chief David Dotson). The Christopher Commission criticized the

LAPD's professionall-oriented culture that, according to the Commission, had historically
emphasized "aggressive detection of major crimes ... and a rapid, seven-minute response

time to calls for service" at the expense of crime prevention and with the result that police
officers became isolated "from the communities and the people they serve." Id. at 98. The
Commission recommended that the Department adopt a community-based policing
model. See id. at 105.
398. Mastrofski, supra note 35, at 60.
399. Bayley, supra note 115, at 231-32.

400. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 45 (noting that when problems are analyzed and
legal control is fashioned specifically to deal with them, "the police can get at the
problem[s] much more directly, and avoid the potential for unfairness and abuse that
always exists if the police response is unnecessarily broad and perhaps overly powerful as
well"); Kelling & Coles, supra note 342, at 58 (laws affording police reasonable "chunks" of
authority benefit "both the police and those they serve").
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dressing particular problems (like automobile cruising and aggressive
panhandling) do not on their face implicate the same concerns at stake
in old-style vagrancy legislation. In fact, the Papachristou Court was as
troubled with the breadth of the Jacksonville ordinance as with the law's
asserted vagueness. 40 ' This breadth might plausibly have been considered evidence that the Jacksonville ordinance represented the illegitimate effort of one part of the community to enlist police assistance in the
perpetual control of another. Only a few months-after the Papachristou
decision, the Court was noting that carefully crafted, conduct-based laws
affording police authority to deal with specified problems are simply
40 2
different.
The indefinite reach of the vagueness doctrine could render even
these narrower laws vulnerable to constitutional invalidation. Some legal
scholars, however, have begun to recognize the importance of laws regulating minor misconduct and have lamented "the excessive federal constitutionalization of street law," said to inhibit cities from devising "localized
solutions to the management of downtown spaces" '4 03 and to prevent
communities from enforcing "norms of order" that might, if observed,
change the social fabric of crime-ridden neighborhoods in positive
ways. 40 4 The courts that have most aggressively invoked the vagueness
doctrine might increasingly heed these scholarly critiques and turn away
from facial invalidation as a principal means of constraining police discretion in order maintenance. Courts might then return to the somewhat
neglected, less intrusive techniques for ensuring against police abuse:
like review for sufficiency of the evidence or "as applied" review where
public order laws or their enforcement may implicate First Amendment,
equal protection, or other constitutional concerns. 4 05
Admittedly, these narrower laws will not address all the problems
with which police may be concerned in promoting standards of civility in
public places. When young rollerbladers turn, dip, and weave among the
pedestrians on a crowded urban street, for example, causing the elderly
to move against buildings or to freeze in place, the officer who requests
the young people to take their rollerblades elsewhere may have no legal
401. See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 (1972) (noting "allinclusive and generalized" character of vagrancy ordinance's prohibitions).

402. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 100, 114 (1972) (upholding
ordinance regulating noise around school and noting that "mathematical certainty" in the

language of public order laws cannot be required).
403. Elickson, supra note 14, at 1173.
404. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence 37-39
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
405. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1972) (reviewing
constitutionality of ordinance regulating disorderly public congregation as applied, and
determining that in absence of any evidence that arrested person was engaged in activity
protected by First Amendment, police "move along" order was constitutional); cf. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating as applied
city zoning ordinance requiring special use permit for operation of a group home for
mentally retarded).
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authority to cite should they ignore his request. 40 6 Because problems of
disorder arise from an intricate congruence of behavior, location, and
surrounding circumstances, no legal regime-perhaps with the exception
of a broad delegation of the Papachristousort-is likely to provide police
with the legal authority to address all minor disturbances in which most
might support some form of police intervention. Police may simply perform an order maintenance role that is not fully encompassed by law and
40 7
that cannot be so encompassed, within constitutional constraints.
Reasonably specified public order laws, however, can help narrow
the gap between those tasks that communities may call upon police to
perform and their legal authority. If police scholars are correct that the
failure to provide police with appropriate authority to deal with less serious crime and disorder "may lie at the core of the misuse of [police]
discretion," 4 8 narrowing this gap would be a significant advantage. Provided also that courts recognize a place for standards as well as rules in
the drafting of public order laws, many problems can be addressed in a
constitutionally acceptable manner. And there should be a place for
standards in this context. Professor Ellickson argues, in fact, that given
the wide diversity in public places and pedestrian behaviors, "the first-best
solution to the problem of street misconduct would be the maintenance
of a trustworthy police department, whose patrol officers would be given
significant discretion in enforcing general standards against disorderly
40 9
conduct and public nuisances."
The problematic character of police discretion in order maintenance does not disappear, however, merely because conduct prohibitions
are reasonably specific. 410 Legislatures, then, might helpfully draft new
laws with additional provisions that further limit police authority. Examples might include sunset provisions in some contexts, since public order
problems sometimes dissipate once efforts are made to ameliorate them,
removing the need for police authority. Discretion might further be limited by laws requiring that people be requested to cease specified behavior before citation or arrest is authorized. For some problems, however,
the enactment of general ordinances can fill the vacuum left by the invalidation of many disorderly conduct, loitering, and vagrancy statutes and
provide police with the authority to deal with street situations they are
406. See Kelling, supra note 26, at 90-91 (citing roller skating example as instance in
which most would support police intervention).
407. See Paul Chevigny, Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas 86 (1995)
(noting that police have always performed an "order-keeping function" not encompassed
by law).
408. Reiss, supra note 20, at 109.
409. Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1245.
410. Moreover, by eschewing reliance upon the vagueness doctrine, courts will
sometimes directly confront other constitutional questions in the review of public order
laws. See, e.g., supra note 375 (discussing the scope of First Amendment limitations on the
regulation of begging).
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expected to handle. 411 These new laws could also help to improve local
conditions in some communities, rendering consideration of broader
laws (such as juvenile curfews) less inviting.
b. Use of Civil Sanctions. - Many of these new laws should employ
civil rather than criminal sanctions. Several factors militate in this direction. First, the Supreme Court has expressed greater tolerance for vagueness in enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties "because the
consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." 4 12 Civil sanctions, moreover, are generally preferable to penal sanctions when the
community wishes to reduce the level of an activity-to regulate it-but
not prohibit the activity entirely. 4 13 Such sanctions have also been
deemed more appropriate when legislators are unable to define in the
abstract the precise standards of behavior they wish to authorize or proscribe. 4 14 Finally, given the stigma that attends arrest for even a minor
criminal offense, civil sanctions are preferable when they are sufficient to
the task, and especially when conduct that may pose serious community
problems nevertheless fails to bear the hallmarks of blameworthiness associated with criminal law.
All these factors suggest an enhanced role for civil sanctions in the
area of public order regulation. The primary interest in many public order laws is not to deter violations by visiting severe penalties on those who
have failed to comply, but to negotiate compliance on the street.4 15 Accordingly, public order ordinances not infrequently take on a regulatory
aspect, even when they provide for criminal sanctions. 416 Officers invoke
these ordinances informally to secure compliance when circumstances
seem to require it, and are given authority to issue citations as an alternative to arrest. 417 The Supreme Court's vagueness jurisprudence, by toler-

ating more imprecision in laws that provide only for nonpenal sanctions,
411. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23 (noting that police in many communities lack
authority to deal with street-order problems).
412. Village of Hoffinan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,

498-99 (1982).
413. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models-And What Can be Done About It, 101 Yale LJ. 1875, 1886 (1992).
414. See id.
415. See Reiss, supra note 20, at 107-09 (distinguishing between deterrence-based
and coerced-compliance enforcement of "soft crimes" like drunkenness, littering, and
loitering).

416. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23; cf. LaFave & Scott, supra note 229, § 1.7, at
39-41 (noting weight of authority holds that ordinance violations are not strictly criminal,
though modem trend is in direction of treating them as criminal offenses for purpose of
considering requisite procedural protections, especially when imprisonment is
authorized).
417. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at 23 (noting that issuance of citation often suffices

to resolve public order problem). In New York City, for example, Transit Police who
undertook to restore order in the subways in the early 1990s were encouraged to inform
citizens of rule violations, to warn them when necessary, and to eject or arrest subway users
only "if they persisted in violating subway rules or the law." Kelling & Coles, supra note 86,

at 132.
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may even have anticipated what is now the common wisdom of police
scholarship: "Too much dependence in the past has been placed on the
criminal law in order to get the police job done; arrest and prosecution
are simply not an418effective way [sic] to handle much of what constitutes
police business."
Consider loitering. The New York Court of Appeals has concluded
that loitering without legitimate purpose about certain narrowly specified
and especially vulnerable places of generally restricted access (like
schools or, in New York City, the waterfront) is itself so potentially threatening to important societal interests that such loitering can be prohibited
entirely even in the absence of a showing of a specific intent to commit a
particular crime.41 9 There is probably a role for such circumscribed
loitering ordinances in some communities. Once it is clear, however, that
an ordinance prohibiting loitering in the absence of any legitimate reason around a school is aimed at affording police legitimate means to perform preventive, order maintenance tasks-to approach those lurking in
the vicinity of a neighborhood school, and to request that they move
along-there may be little reason for such an ordinance to carry penal
sanctions. In New York, school loitering is defined as a violation for
which no sentence greater than fifteen days imprisonment is authorized.420 Communities might alternatively provide that school loitering is
a civil infraction for which arrest and prosecution are permissible only
when a loiterer refuses to comply with a police request to move along or
fails to respond to a citation for civil infraction. 42 1
Municipalities have already moved in this direction in dealing with
some public order problems. In Seattle, Washington, for instance, the
City Council enacted a sidewalk ordinance in 1993 that generally prohibits a person from sitting or lying on a public sidewalk in certain busy
418. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 11.

419. The Court of Appeals recently invalidated as unconstitutionally vague a law
prohibiting loitering in any transportation facility where the loiterer "is unable to give a
satisfactory explanation of his presence," concluding that transportation facilities in New
York have taken on the character of public streets, "replete with wide concourses along
which numerous retail establishments of all kinds implicitly invite the public to enter,
browse and shop," so that a loiterer could have no notice that he had no right to loiter in
such an area. People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (N.Y. 1988). To the NewYork court,
however, ordinances prohibiting loitering are permissible when confined to the area
around a specified place of restricted public access, notorious for illegal activity and
normally frequented only by those who are affiliated with the legitimate activity being
carried on in the location. See id. at 1395; People v. Merolla, 172 N.E.2d 541, 545 (N.Y.
1961) (upholding prohibition on loitering withiri 500 feet of waterfront facilities for
purpose unconnected with lawful waterfront business or related activity); People v.
Johnson, 161 N.E.2d 9, 10-11 (N.Y. 1959) (upholding prohibition on loitering "in or about
any school building or grounds").
420. See N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(5) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(3)
(McKinney 1989).
421. Loitering with the intent to engage in prostitution or in drug-dealing could be
treated similarly.
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commercial areas between 7:00 A.M. and 9:00 P.M., but does not restrict
sitting or lying down in public parks, plazas, and other public areas in the
city.422 The ordinance provides for warning prior to citation and then for
community service or the payment of a fifty dollar civil fine upon refusal

to comply.4 23 Misdemeanor arrest is permissible only when a person re-

fuses to sign the notice of civil infraction or to respond to such a notice. 424

A challenge to the ordinance on numerous constitutional

grounds-including vagueness-was rejected in the Western District of
Washington. 4 25
There are other ways in which civil law might be employed. In approximately two-thirds of the states, for instance, police have been authorized to take incapacitated public inebriates into custody for transportation to a detoxification facility for a limited period, usually seventy-two
hours.4 26 People who are intoxicated but not incapacitated may elect to
be taken home.427 The procedure is not considered an arrest, and has
proved "eminently more sensible than arrest followed by detention in a
4 28
drunk tank until sober, at which time the individual is often released."
Nuisance abatement actions have also recently been employed by New
York City police to close establishments used for the purposes of drug
dealing, illegal gambling, or prostitution. 429 Many public order problems
might be ameliorated through other non-criminal mechanisms, like the
zoning of adult establishments and the enforcement of regulations regarding licensed premises, such as those in which alcoholic beverages are
sold. 43 0
c. Civil Injunctions. - Civil injunctions may offer yet a third option
for dealing with some public order problems, most notably the problems
posed by gangs who have adopted particular neighborhoods as their
turf.43 ' Gangs can represent a profound challenge to the vitality of a
422. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Kelling &
Coles, supra note 86, at 213-21 (specifying date of enactment and providing history and
general description of ordinance).
423. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd,

97 F.3d 300 (1996).
424. See id.
425. See id. On an appeal limited to these issues, the Ninth Circuit subsequently
affirmed the district court's determination that the ordinance was not invalid on First
Amendment or substantive due process grounds. See Roulette, 97 F.3d at 302.
426. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 130.

427. See id.
428. Id. The effectiveness of civil detoxification alternatives, however, does vary
depending upon whether adequate facilities exist to which public inebriates can be
referred. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 46 (noting that decriminalization of public
drunkenness had "enormous [negative] impact on urban life" in absence of "adequate
numbers of community mental health and detoxification centers").
429. See Bratton, supra note 162, at 452-55.
430. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 139-41.
431. See id. at 141; see also supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (describing City
of Norwalk's civil injunction).
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neighborhood's public spaces, since a youth gang that has engaged in
even sporadic violence or drug dealing in a neighborhood can in effect
take it over, by intimidating its residents into retreating from parks, sidewalks, and other public spaces. 43 2 Communities have attempted in various ways to authorize police to intervene in afflicted neighborhoods to
help restore a sense of security.

43

One means that has been recently proposed is a general ordinance
prohibiting loitering "so as to intimidate others from using any public
street or sidewalk." 434 Such a law undoubtedly has a hard core: standing
on a street corner waving a gun would presumably qualify. The Court in
Coates, however, found facially invalid a similar ordinance prohibiting
people from assembling on a public sidewalk so as to annoy others, despite Justice Black's observation that facial invalidation might not be appropriate since such an ordinance might constitutionally be applied "to
prohibit the gathering of persons in the mouths of alleys to annoy passersby by throwing rocks" or the like. 43 5 Though a prohibition on loitering for the purpose of intimidation may be different-more analogous to
the "loitering with intent" ordinances that many courts have upheld-a
municipality in which local neighborhoods are seriously troubled by gang
problems could not have great confidence that such an ordinance would
survive facial review.
Accordingly, such a municipality might next consider use of juvenile
curfews, which some courts have upheld in the face of constitutional challenge 4 6 and which can now be found in over seventy-five percent of
American cities with 1992 populations of 200,000 or more. 437 Curfews,
432. Consider the testimony of the resident of one Chicago neighborhood:
I have had my windows broken out. I have had guns pulled on me. I have been
threatened. I get intimidated on a daily basis, and it's come to the point where I
say, well, do I go out today. Do I put my ax in my briefcase. Do I walk around
dressed like a bum so I am not looking rich or got any money or anything like
that.
[These problems are] keeping 98 percent of us in our houses and off the streets
and afraid to shop and afraid to transit the city.
City of Chicago's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, app.1 at
125-26, City of Chicago v. Avilar, No. 93 MCI 376001 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed May 10, 1993)
(Testimony of Rick Goode, representing African American Citizens Against Drugs before
City Council).
433. See, e.g., supra notes 11-14, and accompanying text.
434. Poulos, supra note 340, at 13-17 (proposing such an ordinance to deal with gang
loitering).
435. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 618 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that facial
invalidation is not appropriate where "a criminal charge is based on conduct
constitutionally subject to proscription and clearly forbidden by a statute," even when "the
law would be unconstitutionally vague if applied to other behavior").
436. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding nocturnal
juvenile curfew).
437. See supra note 11 (documenting prevalence ofjuvenile curfews).
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particularly when combined with truancy enforcement, offer police
broad authority to intervene in an attempt to help prevent the violence
and intimidation associated with some youth gangs. 43 8 Many communities, however, may not wish to impose curfews on all their young citizens
to address a specific neighborhood's gang problem. Moreover, there is
more than a little irony in the realization that decisions like Coates may
have pushed communities in this direction. Juvenile curfews may not be
vague, but they achieve specificity only by expanding the scope of enforcement discretion-raising legitimate concern with the broadened police authority that they thereby confer.43 9
Public nuisance law may offer one way out of this dilemma in some
communities. After this Article had entered the production process, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Acuna upheld the use of a preliminary injunction to restrain as a public nuisance a San Jose gang's activities
in the four square blocks in San Jose that the gang had adopted as its
turf.440 Declarations submitted in support of the application for injunctive relief alleged that gang members in the neighborhood congregated
on lawns, sidewalks, public thoroughfares, and in front of apartment
complexes at all hours, impeding traffic and openly smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and snorting cocaine "laid out in neat lines on the hoods of
residents' cars." 44 1 Area residents had seen "their garages used as urinals;
their homes commandeered as escape routes; their walls, fences, garage
doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a sullen canvas of
gang grafitti."" 2 Gang members, the court asserted, had taken over the
community, in which none of them resided, to operate a "drive-up drug
bazaar." 443 Residents remained indoors, especially at night, and did not
permit their children to play outside.44 4 Serious crime-murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, theft, and arson-was commonplace in the neighborhood. 445
Based on this evidence, the court rendered its decision under
California law. The full import of the decision cannot be considered
here. In abbreviated terms, however, the court determined that a
California statute authorizing the abatement of public nuisances was
properly invoked to prohibit gang conduct in the neighborhood that had
an "inherent tendency to injure or interfere with the community's exercise and enjoyment of rights common to the public."" 6 The court discussed the limitations that its earlier case law had placed upon judicial
expansion in "criminal equity" or "government by injunction," but deter438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

See Sherman, supra note 11, at 342-43.
See id. at 342 (citing concerns expressed by civil libertarians).
See People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 602.
See id. at 601.
Id. at 607. For the definition of a public nuisance, see supra note 10.
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mined that under California law, a general statute prohibiting the maintenance of a public nuisance was adequate to support either civil abatement, as in Acuna, or criminal prosecution. 44 7 Based upon the factual
showing made by the City of San Jose in support of its application for
injunctive relief, the court then went on to conclude that the thirty-eight
individuals named in the City's complaint had been properly enjoined
from gathering within the four-square-block area with each other or with
others they knew to be gang members. 4 8 The court also upheld a provision prohibiting the individuals from "confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting, and/or
battering" any residents or visitors to the neighborhood known by gang
members to have complained about their activities." 9 The court specifically rejected a vagueness challenge to the two provisions, noting that
their words were not vague when read in the context of the injunction's
objectives and the particular social environment to which the injunction
450
was to apply.
Because they lack the admittedly imperfect safeguard against arbitrary governmental action implicit in the requirement that laws be generally applied, injunctions dealing with serious public order problems raise
many issues that must be carefully resolved: like specifying when injunctive relief is appropriate; 451 the people who can be legitimately en447. See id. at 605 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Injunctions 580 (1972); Edwin S. Mack, The
Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 897 (1908)).
448. The court determined that given the showing that a "carnival-like atmosphere of
collective mayhem" prevailed in the neighborhood, the trial court had not abused its
discretion in determining that a total ban on any association among gang members within
the neighborhood was necessary to abate the nuisance. See id. at 615. The court also
determined that gang members' First Amendment associational rights were not infringed
by the prohibition on publicly gathering in the four-block area. The California Supreme
Court opined that "whatever else it may be in other contexts," the street gang's conduct in
the neighborhood failed to qualify as a protected form of association. Id. at 608. The
gang's activities there were "directed in the main at trafficking in illegal drugs and securing
control of the community through systematic acts of intimidation and violence," and thus
failed to qualify as either the "intimate" or "expressive" associations protected by the First
Amendment. See id.
449. Id. at 624 n.8 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
450. See id. at 613. The court noted, in particular, that the declarations filed in
support of the application for preliminary relief gave concrete notice of the types of
conduct prohibited by the provision enjoining the intimidation of persons complaining
about gang activities in the neighborhood. One resident "recounted an incident in which
gang members had threatened to cut out the tongue of her nine-year-old daughter if she
talked to the police." Id. Another resident "reported her neighbor's property had been
vandalized and the resident threatened after complaining to police that gang members
had urinated in her garage." Id. at 614. The court concluded that these declarations left
"little doubt as to what kind of conduct the decree seeks to enjoin" and that the provision
was not unconstitutionally vague "when the objectives of the injunction are considered and
the words of the provision are read in context." Id. at 618.
451. The California Supreme Court noted that an important check on any tendency
in the California courts to expand the range of conduct which they might enjoin arose
from the absence of any authority "to grant equitable relief against conduct not reasonably
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joined;452 and the scope of relief appropriate in different circumstances. 453 These issues are significant because, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, injunctions do carry heightened risks of discriminatory
application, even if at the same time they "have some advantages over
generally applicable statutes in that they can be tailored by a trial judge to
afford more precise relief."454 Their use should also be limited to circumstances in which the evidence suggests they will be helpful. Law enforcement itself is not always the best means for handling some problems
posed by youth gangs. Because street gangs "thrive on enemies, be these
their rival gangs or the police," enforcement can sometimes solidify gang
4 55
membership and render gangs even more threatening.
Civil injunctions, however, may avoid the difficulty that plagues many
generally applicable laws directed at public order-the underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of rules, as opposed to the sometimes
broad delegation in many standards-by requiring advance specification
of the problems that give rise to a need for police intervention. To obtain injunctive relief against gang members on the ground that the gang
itself, by virtue of its activities in a particular neighborhood, constitutes a
public nuisance, police and the attorneys who assist them must in theory
engage in a careful examination of a neighborhood's problems and involve the neighborhood's residents, in order to understand and demonstrate to a court the nature of these problems. The result should be a
carefully crafted injunction that specifies and forbids the precise gang
activities that the neighborhood has an interest in prohibiting.
Injunctions may also offer other important advantages in dealing
with serious neighborhood problems. They operate so as to require judicial imprimatur before police enforcement is undertaken, mirroring the
function that warrants play in authorizing search and seizure. They limit
within the ambit of the statutory definition of a public nuisance." Id. at 606. The court
also noted that to qualify as a public nuisance under California law, a gang's interference
with collective social interests must be both substantial and unreasonable, and must affect
"at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons." Id. at 604.
452. The Acuna court determined that individual gang members were properly
enjoined upon proof that they had been present in the neighborhood and that they either
admitted gang membership or had been identified as gang members. See id. at 618.
Justice Chin, concurring and dissenting, cited NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982), to argue that individual gang members should be enjoined only upon
evidence that such gang members "substantially contributed to the nuisance . . . or
intend[ ] to do so in the future." Id. at 622 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
id. at 631-32 (Mosk,J., dissenting) (same).
453. For a general synopsis of these issues, see Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.
212 (1994).

454. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-27 (1994) (sustaining use
of an injunction to create buffer zone on public street from which anti-abortion protestors
demonstrating near a health clinic could be excluded).

455. Malcolm W. Klein, Street Gang Cycles, in Crime, supra note 11, at 217, 235.
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police authority by specifying the particular neighborhoods in which they
apply, the persons enjoined, and the precise conduct that is prohibited.
Injunctions also require law enforcement authorities to devote substantial
resources to obtain them, which may itself help ensure that their use will
be limited to areas in which public order problems are truly serious. Finally, the advance specification of neighborhood conditions that an application for injunctive relief requires may promote the close analysis of
neighborhood problems and the collaboration between law enforcement
and community residents that are themselves important parts of the new
policing strategies.
d. Public OrderLaw as Administrative Regulation. - Legislatures might
also authorize police to perform order maintenance tasks by first recognizing that public order laws are by necessity sometimes incomplete.
Rather than empowering courts to fill in the details through the device of
public nuisance injunctions, state legislatures and city councils could instead enact public order laws that explicitly require police departments to
promulgate rules prior to enforcement. Courts, then, would defer to
these rules, so long as a reasonable justification supported their enactment.4 56 Such rules could work to require the advance specification of
public order problems prior to enforcement in a manner similar to the
way that public nuisance law is now being used in California to require
advance specification of the problems posed by street gangs. Rulemaking, however, could potentially result in legislative bodies, rather
than courts, assuming greater responsibility for authorizing police to undertake quality-of-life activities.
Thus, instead of enacting general, citywide laws prohibiting behaviors that present public order problems in some circumstances, but not in
all, the appropriate legislative body could provide for the regulation or
prohibition of such behaviors when they constitute public nuisances or
456. Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which police can be delegated the
authority to develop rules guiding their arrest discretion in the enforcement of criminal
laws. Compare Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: A Brief
Rejoinder, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1172, 1174-79 (1977) [hereinafter The Police and
Substantive Rulemaking] (contending that police should be required to enforce law as
provided by legislature), and Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking:
Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 62, 76-81, 86-98 (1976)
(contending that separation of powers and nondelegation prohibit police rulemaking that
affects scope of criminal law, at least in absence of explicit legislative authorization
"accompanied by precise standards") (quoted material at 98), with Kenneth Culp Davis,
Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A Reply, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1167, 1168-70
(1977) (contending that police inherently have authority to promulgate rules regulating
arrest discretion). While it is beyond the scope of this Article fully to canvass these debates,
more recent scholarship has suggested that whatever their resolution, state constitutional
separation of powers and delegation principles are not inconsistent with the development
of law enforcement rules in the context of minor crimes or civil infractions, where police
work is most analogous to the regulatory activities engaged in by state administrative
agencies. See Gregory Howard Williams, The Law and Politics of Police Discretion 74
(1984).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:551

seriously interfere with the collective enjoyment of public places. The
police department could be required to promulgate rules prior to enforcement directed at such activities. These rules would then be available
for public review. The police department could even be required to present testimony before an appropriate legislative committee to ensure that
the problems arising from particular behaviors in specified contexts are
publicly explored.
Rollerblading or biking in a public park, for instance, might pose few
problems in one park-depending upon factors like the frequency of the
conduct, the time of day, and alternative uses to which the park is put. In
another city park, this activity might have displaced alternative uses of the
park so as to constitute this activity, in that park, a serious interference
with a community's collective enjoyment of an important social resource.
Familiar with the problems presented by rollerblading or biking in a city's
parks, and provided with appropriate legislative authorization, the police
department could propose reasonably specified rules regulating these activities which might even vary from park to park. These rules would then
be subject to political scrutiny before the department undertook enforce4 57
ment on its own.

By allocating enforcement resources to specific neighborhoods and
not to others, police departments already informally engage in
policymaking of this type. And enforcement norms for minor infractions
vary from neighborhood to neighborhood in many communities, even in
the absence of formal policies to this effect. Where conduct prohibitions
are reasonably specific, this informal exercise of police discretion may be
adequate in many circumstances to permit flexible response to the
problems presented in different neighborhoods, without prompting any
significant deterioration in the ideal of evenhanded enforcement associated with the rule of law. For some problems, however, particularly when
conduct poses a community concern only in certain circumstances, legislatures and police departments might experiment with the device of administrative regulation.
4. Vagueness Review and the Persistence of Police Discretion. - Placed in
historical perspective, the Supreme Court's willingness in Papachristou
and in similar cases of the period to entertain facial challenges to public
order laws may be explained best in light of the Court's concern with laws
invoked by police to exclude some from participation in the community,
rather than to make community life possible. The Court was not unaware
that police were implicated in the riots of the 1960s, nor that broad laws
were being used in attempts to stifle the struggle for civil rights. Thus,
the Coates majority cited the Kerner Commission Report to observe that
alleged discriminatory enforcement of the Cincinnati ordinance prohibiting assembling in public places so as to annoy others had "figured promi457. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 135 (noting that police analysis of local problems
in Madison, Wisconsin led to enactment of ordinance to prohibit gambling in public
parks).

1997]

COURTS, COMMUNITIES, AND THE NEW POLTCTNG

647

nently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place
in Cincinnati in June 1967."458 In Papachristou,the Court noted that the
Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance, with its broad prohibition on strolling
about anywhere in the city, furnished a "convenient tool" for harassment
of minorities and the poor.4 59 The vagueness cases of the period, as both
Professor Jeffries and Post have suggested, thus partake of equal protec4 60
don concerns.
Without entering the debate as to whether facial invalidation for
vagueness is appropriate only when there are no valid applications of a
law or also in broader circumstances,4 1 the facial vagueness doctrine
should play a more limited role with respect to the new generation of
public order laws. When public order laws do not appear aimed at the
exclusion of groups or individuals from participation in a community's
public life, but rather at the articulation of reasonable behavioral standards in the interest of preserving public spaces, communities should not
be prevented from replacing the Papachristouregime with a new legal regime in which more contextualized, conduct-based prohibitions authorize police to perform order maintenance tasks. Admittedly, by asking
whether a public order law that is in some measure indefinite is aimed at
excluding outsiders from full participation in the community or at facilitating the common use of public spaces, courts will not thereby render
the contours of the vagueness prohibition concrete. Though the next
Part articulates some considerations that might help in this evaluation, it
is necessarily contextual, and could result in legitimate differences of
opinion at the margins. It is not dissimilar, however, to evaluations that
judges have on occasion undertaken to give meaning to other constitu462
tional standards.
458. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n.6 (1971).
459. See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville 405 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1972) (noting that

"poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers" were those "generally implicated by the
imprecise terms" of the Jacksonville ordinance and that the rule of law "evenly applied to
minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that
holds society together").
460. SeeJefflies, supra note 211, at 197; Post, supra note 252, at 498.
461. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System
212-13 (4th ed. 1996) (noting mixed signals sent by Court as to when facial invalidation
for vagueness is appropriate). Compare Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982) ("[A]ssuming the enactment implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct," a court should accept facial vagueness challenge "only
if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."), with Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 859 n.8 (1983) (permitting party to attack statute .on ground that it
would be impermissibly vague as applied to someone else and asserting that "[n]o
authority cited by the dissent" supports argument that facial challenges on ground that a

statute invites arbitrary enforcement are permitted only when statute is vague in all its
possible applications).

462. Justice O'Connor, for instance, has suggested that in the Establishment Clause
context, the endorsement test is animated by a concern that religious endorsement "sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Police discretion in the enforcement of laws regulating minor misconduct-and to some degree the potential for arbitrary enforcementwill persist. The persistence of police discretion, however, cannot be attributed to insufficient judicial vigilance in vagueness review. The facial
invalidation of indefinite public laws simply cannot be a primary constraint on the discretion that police employ in maintaining order in public places. Because public order laws often serve as the basis for informal
resolution of street order problems and are not invariably enforced, they
present different problems from the laws that prohibit homicide, robbery, and major theft. This fact remains true, moreover, regardless of the
precision with which such laws are drafted. Broad rules can be specific
yet still result in expansive enforcement discretion. A plethora of narrow
rules, all definite, can sub silentio authorize a substantial measure of police control over a community's residents (or a portion thereof) provided
that these rules prohibit relatively common behavior. The aggressive invalidation of public order laws, however, can only deprive police of the
lawful authority to perform tasks that communities might nominate.
Such invalidation cannot "solve" the problem of police discretion in the
performance of order maintenance tasks, except at substantial cost to the
ability of communities to address their local problems.
Nor should the persistence of police discretion in promoting the
quality of life in local neighborhoods be attributed to cynical policing
choice. It is simply in the character of many public order laws that they
not be invariably enforced, but that they facilitate the negotiated resolution of street order problems. Legalistic, full-enforcement policies may
be appropriate in some communities, and with respect to some public
order laws. Such policies, however, are not invariably wise, and particularly when alternatives to formal legal sanctions appear equally effective.
Legalistic enforcement can destroy the cooperation between a police department and the community that is "an essential element of effective law
enforcement." 4 63 It is thus not entirely an overstatement to say that there
can be no maintenance policing without police discretion. 4 64
While defending her interpretation of the test, she has acknowledged that this test

"depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular
challenged practice and, like any test that is sensitive to context, it may not always yield
results with unanimous agreement at the margins." Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 629 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
463. Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of

Regulatory Unreasonableness 125 (1982).
464. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the exercise of police

discretion in the context of minor public order problems in other countries, limited
scholarship on the subject suggests that police discretion is both recognized and, to varying
degrees, accepted. See, e.g., David K.Linnan, Police Discretion in a Continental European
Administrative State: The Police of Baden-Wfirttemberg in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1984, at 185, 189-90, 218 (1984) (noting that
German police have legal duty, subject to administrative review, to weigh competing rights
and alternative resolutions in determining proper response to disturbance of public order
and observing that police may in practice also exercise legally more ambiguous discretion
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The exercise of police discretion in the context of laws regulating
minor misconduct is inevitable in any police department, whatever its policing philosophy, but especially in those departments that embrace the
new policing reforms. Community and problem-oriented police take account of a local neighborhood's norms and its concerns; they aspire to
work with rather than against a neighborhood's residents to ameliorate
that neighborhood's problems.4 65 The new policing philosophies thus
involve the exercise of more discretion than traditional, reform era policing.466 The exercise of such discretion "can be a strength, not a weakness,"4 67 permitting police to attend to a neighborhood's problems and
to assist neighborhoods in addressing conditions that may seriously impair the ability of residents to enjoy community life. But discretion has its
dark side, as well.
The constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s have had many
positive results. In some communities, the invalidation of a legal regime
in which police had blanket authority to invoke the criminal law in the
face of difficult social problems has spurred the development of other
approaches: like homeless outreach, often conducted by police in conjunction with social service providers; 468 juvenile programs that lure
young people off street corners for beneficial activities; 469 and drug and
alcohol treatment and rehabilitation services. 4 70 When law is needed as a
basis for police intervention, the constitutional reforms of the past generation have pushed communities to analyze their neighborhood
problems-a necessary part of framing more specific laws to address
by decriminalizing potential offenses and treating them as peacekeeping matters-for
instance, by taking drunken brawlers into temporary administrative detention rather than

subjecting them to criminal arrest); Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A
Comparative Perspective, 64 Ind. L.J. 878, 893 (1989) (concluding that English cases
"support the argument that police officials have the power and responsibility to develop
general guidelines for constables to follow while exercising the broad discretion they do
and must have in enforcing the law").
465. See Bayley, supra note 115, at 231.
466. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at 24.
467. Remington, supra note 335, at 321.
468. In policing the homeless, two researchers recently concluded that cooperation
"between law enforcement agencies and human services agencies can yield substantial
benefits not only for the agencies involved, but for individuals who need help." Peter E.
Finn & Monique Sullivan, National Inst. ofJustice, Police Response to Special Populations
1 (1988) (recounting several successful programs involving such cooperation).
469. The police have often pressed for new community services for the young, for

instance, "[e]stablishment of... dance hall[s] free of alcohol, drugs, and smoke in an area
in which youths aimlessly congregate[ ] with a high potential for conflict," or "construction
of new basketball courts in an area in which idle youngsters [are] creating a number of
problems." Goldstein, supra note 18, at 110. "Because police officers work around the
clock, on the streets and in people's homes, they are among the first to see evidence of
inadequacies in government service and the need for new services." Id. at 109.
470. See id. at 110 (recounting how police have pressed for detoxification programs
in some communities where none had existed to deal with community problems associated
with addiction).
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them-and to authorize police intervention more sparingly and with
more precision. These reforms may have also stimulated an ongoing reformulation of street order law in which civil and administrative sanctions, rather than penal sanctions, play an important and even primary
role.
The reforms, however, could not change the fundamental character
of the task that police perform in helping to maintain standards of civility
in public places. Police do not create order; they nevertheless play an
extraordinarily important, if provisional and tentative, role in preserving
and enhancing the quality of life in local neighborhoods. 47 1 This role is
not fully encompassed by law; it is sometimes accomplished simply when
a patrol officer stands on a street corner, or when he makes requests with
which citizens voluntarily comply. Law is not unimportant to this role,
however, and legal authorization is sometimes vital. But the police will
inevitably exercise discretion in invoking laws that authorize order maintenance. And this will be true whether police are afforded relatively
broad authority to enforce general standards or whether they enforce the
most narrow and specific rules.
The key question therefore becomes not whether to permit discretion, but how to channel, check, and supervise it so as to maximize the
potential for its positive exercise. The ambivalence to police discretion
reflected in some constitutional cases may not take into account legitimate community distress with the cumulative injuries and communal
harms that recurrent forms of minor disorder can visit upon a neighborhood. This ambivalence, however, stems from real and legitimate concerns. In those communities that have elected to authorize the preventive, consensual patrol contemplated in the new policing theories,
placing appropriate constraints on the exercise of police discretion-constraints that courts alone cannot impose-will be vitally important to the
success of community and problem-oriented policing reforms.
III. MANAGING PoUcE DISCRION
Whatever the future of the new policing reforms, there is a significant degree of consensus that the "community-problem" focus in the new
theoretical frameworks is both "solidly based on the most important [empirical] research about contemporary police operations" and representative of the best that policing theory now has to offer.4 72 Police today are
more likely to invoke a different language in speaking about their role:
to note that residents in high crime-rate neighborhoods are concerned
about "street prostitution, low-level drug dealing, underage drinking,
blaring car radios" and a host of other quality-of-life issues; to assert that
471. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at I (noting that localities are heavily dependent
upon police "to provide a sense of security, to facilitate movement; to resolve conflicts; and
to protect the very processes and rights-such as free elections, freedom of speech, and
freedom of assembly-on which continuation of a free society depends").
472. See The Police in America, supra note 44, at 190-91.
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" [p] ublic complaints about low-level crimes are an early warning to the
police that a neighborhood is under stress;" 4 73 and to contend that "police must work with communities to accomplish mutual enforcement
goals." 4 74 New "street laws" are emerging to authorize police intervention. These laws are unlike those characteristic of the decades prior to
Papachristou. They are more specific, more narrowly tailored to a local
neighborhood's problems, and often involve civil rather than penal
sanctions.
Still there remains the difficult matter of police discretion. The
close, local examination by police of a neighborhood's problems, the devotion to ameliorating those problems in consultation with a neighborhood's residents, and the sparing use of public order laws for the specific
purpose of strengthening the social fabric of a community, may offer a
better alternative than what in many places has gone before. Unchecked
deterioration in the quality of social environments can result in the adoption of highly intrusive laws and police tactics, like curfews, combined
with periodic sweeps. 4 75 The legal authorization of order maintenance
activities, however, enhances police discretion on the street. Such authorization may even risk a return to aggressive patrol activities that can
themselves be provocative. But if courts cannot perform the task of constraining police discretion merely by insisting that laws be reasonably specific, how can police discretion be controlled and police accountability be
ensured in the new community policing era?
There are no easy answers to this profoundly difficult question. No
particular institutional arrangement, no one mechanism for selecting,
training, or guiding police officers in the exercise of their discretion,
could ensure completely satisfactory results. Advocates of the new policing reforms assert with substantial empirical support that the reasonable
restraint of police discretion in order maintenance tasks is not impossible. Police in major cities have historically spent most of their time (even
when these activities went unacknowledged and unrewarded) mediating
conflicts and managing disruptions, usually in poor neighborhoods from
which most calls for service come, and with a substantial degree of success: "Police in major cities deal with literally thousands of complex and
ambiguous cases each day, and handle most of them to the satisfaction of
virtually everyone."4 76 Order maintenance policing, however, is altogether different from the policing of serious crime-more subtle, less visible, and calling for an intelligence, modesty, and restraint in the use of
473. See Bratton, supra note 162, at 447-49.
474. Id. at 463.

475. See Chevigny, supra note 407, at 269 (noting that if community police "can
exchange even a modicum of effective preventive policing based on the trust of the people
for the control by intimidation that police have sometimes used, it is a clear gain"); Moore,
supra note 41, at 143-44 (advocating community and problem-oriented policing as an
alternative to curfews and street sweeps).
476. Kelling & Coles, supra note 342, at 69.

COLUMBIA LAW REVWEW

[Vol. 97:551

coercive authority that defies simple regulation. By calling new attention
to this aspect of the police role, the new policing philosophies provoke
renewed consideration of how police discretion, as exercised both by the
department and its individual patrol officers on the street, can be properly restrained.
Two points are worth making at the start. First, in the community
policing era, the accountability of police both to the communities they
serve and to the rule of law is best assured by recognizing explicitly the
inevitability-and even, properly managed, the desirability-of police discretion. Just as Professor Mashaw has argued that the flexibility conferred by broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies may
enhance governmental responsiveness, 4 77 it is discretion that permits local police departments to respond to a neighborhood's quality-of-life concerns and to its preferences about the character of police intervention.
Discretion is part of the solution to the tension that has existed between
police and many communities; it can be a strength. Second, the reasonable restraint of police discretion in the performance of order maintenance tasks is not possible through any single mechanism internal or external to the police department, but is most promisingly possible through
the use of multiple strategies aimed at managing-not dramatically curtailing-the discretion that police inevitably employ keeping the peace in
public places.
There are many such strategies. Recruitment, training, and supervision-all different in a community policing framework-can promote
the beneficial exercise of police discretion. 4 78 The development of
mechanisms for collegial, intradepartmental review of individual police
officers' order maintenance activities is also important. 479 Although the
refashioning of police performance measures is a difficult task, given the
low visibility of order maintenance activities, it is essential. Departments
must account for and reward not simply a given number of felony arrests,
but also those less dramatic police interventions like successful dispute
resolution and negotiated order maintenance. 48 0 Internal discipline,
sending a strong message that brutal, corrupt, and reckless performance
will not be tolerated, is central to the new policing reforms. 48 ' Also im477. See Mashaw, supra note 213, at 98.
478. See, e.g., Bitmer, supra note 138, at 16 (advocating "radical revision of current
selection and training structures," including higher educational standards for entry, as part
of community and problem-oriented policing reforms); George L Kelling et al., Police
Accountability and Community Policing, Persp. on Policing (National Inst. ofJustice, U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, Washington D.C.), Nov. 1988, at 4 (noting that supervision in community
policing framework must emphasize "teaching, reviewing, considering alternatives,
training" and other such techniques).
479. See Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 7 (advocating increased use of peer review
within police departments as part of community policing strategy).
480. See id. at 6-7.
481. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 192 ("Since line supervisors are closest to
their personnel and have the greatest day-to-day effects on their work, they must.., be
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portant is a new style of management, not through the command and
control strategies of reform era policing, but through the articulation of
humanistic values that can motivate line officers, many of whom became
police officers at least in part because of an idealistic orientation to com48 2
munity service.
This Part does not endeavor to examine the many internal police
reforms that seek to promote the beneficial exercise of discretion within
the police bureaucracy by changing, in even radical ways, the character of
the bureaucracy. 48 3 Instead, while acknowledging the central role that
these reforms can play, this Part discusses a narrower set of reforms that
can enhance police accountability in quality-of-life policing by improving
the quantity and quality of information that flows between police and the
communities they serve. Courts alone cannot resolve the problem of police discretion on the street. Communities and their police departments,
however, are positioned-albeit precariously-to help promote the beneficial exercise of police discretion. To a significant degree, the management of police discretion in a community policing framework is about
the exchange of information between neighborhoods and the police.
The very reciprocity between police and communities that is deemed essential to effective community policing is thus also critical to ensuring
that discretion is adequately constrained. This Part first examines several
ways in which reciprocity between police and local neighborhoods might
be enhanced. Finally, the Article returns to the role that courts play in
the review of public order laws to assess the contribution they can make
in restraining police discretion in the community policing era.
A. The Police and PoliticalAccountability
1. The Police and Local Politics.- The result of the professional, reform era orientation that still characterizes modern policing has been a
gradual atrophy in the mechanisms of reciprocity between police and
communities, so that police in many places have become "cut off from
accountable for seeing that officers do their jobs in the most humane ways possible.");
Kelling et al.,
supra note 478, at 6 ("[S]trong messages must be given to officers at all levels
that incompetent performance-brutality and corruption, -for example-is intolerable.").
482. See Robert Wasserman & Mark H. Moore, Values in Policing, Persp. on Policing
(National Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1988, at 3-4
(noting that management by values is important in community policing and in most
organizations, like police departments, in which output is hard to define, discretionary
judgment is necessary, and opportunity for close supervision is limited); see also Skolnick
& Fyfe, supra note 42, at 92-93 (noting that most police recruits are drawn to policing out
of combination of self-interest-the desire for "good, well-paid, and stimulatingjob"-and
idealism); Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 16 (crediting Taylorist managerial principles
with disenchantment of line officers).
483. See Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 5 ("[A]s departments shift away from the
authoritarian model of policing to a more flexible community-oriented approach, a
reexamination of the structure of the bureaucracy [is] essential to the efficient
performance of the officer on the beat as well as the effectiveness of the department's

operations.").
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the aspirations, desires, and concerns of citizens."48 4 Community and
problem-oriented policing seek to change this:
In community policing, the justification for policing is not only
its capacity to reduce crime and violence at a low cost while preserving constitutionally guaranteed rights but also its ability to
meet the needs and desires of the community.... Politics, in
the sense of community responsiveness and accountability,
reemerges as a virtue and an explicit basis of police
legitimacy. 485
This responsiveness and accountability to the community is particularly
important in the context of police interventions aimed at restoring or
preserving the quality of life in local neighborhoods. "Renewed emphasis
is placed on community or political authorization" because the law alone
is not considered sufficient authorization for police activities aimed at
"maintain[ing] order, negotiat[ing] conflict, and solv[ing] problems."48 6
Existing mechanisms can in theory help promote the requisite reciprocity between police and communities. In those communities where
48 7
top police officials are still popularly elected, political control is direct.

And even when police chiefs or police commissioners are appointed, they
488
are today accountable to elected officials in all major American cities.

"At the municipal level a police chief who is by legislation required to
function under the direction of an elected mayor and who is appointed
by the mayor, is obviously considered responsible to the mayor for all
aspects of police operations." 48 9 Police departments are also at least theoretically accountable to local legislative bodies, since these bodies perform an oversight function that some community policing theorists have
suggested might be enhanced: "[A]ccountability might be increased by
regular reporting and discussion in city council meetings or council committee meetings of the kinds of problems police are dealing with in the
4 90
community and how they are handling them."
These formal mechanisms of political control are important. Mayors
and city councils provide forums for discussion in the community about
the quality-of-life activities of police and can thus help constrain police in
the exercise of discretion. When legislation is proposed to regulate aggressive panhandling or begging at automated teller machines, for instance, the public debate over this legislation often reveals legitimate con4 91
cerns about the ways in which police will apply new laws on the streets.
484. Moore, supra note 41, at 117.
485. Id. at 123.
486. Kelling & Moore, supra note 35, at 19.

487. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 132.
488. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 171.
489. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 132.
490. Mary Ann Wycoff, The Benefits of Community Policing- Evidence and
Conjecture, in Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, supra note 32, at 103, 117.
491. See, e.g., CliffordJ. Levy, Council Approves Restrictions on Beggars, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1996, at B4 (discussing New York City Council debate surrounding enactment of
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This debate can be useful to police departments, prompting them to consider how police discretion should be appropriately guided: how officers
should be instructed in employing the techniques of counseling and persuasion as an alternative to citation or arrest. Public discussion can also
prompt beneficial changes in the character of new public order laws: the
addition of sunset provisions where public order problems are likely to
dissipate once efforts are made to resolve them, or legislative specification of circumstances in which warnings should be first attempted prior
to citation or arrest. City councils or committees within these councils
could perform a greater oversight role by periodically reviewing the implementation of new legislation, soliciting public comment on the ways in
which enforcement has been undertaken, and considering modification
to existing laws.
In large urban departments where police attend to the concerns of
many distinct communities, however, these formal mechanisms of political accountability may be too far removed from the concerns of local
neighborhoods to insure responsiveness to these concerns. Professor
Goldstein has argued that by requiring the police to "extend themselves
to a community," to learn about its problems, and to respond to them in
ways acceptable to specific neighborhoods, implementation of the "problem" focus in his theory can buttress these formal mechanisms of reciprocity.49 2 The contacts that emerge from police efforts to deal with a
neighborhood's problems in consultation with its residents are not permanent. They are likely to last only so long as a neighborhood problem
persists, and they involve the police with shifting groups in different
neighborhoods. "Yet, out of this total effort, maintained over a long period of time, one Would expect the total community, eventually ... to
recognize increasingly that the effectiveness of the police depends on
community involvement."493 There is empirical evidence, moreover, that
some change in this direction is occurring. Focused on a particular problem, the police and these shifting parts of the community have already
turned in some places to mayors, city council members, and other political officials for the legislative changes or resource allocations sometimes
necessary to address a local order maintenance problem. "[C] ommunity
policing projects . . . by involving elected officials in dealing with

strengthened existing systems of political
problems, have [thus] actually
4 94
control over the police."
It is easy to discount the role that local politics and neighborhood
reciprocity can play in managing the discretion that police inevitably employ in dealing with quality-of-life concerns. Neighborhoods are not homogenous and problems of disorder sometimes emerge by virtue of "ralegislation to address squeegee men, beggars at automated teller machines, and aggressive
panhandlers).
492. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 26.
493. Id.
494. Id.
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cial, cultural, and economic tensions that arise among those who
legitimately live, work, and recreate in a given area. '495 With whom,
then, do the police consult in determining that the young men who loiter
outside a convenience store, often violating an ordinance against public
drinking, pose a problem? Communities never speak with a single voice
and police can do great harm in places in which there are significant
tensions by even inadvertently contributing to the perception that they
have taken sides.
At the same time, neighborhoods do exist.49 6 Their public spaces

are characterized by patterns of interactions among those going to
school, or work, those playing in parks, and those bantering on public
streets. Skogan's work, moreover, provides important empirical support
that residents within a community, regardless of ethnicity, class, and age,
often agree on the character of its disorder problems. 49 7 Police consultation with elected representatives and with neighborhood residents can
thus help in the identification of problems that are of broad concern.
And if there are complexities in identifying the community with whom
police are to consult, it is also true that police-community consultation
makes a difference in the allocation of police resources. Without such
consultation, "police suffer from a biased view of community
concerns." 498
Accountability, then, may emerge at least to some degree from the
policing problem itself and as part of the effort to resolve it. When police
and citizens together "nominate the problems with which [they] will deal,
the tactics that each will use to address those problems, and the outcomes
that are desired," the agreement that flows out of this exchange is itself a
499
standard by which to evaluate the police department's performance.
The formal mechanisms through which police departments have historically promoted community-police reciprocity-like advisory councils or
regular community meetings held in local precincts-may also be rendered more vital by the "problem" focus in community and problemoriented policing reforms. "Before any major action is undertaken,
whether a shift in resources or implementation of a new problem-solving
approach, the community-oriented police department discusses that
change with the appropriate neighborhood." 50 0
There is reason, however, to be less than sanguine about the role
that both formal and informal mechanisms of political control can play in
holding police managers and their departments accountable to the community in the performance of order maintenance tasks. The historical
effort to wrest control of policing from local ward politicians resulted in
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

Mastrofski, supra note 35, at 54.
See Matthew A. Crenson, Neighborhood Politics 8-20, 107-16 (1983).
See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
Goldstein, supra note 18, at 71.
Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 4.
Wasserman & Moore, supra note 482, at 6.
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broad dissemination of the ideas associated with reform era policing that
helped accomplish this result. These ideas, like faith in police professionalism and in neutral law enforcement in lieu of potentially corrupting
political controls, have sometimes been interpreted to condemn as corrupt any political oversight of the police. 5 01 "Those running for the office of mayor.., often promise to grant autonomy to the police. And it is
not uncommon for mayors running for reelection to brag about the degree of independence they allowed their police departments."50 2 Politicians also have their own reasons for disclaiming much of their responsibility for monitoring police operations. Policing is a risky business, and
distance between politicians and the police helps the former avoid blame
when the latter become ensnared in controversy.5 0 3 Police "are not autonomous; the sensitive function they perform in our society requires that
50 4
they be accountable, through the political process, to the community."
Achieving this accountability, however, is no small feat. Though some
recent evidence may reveal "a capacity and willingness by elected officials
in many communities to assume [oversight] duties in a responsible man- 5 the police in some places still frequently "have greater autonomy
ner,"50
5 06
than other agencies of government that exercise much less authority."
Nor is it easy to establish and then nurture the relationship between
neighborhoodsand police that permits the latter to play a supportive role in
preserving the quality of life in public places while the former acts as a
restraint on the discretion exercised by the police agency. Community
policing theorists are of one mind that the community-police relationship
must be inclusive:, "[N]o social, economic, racial, ethnic, religious, or
other groups can be excluded."50 7 Some groups and individuals, however, may be difficult to bring within the problem-solving consultation
that community policing implies, while at the same time they may be vulnerable to abuse in an order maintenance regime. The nature of the
partnership between police and local neighborhoods to which community policing theorists refer is not fully specified, nor are the processes by
which such a partnership might come into being. 508
501. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 176 (noting that "capacity of local
government to shape police discretion is limited by the success of police reformers during
the first half of the twentieth century to define virtually any political influence over police
as corrupt influence").
502. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 135; see Williams, supra note 456, at 105 (noting

that public reaction to corrupt political control of early police departments influenced
local officials to "stay out of police department work, particularly with respect to issues
concerning development of law enforcement policy").
503. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 86 (noting that local politicians have been
wary of performing an oversight role "for fear that they will get 'burned' by what appears to
be a never-ending crime problem").
504. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 11.
505. Mastrofski, supra note 35, at 66.
506. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 135.
507. Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 168.
508. See id.
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Finally, there are inherent limits to the role that political controls
and informal neighborhood involvement should play in promoting police
accountability. Just as community and problem-oriented policing reforms cannot signal retreat to a legal regime in which police ar! delegated authority to maintain order as they deem appropriate, the advent
of these new policing philosophies cannot mean a return to the corrupt
political control of policing that the reform era successfully-perhaps too
successfully"-transformed. "[P]ublic police must be distributed fairly
across cities on the basis of neighborhood need, not neighborhood political clout."50 9 Police, in addition, "must be free to enforce the law without fear that the person or class of offenders against whom they take action has the power to retaliate against the enforcing officers" through the
political process. 510 Most important, police must resist rather than respond to community mandates that would violate the constitutional
rights of others or require police to act beyond their lawful authority.5 1 '
In practice, then, police must stand at some remove from politics
and from communities while at the same time remaining open to neighborhood concerns and to neighborhood preferences about the character
of police intervention. In fact, an important part of their role in qualityof-life policing is likely to involve educating citizens about limits-imposed by law and by the finite resources of police departments-on what
police can be expected to accomplish. 512 Both the law and the professional autonomy conferred on police by the reforms of this century will
continue to play an important role in maintaining a necessary distance
between police and local communities. The challenge in community policing-critical to police helping to enhance the quality of neighborhood
life-is to identify those contexts that can promote the accountability of
police to local communities while preserving an important measure of
police autonomy.
2. Guiding Discretion. - The patrol officer walking a beat makes
many on-the-spot decisions-to enforce or not enforce, to intervene or to
overlook a minor incident-that may be somewhat removed from the
mechanisms of political control and even neighborhood reciprocity.
Placing reasonable restraints on the individual officer's discretion might
be further facilitated through the use of departmental guidelines: broad
policy statements developed within the police department that seek to
509. George L. Kelling & James K. Stewart, Neighborhoods and Police:

The

Maintenance of Civil Authority, Persp. on Policing (National Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Washington, D.C.), May 1989, at 10.

510. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 149.
511. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at 25.

512. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 266; Moore, supra note 41, at 145-46.
Resource constraints are themselves a substantial limit upon the role that police can play in
attending to neighborhood disorder. "The task of policing disorder competes with other
personnel needs, including the need for rapid-response teams and visible motorized
patrol, and it must battle for attention with conventional kinds of drug-enforcement
efforts." Skogan, supra note 26, at 161.
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instruct the officer in how to employ his discretion in addressing specific
public order problems.5 1 3 Such guidelines, however, are not simply an
internal police reform that might structure discretion on the street. They
may be an important mechanism for promoting reciprocity between police and local communities.
Formulating police guidelines to inform the line officer's discretion
is not a new idea. It was first promoted by legal scholars and law reformers in the 1960s. Professor LaFave was one of the first to endorse the
development of guidelines to govern discretionary practices. He envisioned that these guidelines would be subject to an ongoing process of
review within the police department: "[P]olice ought to acknowledge
their exercise of discretion and reduce their enforcement policies to writ5 14
ing and subject them to a continuing process of critical re-evaluation."
Soon thereafter, the Crime Commission urged that police departments
promulgate guidelines governing such matters as "the issuance of orders
to citizens regarding their movements or activities, the handling of minor
disputes ... and the decision whether or not to arrest in specific situations involving specific crimes."5 15 Professor Davis urged that police departments engage in administrative rulemaking.5 16 By the 1970s, there
was substantial consensus among legal scholars and law reformers that
guidelines of one sort or another should be developed to structure discre5 17
tionary decisionmaking on the street.
Though they may not invoke any explicit analogy to administrative
rulemaking, community and problem-oriented policing theorists have
likewise endorsed the use of departmental guidelines. These theorists,
however, place more stress on the importance of guidelines as a mechanism for promoting the community-police reciprocity that is part of the
new policing.5 18 They commonly opine that police departments dealing
with public order problems should develop guidelines "openly and in collaboration with citizens, prosecutors, and legal counsel. 5 19 Professor
Goldstein has argued that his theory of problem-oriented policing can
provide a basis for articulating criteria for selective enforcement. Such
an articulation can be useful for community-oriented police departments
513. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 180 (discussing guidelines).

514. LaFave, supra note 279, at 513.
515. Crime Commission Report, supra note 86, at 104.
516. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion 137-38 (1975).
517. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.
L. Rev. 349, 423 (1974); Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement
Agencies, 36 Law & Contemp. Probs. 500, 500-01 (1971); see also Samuel Walker,
Controlling the Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. Det. Mercy L.
Rev. 361, 365-366 & n.33 (1986) (recounting development of consensus in favor of
guidelines). But see The Police and Substantive Rulemaking, supra note 456, at 1176-77
(rejecting idea that police should reduce scope of substantive criminal law through
administrative rulemaking process).
518. See, e.g., Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 179-93.
519. Kelling & Coles, supra note 342, at 70.
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enforced
since it helps to avoid the perception that laws are not being
520
fairly, but are being used instead to harass particular groups.
George Kelling and Catherine Coles have recently elaborated on the
ways in which guidelines operate in a community policing regime. 5 21 Unlike the model rules and regulations posited in the 1970s, which often
sought to constrain police discretion simply by standardizing police patrol, guidelines in a community policing framework are based upon the
analysis of particular problems, can be drafted to address these problems
5 22
in specific locations, and are subject to ongoing review and revision.
They inform the exercise of police discretion rather than attempt rigidly
to confine it. As Kelling and Coles have described, they help to ensure:
that police respond to citizen demands;.., that police and citizens negotiate a consensus about the nature of neighborhood
problems and what is to be done about them; ...

that police

policies and practices in neighborhoods are official, legitimate,
and have continuity over time; and, finally, that both citizens
and police 52
develop yardsticks to measure their mutual
performance. 3
Thus, consider their example of a neighborhood in which long-term residents are in conflict over appropriate noise levels with the college students who also live in the neighborhood and attend a nearby university.
Police could ineffectively respond to repeated calls, admonishing the students and sometimes citing them for making unreasonable noise, as individual officers might feel inclined. They could, instead, do something far
different: consult with the concerned parties to explain the problem and
develop workable standards for that neighborhood. The result could be
a community-negotiated guideline distributed to all residents in the community and declaring that loud noise after midnight, especially before
working days, constitutes a legitimate grievance within the neighborhood;
the guideline would express the resolution of the department to take action, where necessary, to enforce an ordinance prohibiting unreasonable
5 24
noise during that time.

The elaboration of guidelines in the context of police interventions
aimed at ameliorating neighborhood disorder can thus play an important
role in promoting the exchange of information between communities
and the police. By openly discussing the formulation of guidelines, police effectively announce in advance the approach to a problem that the
department has tentatively decided to take. Police can then obtain infor520. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 132-33.
521. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 86, at 179-93.
522. See id. at 191 (noting that efforts in the 1970s to elaborate guidelines centered
around promulgation of model rules and regulations).
523. Id. at 188.
524. Kelling and Coles have recounted how a guideline of this type was elaborated by
police in Dayton, Ohio in the 1970s to deal with conflicts between students and the
residents of a working-class neighborhood located near the students' university. See id. at
191-92.
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mation from neighborhood residents or from advisory councils and the
larger community about the acceptability of the planned approach.
Since the purpose of order maintenance policing is not to deter violadons by visiting heavy sanctions on offenders caught unawares, but rather
to ameliorate community problems, the police lose nothing through this
open discussion. In fact, public discussion of a disorder problem can
sometimes help to alleviate it.
Even without specific legislative authorization to engage in formal
rulemaking, police departments can clearly use guidelines to give meaning, in context, to standards prohibiting things like unreasonable noise.
As described in Part II, guidelines might also be promulgated within a
more structured rulemaking process specified by the legislature. The formulation of guidelines in either context facilitates community input into
the policymaking process. As Professor Amsterdam suggested almost
thirty years ago, promulgating guidelines "bring[s] the major issues up to
visibility, and . .. subject[s] police resolution of those issues to correc-

525
tion," if necessary, by political processes.
Many police departments have already articulated guidelines-albeit
often wholly internal-for traffic enforcement. There guidelines are
"often based on an analysis of accidents, to determine times, days, and
areas in which enforcement should be concentrated; violations that
should receive priority; and accepted tolerances beyond legislated standards."5 26 There are early signs, moreover, that some police departments
are moving in the direction of guided discretion to handle street order
problems. In New York City, for instance, the Transit Police Department
developed guidelines openly in consultation with citizens to govern officers' discretion in enforcing rules against minor misconduct on the subways.5 27 These guidelines have been subsequently credited with helping
to keep citizen complaints constant, even as "ejections from the subway
and arrests for rule-violating behavior and misdemeanors doubled in

1990."528

If police departments have moved "to an immeasurable but noticeable degree" to structure the discretion that their officers must inevitably
exercise on the street,5 29 however, there is still reason to express some
reservation about this mechanism for promoting reciprocity between police and communities. Police efforts in this direction have not been uniform and have emerged in large part without stimulus from legisla525.
Criminal
526.
527.
528.

Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 812 (1970).
Goldstein, supra note 18, at 70.
See Kelling & Coles, supra note 342, at 70.
Id.

529. Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The
Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication,
89 Mich. L. Rev. 442, 446 (1990).
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tures.530 Politicians, afraid of being viewed as "anti-police," may be
reluctant to require that police promulgate guidelines for the enforcement of public order laws. 531 In any event, in the absence of legislative
mandates to formulate guidelines for the exercise of police discretion (or
much judicially-imposed pressure), police guidelines have tended to be
elaborated in response to some crisis-like a controversial incident or a
lawsuit-so that officers negatively view such guidelines as an imposition. 53 2 Thus, the positive benefits of structuring police discretion as part
of an ongoing planning process are lost. 533 Police concern that even rea-

sonable departures from established guidelines might prove the basis for
the exclusion of evidence otherwise legally obtained or for tort liability
may have also retarded the process of articulating guidelines to inform
53 4
enforcement decisions.
It is also legitimate to question whether the simple elaboration of
police guidelines can meaningfuilly constrain police discretion in the routine police-citizen encounters that constitute the daily business of order
maintenance. "Numerous scholars have documented the difficulties of
controlling the behavior of police officers... applying law at the 'street
level."' 53 5 In isolation, "the mere development of more specific standards" to govern street discretion is unlikely to constrain police behavior
in those departments where more general standards are already abused
or ignored. 53 6 And the defeasibility that characterizes laws regulating minor forms of street misconduct can render even the most elaborate specification of enforcement criteria ineffectual, since the subway panhandler
who has been let off with a warning simply disappears, as does the opportunity to review the appropriateness of the officer's conduct. 53 7 In addi-

tion, ill-conceived guidelines make it harder not easier to control police
discretion. "No rigid directive can tell officers to arrest every time they
witness a violation of law... [or] never to arrest; no directive can precisely define the circumstances distinguishing cases in which arrest is ap530. See, e.g., Kelling & Coles, supra note 342, at 70 (noting that "[flew police

departments... have considered, let alone developed, guidelines" to govern discretion in
order maintenance); see also Walker, supra note 517, at 385 (noting that "growth of

administrative law over the past fifty years has by-passed the police," largely as result of
legislative and judicial deference to criminal justice agencies).
531. See Walker, supra note 517, at 385.

532. See id. at 368.
533. See id.
534. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 123-24. At least as a matter of federal
constitutional law, any concern of police administrators that the violation of guidelines

could result in evidentiary exclusion is overstated at this point. In Whren, the Supreme
Court indicated just last Term that the violation of police regulations-in that case,
regulations limiting the circumstances in which plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles

should enforce traffic laws-is, at least in the run of cases, irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).
535. Diver, supra note 253, at 75 (foomote omitted).
536. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 125.

537. See Bittner, supra note 138, at 92; Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 119-20.
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propriate from those in which it is not."-38 When such guidelines are
implemented, the result is their routine violation. This-imposes a heavy
cost, since officers who must routinely violate rules to get their work done
in ways that they perceive as appropriate soon "devalue rules and find
shortcuts around all of them." 539
Still, the advent of the new policing reforms suggests that modest
optimism may be warranted concerning the role that police guidelines
might play in promoting police accountability. These reforms make the
exercise of police enforcement discretion highly visible and urge its intelligent and thoughtful use in consultation with a neighborhood's residents in the amelioration of neighborhood problems. Their logic thus
pushes police managers in the direction of the ongoing and critical review of discretionary practices. "If the procedures for addressing community problems are widened and given greater visibility, policy decisions
will be aired, resulting in greater involvement of the community in these
decisions and the articulation of more precise guidance to operating police officers." 540 In addition, the promulgation of guidelines in a community policing framework does not occur in isolation, but rather as one
element in a much broader re-engineering of the police department.
The tentative moves within police departments in the direction of guiding police discretion in quality-of-life tasks may be the early signs of
54 1
greater change to come.
3. Monitoringthe Exercise ofDiscretion.- The most ardent advocates of
the new policing reforms are not dismissive of the dangers of police corruption, discrimination, and even brutality that a closer connection between police and communities may present. 542 Professor Goldstein has
cautioned that in police departments where "police corruption or misuse
of police authority is already common, it may simply not be feasible to
experiment with community policing."5S Even in police departments
with relatively good records for the control of police misconduct, there is
a heightened need for monitoring mechanisms in a community and
problem-oriented policing regime. "No matter how good the training,
how instrumental management has been in shaping the culture, and how
positive supervision has been, the circumstances of police work will continue to allow for corruption, malfeasance, and incompetence." 54 Monitoring mechanisms aim at minimizing these problems by ensuring that
538.
539.
540.
541.

Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 42, at 120.
Id. at 121.
Goldstein, supra note 18, at 47-48.
See Remington, supra note 385, at 321.

542. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 41, at 144 ("Once policing is cut loose from an
obsessive focus with enforcing law and brought back in touch with community concerns, it
is entirely possible that the corruption, discrimination, and brutality that once shamed
policing will return with new vigor.... .").
543. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 21.
544. Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 5.
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needed information is obtained from the community about the activities
of police officers on the street and the response of community residents.
Police departments have historically performed audits to monitor
the performance of line officers. Such audits, however-dealing with
matters like "the completeness of records, the cleanliness of facilities, the
presence of required equipment in vehicles, and the appearance of personnel at roll call"-have not often involved attempts to evaluate the police services actually provided to the community. 545 Some police depart-

ments are now attempting to obtain information from local
neighborhoods about police performance and the satisfaction of local
residents with their police. Citizens who have received police assistance-who have called the police to help settle a dispute or who have
been involved with police in dealing with a neighborhood problemhave been mailed questionnaires to obtain their opinions of the services
provided. 54 Door-to-door inquiries and telephone surveys have been
employed to obtain information on community perceptions of a department's new order maintenance activities.5 4 7 Police scholars have endorsed these efforts and urged their extension to reach "at-risk citizens,"
like street people and juveniles, who are often "excluded or grossly underrepresented" in many traditional surveys. 5 48 They have suggested that
minor-offense arrests be periodically sampled "by interviewing witnesses,
defendants, and other interested parties."5 49 Such efforts represent an
"after-the-fact" form of accountability and cannot replace other mechanisms of administrative control.55 0 They can help, however, to promote a
regular flow of information between the community and the police department about the order maintenance services that are being provided.
There is also a need for external monitoring mechanisms, both because such mechanisms help ensure the integrity and ongoing character
of the monitoring function and because in many communities they enhance the legitimacy of evaluations that are performed. 55 1 These external monitoring mechanisms may be emerging in different forms in many
communities today. For instance, police have increasingly come to share
responsibility with civilian bodies for the review of complaints brought
against individual police officers.5 5 2 The number of such bodies grew by
400% from 1980 to the end of 1994, an increase that some have linked to
545. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 170 (endnote omitted).
546. See Wycoff, supra note 490, at 117.

547. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 170.
548. See, e.g., Mastrofski, supra note 35, at 61.

549. See Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 6.
550. Id.
551. See Bayley, supra note 115, at 236-37 (arguing that an institution outside the
police "must be given the authority and capacity to determine whether community police
operations conform to the rule of law" as requirement for "the responsible
implementation of community policing").

552. See Bayley, supra note 68, at 91.

1997]

COURTS, COMMUNITIES, AND THE NEW POLTCING

665

the advent of community policing reforms.555 Today, a majority of big
cities have at least a hybrid complaint system in which police may investigate complaints, "but civilians sit on the board that recommends discipline."'55 4 To date, most such boards have focused narrowly on the performance of individual police officers rather than on broader questions
about the quality of police services or the overall acceptability of particular policing practices within local neighborhoods. 55 5 Police scholars,
moreover, have expressed reservation about at least some civilian review
mechanisms, noting that it is important that such mechanisms work to
strengthen rather than undercut "the traditional system for controlling
police conduct-the process whereby the chief supervises his personnel
and is held accountable for their performance." 556 The principle that
citizens should participate in reviewing complaints brought against police
officers, however, is widely accepted today and is viewed by many as a
means by which citizens can have input into "the acceptable limits of po55 7
lice practices in enforcing laws and maintaining order."
As variously constituted, these civilian oversight boards could come
to play a significant role not only in the review of individual complaints,
but in helping to evaluate the overall performance of the police department in quality-of-life policing. The review of individual complaints in
the performance of a monitoring role should aim not simply at establishing their veracity, but also at "learn[ing] what it was about police operations that antagonized people." 558 Complaints are "an invaluable source
of community feedback and information."5 59 Analysis of complaint patterns can be used to identify individual officers who generate a disproportionately large number of citizen grievances, to highlight the need for
improved training in some areas, and also to suggest the reconsideration
of some police strategies. 560 Aggressive police patrol, for instance, can
result in increased complaints from the neighborhoods in which this pa553. See Samuel Walker, Citizen Review Resource Manual 3 (1995) (noting increase
in number of civilian review mechanisms and underlining importance of positive

complaint review process in community policing era, "with its emphasis on closer
interaction between police departments and community residents"); see also David H.
Bayley, Preface to Complaints Against the Police v-vii (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed., 1991)
(noting that civilian review mechanisms have become more common in 1980s and

suggesting that civilian participation in complaints-handling process has become more
acceptable to senior police officers because it is consistent with their commitment to
community policing reforms).
554. Chevigny, supra note 407, at 88.
555. See Kelling et al., supra note 478, at 4.
556. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 174.
557. Werner E. Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of Policing.
An American Perspective, in Complaints Against the Police, supra note 553, at 259, 273;
see also Chevigny, supra note 407, at 90 (noting that "[s]ome version of civilian review of
police complaints is becoming accepted, by the public and even by police administrators").
558. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 170.
559. Chevigny, supra note 407, at 96.
560. See id. at 97-98.
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trol is pursued. Even when the police practices are themselves lawful, an
increase in citizen complaints about such practices may be an indication
that police policies or the discretionary practices that line officers have
adopted should be reexamined.
This is not to deny that complaints can be difficult to interpret. The
police department may contend, for instance, that an increase in complaints from a given neighborhood is the result of increased enforcement
in that neighborhood that is broadly acceptable, even though it produces
more civilian complaints. An external monitor, however, can serve an
important role by flagging an observed increase in complaints, especially
when there is a pattern to the situations that give rise to them. Flagging
an increase in a neighborhood's complaints prompts the police department to examine the reason for a concentration of complaint activity in
that neighborhood.5 6 1 At a minimum, the identification of such patterns
can facilitate a more open conversation within the community about the
character of local police services.
Monitoring mechanisms, whether internal or external, are no panacea for the management of police discretion. Internally-generated monitoring mechanisms can "go a long way toward filling in the police administrator on what is happening 'out there"' and may provide "the clearest
and most precise measurement of conformity with department policies
and aspirations."5 62 Such audits, however, are still being developed.
Similarly, complaints about police misconduct may be an important
source of information regarding the exercise of police discretion in communities, but they are unlikely to reveal certain serious problems, such as
police corruption. Moreover, though civilian review may develop as "an
important tool for managing the risks of dispersed police actions," 5 6 this
form of police oversight is still in its infancy. Departments may fail to
take policy guidance from review boards even when these boards are in a
position to offer it.5 6 Such boards can also come to give substantial and
unwarranted deference to police departments: "civilian investigators and
even members of police boards often are or become police buffs."5 65
Still, monitoring mechanisms represent an important source of information about the exercise of police discretion on the street and the
community's perception of the quality of police services. Mechanisms for
monitoring the quality-of-life activities of police officers are still being developed. Even the modest movement in this direction, however, suggests
a new way of thinking about community-police reciprocity that should
result in police supervisors over time becoming "more fully aware of of561. See id. at 98.
562. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 170-71.
563. Bayley, supra note 553, at x.
564. See Chevigny, supra note 407, at 98 (noting that police departments "do not
want to take policy guidance from review boards").
565. Id. at 91.
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5 66
ficers' behavior than they now are in more traditional patrol systems."
Combined with the other mechanisms of reciprocity and accountability,
monitoring mechanisms can play a significant role in promoting the success of the new policing reforms.

B. Courts and the Management of Police Discretion
As communities experiment with the new policing and as new street
law slowly emerges to authorize order maintenance tasks, what role
should courts play in the review of public order laws? The void-forvagueness doctrine, as Professor Sunstein has suggested, can be
"democracy-forcing" 567 because it requires legislatures to speak with clarity. Its reach, however, is uncertain, and the doctrine can also be
"democracy-foreclosing," to borrow his term, if courts employ it in such a
568
way as to prevent communities from regulating within a given sphere.
When reasonably specified public order laws do not appear aimed at the
exclusion of some from full participation in a community's public life,
but rather at the articulation of behavioral standards that may facilitate
the common use of public spaces, this Article has argued that courts
should not invalidate them for vagueness. This standard for the judicial
evaluation of indefinite public order laws, however, is itself indefinite; it
may not dictate results in a range of cases. So how should courts employ
the facial vagueness doctrine in the community policing era, and in the
review of public order laws?
There are a number of orienting ideas that might assist in the consideration of cases. Perhaps most importantly, however, courts might first
take seriously the arguments posed in the new policing philosophies:
that attention to the quality of life in local neighborhoods is important to
the preservation of these neighborhoods and that the protection of social
environments is a task in which police can assist. Courts do have the final
responsibility for prohibiting standardless delegations to police of the authority to control rather than police a community's public spaces. At the
same time, the void-for-vagueness doctrine can never be an adequate assurance against misuse of police discretion. Interpreted too broadly, this
doctrine might significantly impair the ability of communities to deal
with legitimate and often serious community concerns.
Many of the laws invalidated for vagueness in the 1960s and 1970s
were imprecise to some degree. The breadth of these laws, however, combined with their regulation of everyday conduct, may ultimately have
been more important to reviewing courts. A prohibition on loitering "in,
on, or adjacent to any of the streets, ways, or public places" in a community, for instance, is not particularly vague, but such a prohibition is exceedingly broad and reaches conduct in which many commonly en566. Wycoff, supra note 490, at 118.

567. See Sunstein, supra note 368, at 25.
568. See id. at 38.
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gage. 5 69 A court might well have considered these factors as indications
that the provision was not aimed at addressing legitimate community concerns but at authorizing police to prevent "undesirables" in the community from fully participating in the community's public life. Narrower
public order laws do not pose the same concerns.
Admittedly, it will not always be easy to determine whether a public
order law that is to some degree indeterminate seeks to exclude some
from full participation in public life or to preserve the quality of life in
public spaces so that everyone can enjoy them. This inquiry is necessarily
contextual and requires sensitivity to the unique circumstances in which a
public order law is to be employed. Courts might consider in these
harder cases, however, the following orienting ideas.
1. Procedure,Not Substance. - First, with regard to the narrower public order laws of the new generation, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
should be principally concerned with the clarity of law, and not with its
substantive content. Even commentators who have argued that courts
might assume a greater role in reviewing the substantive content of the
criminal law do not thereby come to the view that this substantive review
should take place in the guise of the vagueness evaluation.5 70 Rules
prohibiting sleeping in cars are not vague, however wise or ill-conceived
they might be. When such laws are invalidated for vagueness, courts confuse legislators who are attempting to draft constitutionally acceptable
statutes and ordinances. They also evade responsibility for elaborating
the underlying substantive principles that inform their decisionmaking.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine does permit courts, in the review of
indefinite laws, to invalidate problematic laws while deferring final consideration of the constitutional limits that might exist to preclude regulation
within a given sphere.5 7 1 There is a legitimate role for the doctrine to
play in this context. Courts, however, need to take into account the costs
that this form of "decisional minimalism" imposes on the regulation of
public conduct in local communities. 572 When constitutional questions
are deferred, communities do not know whether they can enact new laws.
Disparate results in similar cases discourage localities from legislating in
the area. In addition, courts have underutilized the mechanism of "as
applied" review to deal with constitutional questions that they may wish to
avoid. Such review also permits courts to resolve the immediate troubling
case, while leaving to another day the full articulation of substantive constitutional principles.
569. See State v. Aucoin, 278 A.2d 395, 396 (Me. 1971) (invalidating loitering
ordinance for vagueness).
570. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 6 (1996) ("Vagueness doctrine is importantly limited by its label:
It does not stop the government from criminalizing innocuous or protected conduct, but
only from doing so through indefinite statutes.").
571. See Sunstein, supra note 368, at 25.
572. See supra notes 368-375 and accompanying text.
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2. Reasonable Specificity, Not Unreasonable Specificity. - Next, courts
should recognize that there is a role for standards in the regulation of
street misconduct. In fact, a relentless insistence on precise rules to circumscribe police authority sometimes defeats rather than serves interests
associated with the rule of law. This is in part because broad rules
adopted to avoid vagueness may expand enforcement discretion. Thus, a
standard prohibiting unreasonable noise specifies the precise conduct
with which the community is concerned in a way that most people can
understand. In contrast, a rule specifying decibel levels and distances
from which sound should be measured could be gravely overinclusive.
Moreover, either the rule or the standard could be invoked by police in
ways calculated to harm or to benefit a neighborhood.
This suggests that courts should not insist on a greater degree of
specificity in laws regulating public conduct than they demand in many
other contexts. By requiring too much precision in such laws, courts discourage localities from attempting to regulate public spaces. Given the
mounting empirical evidence that police efforts directed at the quality of
life in public spaces may help to ameliorate disorder and to improve
neighborhood conditions, this is a bad result. Reasonably specific public
order laws should not be invalidated simply because police must exercise
judgment in their enforcement. There are mechanisms-as exercised by
reponsible mayors, city councils, civilian oversight boards, and by the police department itself-by which this judgment might be informed.
3. Reciprocity and Contextualization.- At least in those close cases that
call for the exercise of judgment courts might also consider whether a
given public order law embodies characteristics that suggest it will be employed in keeping with the new policing philosophies. Does a public order law contain features that can help ensure the reciprocity between
neighborhoods and police that is part of the new policing? Does it reflect
or promote the close, local examination of disorder problems that the
new policing philosophies imply? Reciprocity between citizens and police
and the contextualization of public order problems in a community can
themselves help constrain the potential for arbitrary enforcement. A
court might then consider whether a law reflects ideas associated with the
new policing in deciding to uphold it.
Consider the use of public nuisance law by municipalities in
California. Because police must make a showing to obtain a preliminary
injunction restraining gang conduct in a neighborhood, public nuisance
law requires police to meet community residents and to talk to them
about the problems in their neighborhood. A court presented with an
application for injunctive relief is likely to consider affidavits submitted by
residents of the neighborhood in which an alleged nuisance persists. In
evaluating the provisions of a nuisance injunction for vagueness, the
court thus does not consider language in a vacuum; the court has a more
contextualized backdrop against which to judge "not merely the degree
of indeterminacy, but also the acceptability of indeterminacy" in a partic-
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ular context.5 73 This is not to say that courts will not confront difficult
issues in reviewing such applications, not that they must not be vigilant to
ensure that the nuisance device is not improperly used. This device, however, does help ensure that problems are considered at the neighborhood level in precisely the way that the new policing philosophies imply.
4. Limited Police Authority. - Finally, courts might also consider in
close cases whether legislatures or police departments have taken reasonable steps to narrow the opportunity for arbitrary police enforcement.
These steps might take a variety of forms. The inclusion of a sunset provision in a public order law, for instance, restrains police authority by requiring that the need for such authority be reexamined after a reasonable period of time. Such a provision might bespeak a willingness on the
part of the legislature to engage in responsible oversight of the police.
Similarly, the promulgation of police guidelines reflects an effort to constrain police discretion. Publicly promulgated guidelines may attest to
the fact that police have consulted with neighborhood residents in formulating a police initiative, thus helping stimulate the community-police
reciprocity that itself helps constrain police abuse. Where guidelines
have been formulated, courts should take these guidelines into account
in considering a vagueness challenge to an underlying public order law.
There are other ways in which the concern with arbitrary enforcement might be addressed-ways that courts might also consider in the
vagueness evaluation. When legislatures provide for warning prior to citation or arrest, this fact should be considered, since it lessens to some
degree the concern with arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Such
a provision restricts formal enforcement authority to those occasions
when a person fails to comply with a police request to cease specified
behavior and at the same time makes clear that the legislature has authorized police to exercise discretion in informally resolving street order
problems. The use of civil rather than criminal sanctions in a public order law also helps constrain police authority by limiting the circumstances
in which police can invoke the harsher penalties of the criminal law.
CONCLUSION

Policing, like judging, is a complex task, and the prospects and
promise of the new policing reforms must at this juncture be deemed
uncertain. There is an intelligence to the new reforms: a more nuanced
conception of both the character of the police role and the problems that
can beset local neighborhoods. The ideas associated with community
and problem-oriented policing also come closer to capturing the empirical realities of policing than the reform era model ever could. Policing is
not the simple enforcement of law, though law is important to the police
role; policing that ignores the ebb and flow of community life does so
573. Jeffiies, supra note 211, at 196 (noting that vagueness inquiry demands
judgment about measure of statutory indefiniteness acceptable in different contexts).
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only at grave peril to both police and the people for whom they work.
But there are real and serious questions here. Can police departments
identify those among their number "inclined toward self-directed information gathering and analysis, capable of inventive planning, and motivated to work for long-range solutions," and then use such personnel in
problem solving? 574 Can departments walk the tightrope between responsiveness to community concerns and outright deterioration in the
ideal of evenhanded enforcement associated with the rule of law? "Perhaps it is better in the long run," as one scholar recently put it, "to say
that the law should be equally enforced-even though equal enforcement is often unrealistic-than to say that the law should be used by the
police to maintain order acceptable to local communities[.]" 5 75 In some
distressed neighborhoods, conditions call out for police to work with residents to alleviate problems: to help restore confidence in public spaces,
tranquility in neighborhood parks, and a secure environment in which
social, political, and economic life can flourish. But if there is promise in
these policing reforms, there is also peril.
Courts have little capacity-very little capacity-to constrain police
and to control the discretion that they inevitably exercise on streets, in
neighborhoods, in the precincts where patrol officers are given their
tours of duty, and in the administrative offices in which police enforcement policies are hammered out. The reforms of the 1960s and 1970s
established principles from which no thoughtful person now seeks retreat: that police cannot be delegated authority to maintain order as they
see fit and that rules governing the conduct of citizens on the street must
set forth intelligible limits on enforcement authority. These reforms,
however, could not eliminate the significant discretion that police have in
order maintenance tasks, nor could they promote the beneficial exercise
of that discretion in ways that might enhance rather than imperil the
public life of a community. Interpreted too broadly, the open texture of
these constitutional reforms could threaten public order by invalidating
the reasonable efforts of communities to regulate matters like unreasonable noise, aggressive panhandling, or loitering on a street comer to solicit
customers for the sale of drugs. At the same time, the reforms could not
ensure that police departments acted fairly, with restraint, and with an
abiding respect for the rights of individuals and for constitutional values.
The reforms could not solve the problem of police discretion.
Nor can neighborhoods and their police. But perhaps communities
and police departments, prompted by the problems that beset them and
the new philosophies that point in a different direction, might take up
the task-an ongoing one-of better managing police discretion. The
574. Bitmer, supra note 138, at 16 (arguing that police departments are not now
staffed by many individuals with these "interests, inclinations, and aptitudes," and
suggesting that entry into police work might one day be open only to those who have
completed postgraduate degrees).
575. Bayley, supra note 115, at 232.
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visibility of that discretion in the performance of the order maintenance
tasks that many communities are now authorizing may, itself, stimulate
movement in this direction. Legal scholars might also help, by focusing
renewed attention on what Professor Remington referred to as the "administrative law of criminal justice"-those practices adopted by police to
deal with community problems, practices that are often quite different
frgm the "law-on-the-books." 5 76 Policing on the ground is changing, as is
the character of the "street law" that police enforce (or do not). Perhaps
legal scholarship might change as well. If criminal law and procedure
scholarship, as some have contended, is a backwater removed from the
realities of social life in the round, 577 this is not because little is happening out there. There is a dense complexity to the problem of public order with which communities are now grappling and to the enduring
problem of controlling the police. Perhaps some views from the bottom
up-views that begin with the recognition that neighborhoods and police
departments will succeed or fail in their efforts to deal with local
problems at the local level, in communities and in neighborhoods, where
laws are passed and police policies are pursued-might be in order.

576. Remington, supra note 335, at 321.
577. See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal
Scholars, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1992).

